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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN IMPACT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MODEL CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FISSILE MATERIALS CUT-OFF TREATY
The Conference on Disarmament today held two plenary meetings, one in the morning and another in the afternoon, in which it conducted interactive debates on the issues of humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The Conference also discussed other items of the agenda, including the non-placement of nuclear weapons in the outer space introduced by the Delegation of the Russian Federation.
The President of the Conference, Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco of Mexico, said that the objective of this plenary meeting was to give an opportunity to Member and Observer States to discuss specific issues which had bearing on the agenda and the beginning of the negotiations.
Austria briefed the delegates about the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, whose fact-based discussions, findings and compelling evidence should provide impetus and focus for the deliberations of this body. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there remained a possibility of an explosion and this risk was unacceptable; the only assurance against this risk was the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Costa Rica presented a draft Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons, which prohibited the development, production, possession, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. States had the responsibility to destroy their nuclear weapons in phases, adopt the necessary legislative measures to comply with the obligations and create national authority responsible for the implementation.
France said that the priority was to start the negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which was the international community’s long-standing commitment, and had to be part of a realistic approach, based on concrete and progressive actions. The central obligation of an FMCT had to be a halt to fissile material production for nuclear weapon purposes.
United States said that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty represented the next logical and necessary step in creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. There was no other disarmament measure for which the groundwork had been better prepared and there was no technical obstacle to the commencement of negotiations. The goal was a non-discriminatory treaty that halted the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and was internationally verifiable.
The following delegations took the floor in the deliberations in the morning: Austria, Canada, Brazil, Australia, Belarus, India, Costa Rica, Chile, United Kingdom, Algeria, France, United States, Spain, Pakistan, Russia, China and Kazakhstan.
Germany, Ireland and Russian Federation spoke addressed specific agenda items and their relationship with a Programme of Work. In its statement, the Russian Federation reiterated the need for immediate negotiations on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space based on the revised draft treaty it had, together with China, submitted to the Conference last yearThe Conference on Disarmament will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 29 January, to take action on the draft programme of work for the 2015 session.
Opening remarks
JORGE LOMONACO (Mexico), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that the objective of this plenary meeting was to give an opportunity to Member and Observer States to discuss specific issues that had bearing on the agenda and the beginning of the negotiations.
ELISSA GOLDBERG, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament, said in her farewell address to the Conference that Canada continued to study the draft programme of work and welcomed the underpinning commitment to return this body to substantive work. The Conference had become a world of absolutes and this had to be changed; one such absolute was the conviction that own policy positions were sacrosanct while those of others were wrong or suspect of ulterior motives. The Conference was the embodiment of the trust deficit which currently existed in multilateral disarmament more broadly, and which, if not effectively reversed or redressed, would cause irreparable harm to the ability to find cooperative solutions to pressing global challenges. While there were many practical initiatives that could be taken to rebuild trust among States, the first step was dialogue and understanding. Another absolute to overcome was the belief that progress on one issue would mean abandoning or scarifying all others. A move forward in one area could revive this body. There existed another absolute in the Conference that had to be overcome, and that was the belief that only one vision of a treaty could be negotiated. Rules of Procedures should be changed; this was a tool of the Conference which facilitated negotiations on most important issues related to international peace and security. The Conference had to look into regional groupings and the rotational presidency; one month mandate was not long enough to allow the President to undertake consultations, build bridges and provide direction to the organization.
THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Introduction
Austria spoke about the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which had taken place on 8 and 9 December 2014 and said that its fact-based discussion, findings and compelling evidence should provide impetus and focus for the deliberations of this body. The sense of urgency that was evident in the presentations, discussions and statements in Vienna and two previous conferences in Oslo and Nayarit made the protracted inability of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil the mandate even more striking. The Chair’s Summary contained several key conclusions that had emerged from the humanitarian initiative of the previous three years, including that the regional and global consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation could threaten the survival of humankind. The scope, scale and interrelationship of the humanitarian consequences caused by nuclear weapon detonations were catastrophic and more complex than commonly understood. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there remained a possibility of a nuclear weapon explosion and this risk was unacceptable; the dangers of access to nuclear weapons and related materials by non-State actors, particularly terrorist groups, persisted. The risk of nuclear weapon use was real; opportunities to reduce risk ought to be taken now, but the only assurance against the risk of nuclear weapon detonation was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. No state or international body could address in an adequate manner the immediate humanitarian emergency or long-term consequences caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in a populated area, nor provide adequate assistance for those affected; such capacity was unlikely ever to exist.
Austria stressed that there was no comprehensive legal norm universally prohibiting possession, transfer, production and use, and there was a doubt that those weapons could ever be used in conformity with international humanitarian law. Suffering caused by nuclear weapons use was not only a legal matter, but it also necessitated moral appraisal. The catastrophic consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation event and the risks associated with the mere existence of those weapons raised profound ethical and moral questions on a level transcending legal discussions and interpretations. Austria had issued a national pledge which included the commitment to present the compelling evidence to the relevant fora, in particular the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the United Nations framework. It also called on State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to identify and pursue effective measures to fulfil the legal gap in the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.
Discussion
Brazil, which had participated in the conference in Vienna, fully endorsed its conclusions and asked how the linkages could be established between those conclusions and the 2015 programme of work.
JORGE LOMONACO (Mexico), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that the programme of work had to take into account conclusions of all three conferences on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and that the outcomes should feed into the diplomatic process.
Austria said that the next key opportunity to raise humanitarian points and seek answers to those was the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The key findings that had emerged over the previous few years from the humanitarian initiative should inform all fora, as well as the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
Australia reflected on the success of the Vienna Conference which gathered a very diverse group of States and its summary had reflected all the voices expressed at that forum. It was a challenge for both the Conference on Disarmament and the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT Review Conference) to find a way how to unite and make progress.
Belarus asked about the plans of Austria and friendly nations in case no consensus would be reached during the NPT Review Conference on the issues of humanitarian impact.
India had participated in the three Conferences on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon and said that the concern of the threat to the humankind in case of nuclear weapon detonation was not a new concern; it had been there since the dawn of nuclear weapons. The nuclear danger had to be progressively reduced and the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism had to be addressed, said India, stressing that the appropriate forum in which those issues should be addressed was the Conference on Disarmament. There existed a gap between advocacy and commitment, work and action; India hoped that Vienna Conference would foster the dialogue in that regard.
Costa Rica thanked Austria for the submission of the outcomes of the conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the commitment and political leadership shown in organizing this Conference. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States had reaffirmed in 2013 the need to make progress towards nuclear disarmament and achieving total elimination of nuclear weapons, while an internationally binding instrument prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons should be negotiated. The Heads of States and Governments of Latin American and Caribbean States would approve a declaration on the topic the following day.
Chile said the draft declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Latin American and Caribbean States, which would be approved the following day, would fully support Vienna Conference and its outcomes.
Mexico thanked Costa Rica and Chile and said that the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was the first region that would endorse the Austrian pledge at its Summit, which was currently taking place in Costa Rica.
Concluding remarks
Austria thanked the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States for the endorsement of the pledge and said, in an answer to the question posed by Belarus, that Austria would not prejudge a negative outcome of the NPT Review Conference. The humanitarian initiative was a part of the genetic code of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and its raison d’etre. Austria considered that there would be a genuine effort by everyone to give answers to those findings that had emerged in the recent years on the questions of humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. It was the existence and the possession of nuclear weapons that was the problem, so their elimination was what Austria aimed for. Austria was approaching the NPT Review Conference with the mindset of achieving a strong outcome that would give answers to the important information that came out from the humanitarian initiative.
MODEL CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Introduction
Costa Rica said that in 2007, Costa Rica and Malaysia had submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal for the Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons, with the view of contributing to the discussion on the progressive elimination of such weaponry. The Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons prohibited development, production, possession, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It placed an obligation on States to destroy their nuclear weapons in phases and to declare all nuclear weapons, installations and nuclear delivery systems that they possessed or controlled. The Convention envisaged several stages of implementation and provided protection for those who reported violations of its provisions, including the asylum. State parties needed to adopt necessary legislative measures to comply with the obligations, create national authority responsible for the implementation of the Convention in the country.
The Convention also established rights and responsibilities of persons and States and prohibited the production of all fissile and fissionable materials that could be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Disputes could be brought before the International Court of Justice, while gradual response for non-compliance with decisions would be established. The Convention did not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and proposed an Optional Protocol which would establish an assistance programme for the State parties which chose not to develop nuclear energy or to phase out their programs of nuclear energy. Twenty years earlier, the International Court of Justice had pointed out the obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Discussion
Brazil said that the proposal of the Model Convention was realistic and that it should receive utmost and serious consideration and attention. Recalling the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brazil said that nobody ever thought that it would fall, and that the Model Convention was an occasion to think along those lines.
India believed that the Convention contained certain basic principles which met India’s support, such as non-discrimination and verification and others. The Conference on Disarmament was the forum in which the Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons should be negotiated and that should be done under the agenda item 1. Taking measures to prevent nuclear war which was not mutually exclusive with eliminating nuclear weapons; efforts should be taken in parallel and in a mutually enforcing manner.
United Kingdom agreed on disastrous consequences of humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and said that the utmost importance had to be given to preventing the use of nuclear weapons and keeping nuclear weapons secure. United Kingdom agreed that the goal of a world without nuclear weapons should be pursued and said that the declaratory ban on nuclear weapons would jeopardise regional stability. A step-by-step approach to disarmament was the only way to assure both disarmament and global and regional stability; the stockpiles of a number of nuclear States, including the United Kingdom, had already been significantly reduced, and further reductions were planned.
Algeria said that an assertion that nuclear weapons presented risk only when they were not properly secured went against common sense, as did the belief that nuclear weapons assured regional stability. If nuclear weapons were indeed a guarantee of stability, why they were then not given to everyone?
Concluding remarks
Costa Rica thanked delegates for their questions and comments and said that the idea was to undertake negotiations leading to a legally binding instrument that would eliminate nuclear weapons. The time was ripe and there existed a moral, legal and political imperative to start moving into the negotiating process. The process of technological innovation had to keep in line with security doctrines and there was a need to move decisively to uphold the moral imperative and provide the future generations with a legal platform for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
FISSILE MATERIALS CUT-OFF TREATY
Introduction
France said that a priority was the start of negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which was the international community’s long-standing commitment. The negotiation on the FMCT was in line with keeping the world free of nuclear weapons on the principle of the undiminished security for all. This had to be part of a realistic approach, based on concrete and progressive actions. Because the aim of the FMCT was to become a universal treaty and contribute to nuclear disarmament and armed control, it was imperative for all nuclear States to join the treaty and actively implement it. The central obligation of the FCMT had to be a halt to fissile material production for nuclear weapon purposes; existing stockpiles would be excluded from the scope of the treaty.
The treaty should cover only the fissile unirradiated direct use materials and should not prohibit the production of fissile materials for civilian use or for non-explosive military use. The concept of irreversibility was key to the FMCT, while its implementation could not be envisaged without establishment of a verification system. Turning to the prospects of negotiating the FCMT, France said that all States possessing nuclear weapons today had to be involved, while the negotiations had to be conducted on the rule of consensus and take into consideration national security interests. More than ever, the negotiations of the FMCT were within reach, which was why it should be considered a priority in 2015.
United States was ready to begin the negotiation on the FCMT, the next logical and necessary step in creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons. It had been frustrating to watch the Conference on Disarmament stay deadlocked over this issue, as the negotiation of the FMCT was an essential prerequisite for global nuclear disarmament. The priority goal of nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without taking the first step of capping fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons.
United States stressed that there was no other disarmament measure for which the groundwork had been better prepared and that there was no technical obstacle to the commencement of negotiations, which would need to address the definition(s), scope and verification arrangements for the FMCT. The goal was a non-discriminatory treaty that halted the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and was internationally verifiable. The verification system of the FMCT had to be spelled out in the treaty and tied closely to the basic undertakings of the treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency was best suited to carry out monitoring and inspections. Concerning the scope of the treaty, the United States said that it should cover only new production of fissile materials, while existing stockpiles should be dealt with separately, through other agreements or voluntary measures.
Discussion
Belarus supported the idea of verification under the proposed treaty and said that it might be useful to call upon interested delegations to develop a paper that would clarify approaches and reflect their positions and use.
India fully supported the early commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament which would include the negotiation on theFMCT. India supported the negotiations on this treaty because it was compatible with its commitment to nuclear disarmament and would contribute to the negotiation on a global nuclear ban treaty. India considered the Conference on Disarmament as the world’s single multilateral disarmament forum and hoped that the able leadership of its President would enable it to commence negotiations early. Progressive restrains on the use of nuclear weapons furthered the objective of nuclear disarmament and paved the way to step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, including restrains on possession.
Spain said that there was an urgent need to cut of fissile materials before attempting to eliminate nuclear weapons, and this should be the greatest priority for the Conference on Disarmament.
Chile stressed that nuclear disarmament was a political issue and not only a military one, and the aim had to be to provide security guarantees to all and not just a few.
Pakistan said that the arguments and the rational on the FMCT expressed by France and the United States were well known. Pakistan could not join the start negotiations on a treaty that only addressed future production of fissile materials, because it had distinctive national security disadvantages for Pakistan. The treaty had to address the existing asymmetries and a discriminatory approach would not work. The new negotiating mandate had to be consistent with the interests of all members of the Conference on Disarmament, which had to be addressed before the start of negotiations. Besides nuclear disarmament, Pakistan was ready to join the negotiations on other issues. It was not a secret that the most ardent supporters of the FMCT were States which already had large stockpiles of fissile materials.
Australia said that the Conference on Disarmament had an obligation to seize the opportunity offered by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE).
United Kingdom said that the General Assembly resolution establishing the Group of Governmental Experts was not divisive, as it had been adopted by 168 States.
Canada agreed with the United Kingdom that the resolution establishing the Group of Governmental Experts was not divisive, and hoped that Pakistan would reflect openly on the forthcoming GGE report.
Belarus said that the Conference on Disarmament was a multilateral negotiating body which had to respect the position of all its members and agreed with Pakistan in that the General Assembly resolution on GGE had been adopted very hastily. Any discussion on the FMCT within a small group of experts from 25 countries was a step backwards in the discussion on fissile materials which had been discussed for a long time. At this stage, the FMCT should be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament.
Algeria said that a cut-off treaty for the production of fissile materials was not a new issue and that it should also encompass the existing stockpiles.
Russia asked when other agenda items would be addressed.
Concluding remarks
France said that there was considerable interest in the subject among the delegates, which was understandable because it represented a concrete measure. To Belarus, France said that a document as proposed by the delegate already existed. Regarding the question of stockpiles, there was a series of more complex questions and no clear divide or split; there was the issue of past production, both for civilian and military purposes, the issue of the materials that was already in weapons, and the issue of non-operational weapons. The core of the treaty was a ban and verification system, and it was not worth blocking the treaty on one issue. Once actual negotiations started, solutions would be found; divisions were not insurmountable and this was how the Conference should proceed.
Algeria agreed that stockpiles were a complex issue and stressed that before the beginning of negotiations, principles had to be agreed on, while technical issues would be resolved during negotiations. Algeria asked about the verification system proposed by France.
France supported a verification mechanism which would be effective and ensured that there was no diversion. The thrust of the verification had to focus primarily on enrichment and reprocessing civil facilities, which offered risk of diversion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION ON AGENDA ITEMS
Germany said that on the four core items on the agenda progress towards a balanced Programme of Work was strongly needed. With regard to the opposing ideas and approaches to achieving “Global Zero”, Germany suggested focusing on existing commonalities by identifying practical building blocks for nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Progress should be envisaged through practical, effective confidence-building measures, particularly by those States that possessed nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still had a role to play in security doctrines; this role should and could gradually reduce, but the process could not take place in a vacuum. Germany called for a full commitment to non-proliferation and said that more needed to be done in that regard, including by negotiating a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and, pending this, declaration of moratoriums of nuclear tests; continued commitment by all states possessing nuclear weapons to fully respect their binding commitments with regard to security assurances.
Weapons of Mass Destruction free zones ought to be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons detonations was of special importance and the Conference held in Vienna had given some important insights into this topic. Germany questioned whether the attempts at outlawing or delegitimizing nuclear weapons without including the States possessing them would really get the world closer to the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapons free world.
Ireland said that the agenda adopted the previous week was a long-standing one, and it was clear why cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were its first two items. Ireland had the honour to present the paper on Article VI on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, which had been circulated as an official document of Conference CD 1986. This paper outlined the history of failed attempts to secure negotiations on a framework for multilateral nuclear disarmament, from the 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to the 2010 Action Plan. The purpose of the Paper was to bring into the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Cycle a serious discussion of the essential constituent elements necessary for the fulfilment of the Article VI. Ireland believed that the dialogue and deliberations on nuclear disarmament had been dominated by narrow conceptions of state-centric security rather than focusing on the broader implications for humanity of the failure to make concrete and sustained efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In this context, Ireland congratulated the Governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria for organizing Conferences on humanitarian impact on nuclear weapons.
Russia believed that the Conference should be maintained as the global multilateral forum for negotiations on nuclear disarmament and said that there would be great harm in recourse to outside forums. Global agreements could be achieved only if based on the principle of consensus. Concerning agenda item 3 on the prevention of arms race in the outer space, and the Chinese-Russian initiative, Russia said that it prevented the emergence of yet another arena for a potential armed confrontation. International legal guarantees of non-placement on nuclear weapons in outer space would help strengthen regional stability and create conditions for measures leading to global nuclear disarmament. Such steps forward would be fully in line with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would fit neatly in the context of full disarmament. The time had come to move from general comments to specific proposals, to make shift from criticism to substantive work on the text itself. The draft Treaty on non-placement of nuclear weapons in the outer space was now ready for negotiations.
China said that preventing the arms race in outer space was beneficial to all States and reiterated its commitment to maintaining peace in outer space. China invited all delegations to put their comment to the draft text of the Treaty. China supported the adoption of long-reaching and balanced programme of work and to starting substantive work on the issues.
Belarus believed that the Treaty on prevention of placement of nuclear weapons in outer space was less problematic than the Treaty on Cut-off of fissile Materials. What was needed was the political will of States, stressed Belarus, and expressed its support for a global moratorium on the placement of nuclear weapons in space.
Kazakhstan said that several draft texts under agenda items one, two and three were ready for negotiation and hoped that the draft programme of work would be adopted the following day, thus enabling the Conference to start substantive work.
Brazil said that there was maturity in the Conference to face proposals, examine them positively and negotiate document on non-placement of nuclear weapons in the outer space, as per the Chinese-Russian initiative.
JORGE LOMONACO (Mexico), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that the Chinese-Russian proposal on the outer space should be considered as a basis for negotiation, as should any past or future proposals, if the draft programme of work were to be adopted the following day. It was clear in the deliberations today that different members had different priorities, and the President said that the draft programme of work had been designed as ultimate compromise, in a sense that it asked members to engage in negotiations on items not a priority in exchange for negations on the issue of priority.
General Statement
Finland said that the previous week, the Conference had heard the United Nations Secretary-General call for the Conference on Disarmament to act on its mandate of enhancing security for all. The Conference should be renovated to become a modern negotiating forum, responsive to the needs of today; to achieve this, it should look into revising the rules of procedure, enlargement and inclusion of the civil society and academia. Finland commended Austria for the Conference on humanitarian impact which was a productive continuation of previous conferences in Norway and Mexico and hoped that the 2015 the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference would take its conclusion into consideration.
For use of the information media; not an official record
DC15/004E