CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES THREE ITEMS ON ITS AGENDA

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held a discussion on the fifth, sixth and seventh items on its agenda: new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armaments.

China believed that preventive diplomacy ought to be carried out in arms control, while the regulation of scientific research activities should be enhanced. Belarus stated that codes of conduct to strengthen space security could be developed, as they would enhance transparency and regulate the problem of space debris. Pakistan said that the absence of common understandings on acceptable State behaviour on the use of information and communication technologies increased the risk to international peace and security.

The Russian Federation circulated an updated version of its 17 May proposal of a draft programme of work, which was hoped would allow its partners to take proactive steps towards moving the work of the Conference ahead. The United States reiterated that the Conference was not the appropriate venue to address the issue of biological and chemical terrorism. The United Kingdom clarified that the paper circulated by the Russian Federation was Russian, and not a joint British-Russian proposal.

The Conference will next meet in public on Tuesday, 21 June at 10 a.m.

Statements

China said that since the end of the Cold War, science and technology had been leaping forward at an unprecedented pace, and more countries and entities now possessed space-faring capabilities. Never before had the prospects of a much-improved human life been so promising. The development of science and technology was, nonetheless, a double-edged sword. Some countries had made cyberspace a new battleground, while others were vigorously developing outer space weapons. Killer robots had become part of the military strategies of several countries. Weapons in outer space and cyber space would change the international balance of power and upset the international strategic balance and stability. That would also lower the threshold of war and change the form of war, and exacerbate the risk of terrors attacks, while increasing the difficulty for the fight against terrorism. Such trends would endanger human survival and development and cause a series of legal and ethical issues. China believed that preventive diplomacy ought to be carried out in arms control, while the regulation of scientific research activities should be enhanced. An effective regime on non-proliferation needed to be established, and steps needed to be taken to prevent extremist and terrorist forces from acquiring and using high-risk dual-use technologies and materials. China firmly believed that to prevent was always better than to remedy, and the Conference on Disarmament had an unshrinkable responsibility in that regard. China remained committed to the cause of international arms control and disarmament, and stood ready to work with others on revitalizing the work of the Conference.

Belarus believed that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was one of the highest priorities. Regulating activities of States in the outer space law was the responsibility of the international community. Codes of conduct to strengthen space security could be developed, as they would enhance transparency and regulate the problem of space debris. Codes of conduct, at the same time, were not legally binding documents, so they needed not be opposed. Belarus said that the Russian-Chinese proposal provided a good ground for regulating the mentioned issues in the space law. The obligations of Member States on assessing the lawfulness of new types of weapons had to be strictly complied with. Belarus consistently supported an international legal ban on the development of new weapons and systems of mass destruction, which was becoming an ever more relevant issue. Keeping the items of comprehensive disarmament and transparency in armaments on the agenda of the Conference was wise, and the Conference could make a contribution in that regard, such as by filling in the legal gaps of chemical and biological weapons into the hands of terrorists.

Pakistan stated that the absence of common understandings on acceptable State behaviour with regard to the use of information and communication technologies increased the risk to international peace and security. The application of norms derived from the existing international law relevant to the use of information and communication technologies by States was an essential measure to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability. The role of international cooperation and assistance in enabling States to secure such technologies was essential. Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems were rightly described as the next revolution in military affairs, which could fundamentally change the nature of war. They were unethical because there was no longer a human in the loop and the power to make life and death decisions was delegated to machines. Monopolies over such technologies would not last forever, and such weapons could also proliferate to non-State actors with unimaginable consequences. The further development and use of those weapon systems had to be pre-emptively banned, and the States currently developing such weapons should place an immediate moratorium on their production and use. Pakistan also stood ready to discuss destabilizing weapon systems such as anti-ballistic missiles, as well as questions of chemical and biological terrorism, including negotiations on a legally binding convention.

Russian Federation said that, under the agenda item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it had proposed developing a comprehensive conference on the prevention of chemical and biological terrorism. Appreciation was expressed to those delegations who had seen the value of the Russian proposal, which would help bring the Conference back to its negotiating mandate. The Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, could deal with any issue related to disarmament. An anti-terrorist convention would not undermine anyone’s security. In addition to that, the Russian Federation proposed continuation of work on other issues, balancing negotiating and discussions within the Conference. The 17 May proposal had combined the Russian and the British proposals, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive and balanced programme of work which could be accepted by consensus. There was some movement towards compromise. Russia was ready to modify the informal document of 17 May, and could replace the term “negotiations” with “developing elements”. Today, Russia circulated an updated version of its proposal, which was hoped would allow its partners to take proactive steps towards moving the work of the Conference ahead.

United States said that there was no difference between Washington and Moscow vis-à-vis biological and chemical terrorism, but the Conference was not the appropriate venue to address that issue. Robust and multilateral tools already existing within the international framework could easily be used. In 2015, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had established a working group on non-State actors; that mechanism could take immediate steps to address the issue in question. Numerous international agreements and mechanisms were already in place and were relevant to the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. Those mechanisms should be enhanced, and critical national capacities to detect and deter such actions ought to be further developed.

United Kingdom clarified that the paper circulated by the Russian Federation was Russian, and not a joint British-Russian proposal.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC16/027E