CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT OPENS SECOND PART OF ITS 2016 SESSION

The Conference on Disarmament this morning opened the second part of its 2016 session by hearing statements by Syed Tariq Fatemi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, and Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Mr. Fatemi said that any treaty that did not address the global and regional asymmetries in fissile material stocks would adversely affect Pakistan’s vital security interests. A cut-off only treaty, without the inclusion of stocks, would merely be a partial non-proliferation instrument and make no contribution to nuclear disarmament. In the absence of consensus on the commencement of negotiations on the Conference’s agenda, the Conference could undertake structured informal discussions.

Mr. Zerbo stated that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had 183 States Signatories, 164 of whom had ratified it. Ratifications by eight remaining countries listed in Annex 2 were still needed before the nuclear test ban was a legal reality. He stressed the importance of the value already created: an almost complete end to nuclear tests and a whole range of civil and scientific applications resulting from the monitoring data.

Ambassador Tehmina Janjua of Pakistan, President of the Conference, informed that at this stage, no concrete progress on the programme of work could be reported, and the consultations were continuing.

Russia stated that the existing international legal infrastructure on combatting biological and chemical terrorism was inadequate, and distributed an informal proposal on a draft decision of the Conference for the establishment of a programme of work.

Malaysia, on behalf of the Group of 21, said that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and reiterated that outer space and other celestial bodies had to be used, explored and utilized for the benefit and interest of all humankind in a spirit of cooperation. The Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, said that the European Union had adopted an action plan to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on its twentieth anniversary and reiterated its call on all States that had not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Cuba said it would continue to press for issues of nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. Guatemala, on behalf of the Informal Group of Observer States, said that the expansion of the Conference was of essential importance and a way to improve the existing disarmament machinery. China reiterated its support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and was ready to play an active role on the early entry into force of the Treaty. Venezuela stressed the value of multilateralism and said that it was a collective responsibility to negotiate documents on eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Belarus reiterated its support for the proposal by the Russian Federation, which would help expand the scope of future international treaties.

The United States said it believed that Russia had not been able to convince a number of States that there was a legal gap or that the Conference was the best venue to discuss issues of biological and chemical terrorism. The United Kingdom thanked Russia for the informal draft circulated this morning, which merged elements of the United Kingdom’s own proposal. Italy opined that a new convention on biological and chemical terrorism could be a relevant tool to strengthen judicial cooperation among States and could complement the existing international legal regime.

Myanmar said it believed that there were elements in the Russian proposal which could serve as a starting point for future negotiations on the matter of chemical and biological terrorism. Turkey, which had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2001, said it actively encouraged the remaining Annex 2 countries to ratify the Treaty. Kazakhstan said it supported conducting negotiations on the Russian draft and welcomed Russia’s proposal on establishing two working groups.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stressed that it would not use its nuclear weapons unless its sovereignty had been threatened first. India said it remained ready for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, and supported Russia’s draft proposal which included bioterrorism. France said it was committed to a progressive approach on nuclear disarmament, which was anchored in a strategic context, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was one of its priorities.

The Conference will hold its next public plenary on Tuesday, 24 May at 10 a.m.

Statements

SYED TARIQ FATEMI, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, said that many interesting and innovative proposals were on the table of the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan remained committed to the Conference’s efficient functioning for further progress on nuclear disarmament, which was its raison d’être. It was unrealistic to aspire for absolute security and unrestrained freedom of action for oneself while expecting others to compromise on their peaceful existence by circumscribing their legitimate security interests. Genuine progress could be possible only on the basis of cooperative and non-discriminatory approaches that respected the right of all States to live in peace. The debate on nuclear disarmament should not be framed under an exclusively humanitarian paradigm. Addressing the security concerns of States was a paramount prerequisite for nuclear disarmament.

After Pakistan’s security had been qualitatively challenged by the introduction of nuclear weapons in its neighbourhood, it had been left with no option but to follow suit, in order to restore strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s conduct continued to be defined by restraint and responsibility, and its proposal for the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime remained on the table. Strategic stability in South Asia had been negatively impacted by discriminatory approaches and deviation from established non-proliferation norms. It was essential for the international community to adopt an approach to the region which was even-handed and criteria-based rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations of political expediency. Mr. Fatemi emphasized that Pakistan had a long history of support and activism on the issue of negative security assurances. The latest General Assembly resolution on that issue – 70/25 – had been adopted without a single vote against in 2015.

Pakistan also supported the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The country also stood ready to negotiate legally binding instruments in the Conference on other contemporary issues that were of a direct concern to international peace and security, which included cyber security, lethal autonomous weapons systems, chemical terrorism, etc. A treaty that did not address the global and regional asymmetries in fissile material stocks would adversely affect Pakistan’s vital security interests. A cut-off only treaty, without the inclusion of stocks, would merely be a partial non-proliferation instrument and make no contribution to nuclear disarmament; such a treaty, therefore, was not acceptable to Pakistan. In the absence of consensus on the commencement of negotiations on the Conference’s agenda, the Conference could undertake structured informal discussions. Informal in-depth discussions had been of great value in 2014 and 2015, stressed Mr. Fatemi, and Pakistan would continue to engage constructively in the work of the Conference.

LASSINA ZERBO, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), stated that it was in the Conference, almost 20 years earlier, that the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been concluded. The conclusion of negotiations and the adoption of the Treaty by the General Assembly had been historic moments and outstanding achievements. From 1994 to 1996, the Conference had created a disarmament and non-proliferation instrument that was unprecedented in history. It had created a legitimate and non-discriminatory means of banning, detecting and monitoring signs of nuclear explosions. At the same time, the Conference, which remained a rich resource difficult to replicate elsewhere, had been unable to fulfil its important mandate for nearly 20 years. Trust and confidence were the key elements in order to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was paramount to maintain and secure the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its entire web of responsibilities. Recent history, for example in Syria and Iran, had shown that progress in disarmament was possible.

On the twentieth anniversary of the CTBT, the word “celebration” ought to be avoided as it was the twentieth year of the Treaty not being in force. Hence, it was a time for action. The Treaty had 183 States Signatories, 164 of whom had ratified it. Ratifications by eight remaining countries listed in Annex 2 were still needed before the nuclear test ban was a legal reality. The CTBTO’s on-site inspection capabilities had reached a high level of operational readiness. The added value of its International Monitoring System had been demonstrated through the provision of data for tsunami early warning and in the response to the tragic events in Fukushima in 2011. Mr. Zerbo stressed the importance of the value already created: an almost complete end to nuclear tests and a whole range of civil and scientific applications resulting from the monitoring data.

While “North Korea” remained the only country to have conducted nuclear tests this century, efforts should continue to at least bring the country towards a moratorium on nuclear testing. Engagement should be promoted over isolation. Potential for progress also existed in the Middle East, where Egypt, Iran and Israel were yet to complete their ratification procedures. A nuclear-test-free zone in the region could be a building block towards the establishment of the weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone. In South Asia, India and Pakistan needed to sign and ratify the CTBT. China and the United States, both signatories, were also yet to ratify the Treaty. With adequate trust and confidence, multilateralism could be the most effective tool for the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Action on the Treaty provided an excellent opportunity to overcome the existing hurdles.

AMBASSADOR TEHMINA JANJUA of Pakistan, President of the Conference, provided a brief update on the informal consultations during the inter-sessional period. At this stage, no concrete progress could be reported, and the consultations were continuing. The President would continue to be guided by Member States in the process, all with the goal of establishing consensus.

Russian Federation said that the reasons for the standstill in the Conference were related to specificities in the approaches of Member States, which had effectively atrophied the body. Russia believed that the deadlock could be broken by offering a new item to the agenda, which was why Russia had introduced a proposal to discuss a treaty to combat chemical and biological terrorism. Russia was ready to temporarily not insist on its national priorities, including the non-placement of weapons in outer space. Most Conference members either supported Russia’s proposal or were ready to join consensus if one was to emerge. The existing international legal infrastructure on combatting biological and chemical terrorism was inadequate; filling in the gap related to taking action in conflict situations would by itself be an important step. The international prohibition on the use of biological weapons was not applicable to non-State actors, which was another glaring gap, stressed the Russian Federation. Security Council resolution 1540 was not in essence a non-proliferation and anti-terrorism text and did not provide for mandatory inspection missions.

Combatting terrorism in the United Nations was dealt with by different bodies. Russia was proposing a tested and more democratic path, that of reaching an agreement through negotiations. What was preventing the Conference from developing a text on combatting biological and chemical terrorism? The question was also asked on what an alternative to the Russian proposal would be – would it mean continuing fruitless consultations ad infinitum until the Conference was no longer needed? Russia was hoping to prepare and present an updated version of the draft text, covering both chemical and biological aspects, by the beginning of June. Russia also distributed an informal proposal on a draft decision of the Conference for the establishment of a programme of work.

Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, stressed that the highest priority on the Conference’s agenda was nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons existed, the risk of their use and proliferation would remain. The Group welcomed the formal proclamation, for the first time in history, of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, which would hopefully be followed by other similar proclamations around the world. Deep concern was reiterated over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The Group fully supported the goals of the General Assembly resolution 70/34 and welcomed the decision to convene, no later than 2018, a high-level conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made. The Group of 21 reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The importance of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation was reaffirmed. The Group of 21 stressed the need for Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without further delay and to place all of its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Malaysia, on behalf of the Group of 21, reiterated that outer space and other celestial bodies had to be used, explored and utilized for the benefit and interest of all humankind in a spirit of cooperation. All States with major space capabilities had a special responsibility to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space. It was paramount that States complied with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space had assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter further militarization of outer space, or prevent its weaponization. The Conference had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement in that regard and should thus establish a working group as early as possible during the 2016 session. The Group welcomed the updated draft treaty text submitted by the Russian Federation and China, which was a good basis for discussions towards adopting an international binding instrument.

Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, said that all its 28 Member States had signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The European Union was committed to strengthening the verification regime and encouraged all States to put into operation International Monitoring System stations. The European Union and its Member States were amongst the most significant financial contributors to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had highlighted the importance of the Treaty and the necessity of its prompt entry into force. The European Union had adopted an action plan to promote the Treaty on its twentieth anniversary and reiterated its call on all States that had not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Cuba stated that it was important that the Conference adopted a programme of work which was balanced and dealt with nuclear disarmament. Cuba would continue to press for issues of nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. Speaking of the Russian proposal, Cuba supported looking into the initiative and was ready to have timely consultations with Russia and other States. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to address various issues related to disarmament. Whatever could break the current deadlock ought to be actively supported.

Guatemala, on behalf of the Informal Group of Observer States, said that the group had cross-regional membership and was ready for a constructive engagement with the Conference. The expansion of the Conference was of essential importance and a way to improve the existing disarmament machinery. The Group was concerned about the long-lasting deadlock, which was why the disarmament machinery had to be looked into. Universality, transparency and multilateralism were principles which the Conference had to respect. In the absence of an imminent breakthrough, an enlargement should be considered a matter of urgency. The position of a special coordinator of enlargement should be re-established and made permanent.

China expressed appreciation for the Pakistani Presidency’s efforts to conduct consultations with the view of agreeing on a programme of work. China was convinced that the important statement by the Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs would help the Conference break the deadlock. China reiterated its support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and was ready to play an active role on the early entry into force of the Treaty. China had taken note of the fact that Russia had circulated a new food-for-thought document on an international agreement on combatting biological and chemical terrorism, which had not yet been dealt with comprehensively in international law. Biological terrorist attacks represented a realistic risk which had to be addressed. The Conference could break out of its deadlock by looking into the Russian initiative.

Venezuela said it was committed to cooperating with others on moving the work of the Conference forward, and was supportive of Pakistan’s efforts in that regard. The Conference was an irreplaceable forum and a key component of the multilateral system, which had to win back its mission. Venezuela stressed the value of multilateralism. The overriding aim was to strengthen the Conference; it was a collective responsibility to negotiate documents on eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

Belarus hoped that the joint efforts would allow for the adoption of a programme of work. The renewal of the substantive work of the Conference as a unique mechanism for producing legally binding rules of behaviour on international security was necessary. Belarus reiterated its support for the proposal by the Russian Federation. That would help expand the scope of future international treaties and the Conference should be chosen as the best platform for those negotiations, thanks to its institutional memory, and financial and human resources. The Conference worked for about six months a year and had six substantive issues on its agenda; working in an integrated manner on combatting biological and chemical terrorism was chiefly possible within this forum.

United States expressed disappointment that the President’s consultations had not led to a concrete outcome. Russia had not been able to convince a number of States that there was a legal gap or that the Conference was the best venue to discuss issues of biological and chemical terrorism. A number of other bodies, including Committee 1540, already existed. Given that there was no consensus emerging on its proposal, would Russia continue to insist that action be taken on it before any other items could be discussed?

United Kingdom thanked Russia for the informal draft circulated this morning, which merged elements of the United Kingdom’s own proposal. Russia’s draft would be given due consideration. It was reminded that in 2015, the United Kingdom had, under the existing convention, prosecuted two private individuals for trying to acquire biological weapons.

Italy appreciated that Russia had widened the scope of its proposal to include the acts of biological terrorism. The proposal addressed a real and topical issue, as the threat of chemical and biological terrorism affected all States. It was welcome that attention was being drawn to that subject. A new convention could be a relevant tool to strengthen judicial cooperation among States and could complement the existing international legal regime. Italy acknowledged that legal gaps currently existed in combatting biological and chemical terrorism. Italy’s preference would be to go through the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. A fissile material treaty remained a priority for Italy.

Myanmar believed that there were elements in the Russian proposal which could serve as a starting point for future negotiations on the matter of chemical and biological terrorism. Should there be a consensus to move forward discussions in that regard, Myanmar would be glad to actively contribute.

Turkey believed that the Conference, as a unique platform, bore special responsibility in the field of disarmament, and had capacities to take the work forward. It was high time that a global prohibition on nuclear testing was incorporated into a legally binding instrument. Turkey, which had ratified the Treaty in 2001, actively supported efforts to encourage the remaining Annex 2 countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Kazakhstan stated that nuclear disarmament remained a priority for the Kazakh delegation in the Conference. Taking into account the existing legal gaps on dealing with biological and chemical terrorism, Kazakhstan supported conducting negotiations on the Russian draft and welcomed Russia’s proposal on establishing two working groups.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that it needed to counter nuclear threats posed by hostile forces. As regards the moratorium, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea put forward last year a proposal that it would put a moratorium on its nuclear tests in return for the United States halt to the joint war drills, but this proposal became no longer valid as the United States turned it down. If threats to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were eliminated, there would be a path for a way forward. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stressed that it would not use its nuclear weapons unless its sovereignty had been threatened first.

India recalled that the programme of work had last been adopted by consensus in 2008. Since then, the consensus had been blocked by citing unconvincing reasons. India remained ready for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty. India had continuously raised the issue of international terrorism and took note of the Russian proposal and subsequent statements. India supported the proposal, which included bioterrorism. India would also consider today’s proposal by Russia, which included the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament.

United States said that if “North Korea” were to end its isolation, it would need to respect its international obligations. It would need to denounce its nuclear activities and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The United States did not recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon State.

Republic of Korea stated that a meaningful dialogue on the Korean Peninsula would start when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stopped its nuclear activities and threats in a verifiable and irreversible manner. There seemed to be no change in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s message. No rights could emanate out of illegal acts.

France said it was committed to a progressive approach on nuclear disarmament, which was anchored in a strategic context. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was thus one of France’s priorities. The relevance of the Treaty remained unchanged since 1996. France recognized the technical maturity of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its verification regime. Its capacity had to be preserved and further developed. Annex 2 States needed to be encouraged to ratify the Treaty. The complete prohibition of nuclear tests was a key goal for all those aspiring for nuclear disarmament.

Russian Federation believed that the Russian proposal did have a chance of succeeding. The existing problems could not be resolved under resolution 1540; under international law there was no criminalization of acts of biological terrorism, which could not be developed through Security Council resolutions. After expanding the scope of the Russian proposal to include biological weapons as well, there was no longer ground to hold negotiations at The Hague. Why were there efforts to move negotiations away from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva? In the draft convention, all acts of chemical and biological terrorism would be criminalized, explained Russia. The draft proposal would undoubtedly add value to the existing legal framework, and it was unreasonable that some delegations, including the United States, were not willing to support the process. Russia hoped that in 2016 the Conference would manage to agree on a programme of work, which would include negotiations. Russia was aiming for rejuvenating and moving forward the Conference.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that dialogue should be based on mutual respect and equality of the parties. It would not hold dialogue under the pressure of sanctions or unilateral threats.

United States said that it was not incumbent on Member States of the Conference to explain why they did not support certain proposals. The United States was prepared to listen, but Russia did not like what the United States and others were pointing out about the Russian proposal. It was not fair to say that the United States was not ready to combat terrorism; it preferred to do so through the existing avenues. As it was clear that there was no consensus on the Russia proposal, why not allow discussions to go forward on other issues?

Russian Federation asked the United States to explain on which points in the Conference there was consensus. Reasons should be provided why certain delegations were not supporting the proposal. Russia could not support the proposal on the fissile material treaty because it would go away from the Shannon Mandate.

United States responded that there were two proposals – Nigeria’s and United Kingdom’s – which had given hope that there was potential for consensus until the Russian proposal on chemical terrorism had come through at a late point.

United Kingdom understood, on the basis of numerous consultations, and prior to the High-Level Segment of the Conference, that its proposal had been close to gaining consensus. The United Kingdom welcomed the informal Russian proposal of today.

Russian Federation said it had proposed four discussion mandates on four issues on the Conference’s agenda. A similar proposal had been made by the earlier Nigerian Presidency, which Russia, in principle, was ready to consider. A programme of work with a discussion mandate could keep the Conference alive. Russia would prefer a programme of work which would include negotiations. As for the British proposal, Russia was not happy that it had not been balanced; a combination of the British and Russian initiatives was presented in today’s draft presented by the Russian Federation.

United States said that the Russian draft from today did not address a number of concerns expressed by Member States in the Conference. Would Russia give a chance to either Nigerian or British proposals, which seemed to be closer to consensus.

Russian Federation stressed that, if a consensus seemed to be forming around the Nigerian proposal, Russia would look into it, with certain things modified. The British proposal was unbalanced. Would the United States be ready to support the more balanced document presented by the Russian Federation this morning, and if not, why?

United States stated that most Member States had just seen the most recent Russian proposal. The United States was not going to explain what was or was not in the American national interest. Russia still had a lot of convincing to do on its proposals.

Russian Federation said that no delegation had ever expressed concerns over the Russian initiative, but rather doubts. No concrete concerns had yet been heard.

AMBASSADOR TEHMINA JANJUA of Pakistan, President of the Conference, said that a new Russian draft proposal was now on the table and would be considered in the coming period.


For use of the information media; not an official record

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