CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES FISSILE MATERIAL

The Conference on Disarmament held a plenary meeting this morning to discuss the issue of fissile material, including the definition of fissile material, the scope of a treaty on fissile material, and the verification regime for such a treaty.

During the discussion many speakers applauded Australia and Japan for organizing a side event that was a panel discussion dealing with defining fissile material. Many delegations said that the informal discussion clearly demonstrated not only the usefulness, but the necessity, of a sustained process of engaged discussion in order to clarify complex conceptual issues if the Conference on Disarmament wanted to deal with the challenge of fissile material in a manner which satisfied the requirements of a meaningful, binding agreement. One of the merits of holding such side events was their informal nature in which views expressed were not attributed to individual delegations which allowed for a more open, frank and thus more fruitful debate. Numerous speakers said that they supported similar events in the future because these initiatives showed that complex issues before the Conference did not have to be postponed due to procedural deadlock, but could be approached in creative ways. In fact, such discussions helped to prepare the ground for negotiations and could later enrich such negotiations.

While many people applauded such side events, there were also many delegations that did not participate in the discussion because they said such meetings had no status in the Conference on Disarmament and such discussions were no substitute for negotiations within the Conference and this should not be held at informal meetings outside of the negotiating body.

Countries also had the opportunity to express their views on a range of issues that needed to be addressed in a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, namely definition of fissile material, the scope of a treaty, and the verification regime for such a treaty. On the question of definition, some speakers said that this should be as broad as possible to prevent there being any loopholes in the treaty. A speaker noted that while the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency was not guaranteed, their definitions should be used because there was no reason to reinvent the wheel when there was already a well working system that had been in place for more than four decades to ensure that no fissile material was produced for nuclear weapons purposes. But there was a deeper, more political point as well. If the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty had a different set of definitions than the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, there would be the clear danger of damaging the safeguards system because people would understandably ask why two different standards should be applied to essentially the same set of issues. These definitions would have be upgraded, however as they had been developed 50 years ago and would need to reflect current and future technologies.

On the issue of scope, there was much discussion of how far reaching the treaty should be and questions were posed, including: what were the key elements of such a treaty? Would it include protocols? Would it be of a general nature or a detailed arms control treaty with scopes of prohibition and verification?

Regarding verification, many countries said that the cost of a verification system should not be onerous and it should be non-discriminatory in its application to all States parties and multilaterally verifiable. In terms of who should do the verification, the International Atomic Energy Agency held incomparable experience in this realm, but its relationship to a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should not be assumed.

The next public plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 8 March 2011 when it will have a discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Statements

PEDRO OYARCE, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Chile), welcomed the new Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the Conference. Reagrding today’s discussion on fissile material, Mr. Oyarce said that there was clearly a high level of interest in getting down to work on this issue. There was concern about the eventual use of this material by non-State actors and it had been suggested that they adopt a flexible approach to such negotiations. Did the Conference need to revisit the carefully crafted compromised known as the Shannon Mandate as a way of addressing the concerns of all States? After this more focused discussion there was no doubt they needed to move on to a new stage in their work. He then gave speakers the floor.

PETER WOOLCOTT, (Australia), said that from 14 to 16 February Australia and Japan co-hosted a three-day side panel at the Palais des Nations on fissile material definitions, the purpose of which was to build confidence about the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and momentum toward Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. More broadly, the panel discussion sought to inform and support the work of the Conference and to build confidence among Member and Observer States. Australia’s and Japan’s goal in this process was to inform and support the work of the Conference to stimulate further substantive exchanges in the Conference on Disarmament on issues related to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and to benefit all delegations by facilitating the type of learning opportunity which could help them advance in this important subject.

In terms of defining fissile material, Mr. Woolcott said that during the panel discussion four options had been discussed. They represented a sliding scale of isotopic quality, from the first option in which fissile material would be very high grades of enriched uranium and plutonium, through the second and third options in which fissile material would be high enriched uranium and plutonium, to the fourth option in which fissile material would be uranium enriched just above natural levels as well as plutonium, uranium-233 and neptunium produced through irradiation. The primary variations were whether the fissile material covered by a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty might include neptunium and americium and whether production covered by a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty might include enrichment of plutonium-239 by isotopic separation. The Vice-Chair of the panel suggested that a set of elements that could allow effective assessment for Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty options could include verifiability, confidentiality, and costs. Some argued whether costs should be used as an evaluating factor in a preliminary technical context while some emphasized the importance of developing a “dialable” range of options for definitions, especially for fissile material and production, which would help when the broader considerations of treaty objective, scope, verification and costs were being addressed in negotiations. There was also debate about whether new definitions of fissile material and production needed to be created or whether existing International Atomic Energy Agency definitions and categories were sufficient. Other issues that were raised included whether to include neptunium in any definition of fissile material covered by a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the definition of stocks, the definition of production facilities, and whether to define nuclear explosive devices in a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

MYKOLA MAIMESKUL, (Ukraine), said that Ukraine considered the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as one of the utmost priorities of the Conference on Disarmament. The conclusion of this important international instrument should significantly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and become the next step on the path to global disarmament. Obviously, there was an urgent need for a compromise that would strike a calibrated balance between these two aspects and hence enable the Conference on Disarmament to resume substantial work and to retain its central and unique role in the field of disarmament. This was their common, and he believed, attainable goal. However, looking from the wider perspective they could not forget that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were not the goals in themselves, but only crucial prerequisites for a more secure world. One of the most basic principles of the current non-proliferation regime was a vivid balance among three Non-Proliferation Treaty pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Hence their efforts aimed at non-proliferation and disarmament should not only contribute to the strengthening of regional and global security, but create auspicious conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the wider, human-oriented context, thus giving impetus to the social and economic development and prosperity so needed today.

Mr. Maimeskul highlighted a recent initiative of the President of Ukraine, the high-level “Kyiv Summit on Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy”, which would take place on 19 April 2011 as part of a series of events devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Ukraine’s initiative to convene this international forum was yet another step on the path to the implementation of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit commitments, namely to promote the idea of the conversion of highly enriched uranium fuel nuclear reactors to low enriched ones, as well as to secure the rights of non-nuclear weapons States to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Kyiv Summit should also serve as an integral part of the broader preparatory agenda to the next Nuclear Security Summit scheduled for April 2012 in South Korea.

WANG QUN, (China), said that on the question of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, China wanted to make the following points of principle. First, China had always supported the early negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory multilateral, verifiable treaty and the Conference should reach a balanced programme of work that would allow them to begin such negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate. Secondly, China had always believed that negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be conducted within the Conference on Disarmament with all relevant parties and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure; only in this way would they reach a treaty acceptable to all parties. Thirdly, before they began substantive negotiations, it was essential to determine the structure of such a treaty. For example, what were the key elements of such a treaty? Would it include protocols? Would it be of a general nature or a detailed arms control treaty with scopes of prohibition and verification? Fourthly, Mr. Qun had listened very carefully to Australia’s intervention about the side panel co-hosted by Australia and Japan a few weeks ago and it sounded as if the discussions held there were substantive. At the same time, Mr. Qun wondered whether since the side event and its result did not enjoy any status in the Conference on Disarmament, whether they should have such a discussion within the Conference on Disarmament which would be more meaningful. Lastly, he said that China would listen carefully to the views expressed by all parties regarding the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty today and China would make its views known accordingly.

AKIO SUDA, (Japan), began by thanking everyone who participated in the side event co-hosted with Australia on the definition of fissile material. The event showed a clear eagerness among participants for the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as well as the high level deliberations that would be required once those negotiations started. The event also provided an opportunity for participants to exchange technical views and deepened the understanding of delegates. It was particularly meaningful that a range of options were put on the table for their further study and deliberations. From this perspective, the Japanese delegation believed that the substantive discussions at the side event would greatly contribute to their prospective negotiations.

With regard to the issue of definitions, Mr. Suda articulated a few basic points that he said would guide them in considering this issue. First, definitions should effectively serve the primary objective of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which was to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and place a quantitative cap on existing stockpiles. This was the most important point as they needed to make sure that they didn’t inadvertently create any legal loopholes by choosing narrow definitions. Also, they needed to ensure that definitions alleviated the existing discriminatory nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime between the nuclear weapons States and the non-nuclear weapons States. Definitions should therefore be as broad as possible while not adversely affecting the peaceful uses o nuclear energy. Some argued that if they adopted a definition of fissile material that was too broad, they would face practical difficulties in carrying out verification. Japan understood such concerns and they needed to be as practical as possible in that regard. However, that was a separate matter that should be discussed in the context of verification.

LAURA KENNEDY, (United States), said the United States supported the side event held by Australia and Japan last month and they would welcome another such side event focusing on verification issues. The United States looked forward to presenting their thoughts on the structure and objectives of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty verification regime. The United States expected verification would focus on facilities that were producing or were clearly capable of producing fissile material. Understanding the interrelationship between the definitions, verification regime, and the scope and architecture of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be critical to the success of the Conference on Disarmament negotiations. In preparation for such a future event, and in light of a number of questions that were raised previously about views of the United States, Ms. Kennedy said she wanted to review the philosophy of the United States regarding how a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be structured and why they supported certain definitions.

In the view of the United States, the purpose of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was to ban the production of fissile material for use in migrant workers or other nuclear explosive devices. For this reason, they had suggested a definition of fissile material aimed at capturing material that could be used to make such weapons. It corresponded to the standard International Atomic Energy Agency definition of direct use material. Since no one argued that one could make a weapons or explosive devices from low enriched uranium or plutonium with a high concentration of Pu-238, the United States believed this was a conservative approach which addressed the fundamental objective and purpose of the treaty. Further, their definition of production captured the processes by which material directly usable in weapons was created. The processes that produced materials directly usable in weapons were primarily isotopic separation of uranium, or enrichment, and chemical separation of plutonium from irradiated nuclear material, or reprocessing. No one was arguing that one could make a weapon directly out of spent nuclear reactor fuel.

The United States suggested that a verification approach would be based on monitoring facilities capable of producing fissile material and any newly produced fissile material. It was tied closely and directly to the expected basic undertaking of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and these basic definitions. Their approach aimed at keeping implementation costs low while achieving the aims of such a treaty. Critically, this structure for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was aimed at complementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: they did not foresee additional verification obligations under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty for Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear weapons States with Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements in place and supplemented by an Additional Protocol.

HAERYONG KWON, (Republic of Korea), said it was his pleasure and honour to lead the delegation of the Republic of Korea in the Conference on Disarmament, the cradle of so many important agreements on disarmament. Even people who had little to do with disarmament affairs had heard of the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament after the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty contrasted all the more with the meaningful progress that had been made in the bilateral disarmament sector, especially among the major nuclear powers. Having said that, he was filled with mixed feelings of concern and anticipation regarding his mission ahead in the Conference; they were in the same boat and needed to show collective wisdom. Mr. Kwon looked forward to benefiting from the insightful wisdom and cordial cooperation of the Conference and confirmed his delegation’s readiness to support the president and fully cooperate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

ZAMIR AKRAM, (Pakistan), said that in its several past statements to the Conference, Pakistan had argued that no State could be expected to engage in disarmament, arms control or non-proliferation negotiations if these negotiations undermined the security interests of that State. For this obvious reason, they in the Conference on Disarmament, as part of the international disarmament machinery, worked on the basis of consensus which ensured the equal security of all States. Past experience within the Conference on Disarmament clearly demonstrated this truism. The current focus on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty followed a regular pattern of negotiating only those agreements that did not undermine or compromise the security interests of States, especially the major powers. The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention were negotiated only after possession of vast numbers of nuclear weapons made these conventions superfluous and redundant. Similarly, major powers were ready to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty only after a sufficient number of nuclear tests had already been carried out by them and further testing became unnecessary. The same was the case for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Now, after having developed huge stocks of nuclear weapons, as well as stocks of fissile material, that could be quickly converted into nuclear warheads, these major powers were ready to conclude a treaty that would only ban future production of fissile material. This approach was cost free for them as it would not undermine or compromise their security. Only a treaty that banned future production and reduced existing stocks would constitute a true disarmament measure.

Mr. Akram went on to say that the sweetheart deals given to some nuclear weapons States outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime would make a mockery of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as had already happened in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These deals would enable recipients to not only divert their own indigenous stocks towards weapons production or enrichment just short of weapons grade fissile material, but also to use imported fissile material, ostensibly for civilian purposes, in their fast breeder reactors and reprocessing plants for potential weapons purposes because the safeguards arrangements for them under the International Atomic Energy Agency remained extremely limited in scope and verifiability. The Conference on Disarmament remained the sole forum to discuss all aspects of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and other issues on their agenda in the plenary and in informal meetings. Pakistan remained ready to engage in such deliberations as long as they remained within the ambit of the Conference. Unfortunately, they had witnessed efforts that could undermine the Conference on Disarmament. It was even more unfortunate that there had been efforts to question the very basis of the rules that had always governed their work. These tactics did not impress them at all.

Mr. Akram said Pakistan did not participate in the side event co-hosted by Australia and Japan and he reiterated Pakistan’s belief that side events had no status as far as the work of the Conference on Disarmament was concerned.

GIOVANNI MANFREDI, (Italy), said that when discussing definitions in the context of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, especially the definition of fissile material, they should bear in mind two key principles: feasibility and credibility. Feasibility had two aspects: feasibility in production and application and feasibility in verification. Feasibility in production and application meant that their definition of fissile material should include those materials that currently or in the future had a reasonable probability of being used in the manufacture of nuclear explosives, principally the relevant isotopes if uranium and plutonium. If they could keep this definition as close as possible to real-life conditions and avoid theoretical scenarios, he was certain the implementation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be greatly facilitated.

Feasibility in verification meant that the definition they chose for fissile material should be such that it allowed verification without undue technical complications or excessive expenditures. Credibility, the second principle they should hold to, was easier to explain. Simply put, any solution to definitions should be such that it allowed the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to be a serious, legally enforceable, verifiable international instrument which would in fact be able to play a visible, concrete role both as a factor of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

MARIUS GRINIUS, (Canada), said Canada supported more side events such as that hosted by Australia and Japan. He reiterated Canada’s support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and said since the adoption of the Shannon Mandate in 1995 Canada had submitted a series of working documents on definitions, verification and scope for a treaty. Almost all United Nations members wanted such a treaty to be adopted, not just Members of the Conference on Disarmament. Starting negotiations was only the very first step. There were a number of complex technical, legal, institutional and legal questions that had to be addressed during negotiations. Canada underscored that for the purposes of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, fissile material should be defined as “un-irradiated direct use material” and there was a case to be made for incorporating neptunium and americium into this definition, although they did not pose the same threat as uranium and plutonium. Stocks were not an all or nothing issue. The matter of scope was about several important things such as the nuclear fuel cycles for civilian purposes, and States had to be flexible in their approach. They must transform statements of positions into actionable, concrete proposals that could be taken up in negotiations. Regarding verification, Canada reaffirmed that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be non-discriminatory in its application to all States parties and multilaterally verifiable, while not placing undue burdens on Non-Proliferation Treaty States. In terms of who should do the verification, the IAEA held incomparable experience in this realm, but its relationship to a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should not be assumed.

JÜRG LAUBER, (Switzerland), said Switzerland understood that many delegations felt it was premature to state clear preferences for one or the other definition as long as objectives, scope and degree of verification of a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty remained to be defined. This just underlined how closely linked the questions of definitions and verification were with the key issues of objectives and scope. Only real negotiations would create the comprehensive and dynamic environment necessary for resolving complex issues. The side event held by Australia and Japan showed that with political will the Geneva disarmament community could make progress on the Conference on Disarmament agenda. The initiative also showed that complex issues before the Conference did not have to be postponed due to procedural deadlock, but could be approached in creative ways. In fact, such discussions helped to prepare the ground for negotiations and could later enrich such negotiations. They also proved that focused discussions over several days, with expert participation, were much more efficient than other formats the Conference had tried before, when only three hours per week were dedicated per subject. This underlined the need to establish subsidiary bodies on all four core issues to make progress. Mr. Lauber said that while informal side events were no substitute for actual negotiations, Switzerland welcomed the organization of future seminars on other fissile material issues and they intended to continue to play an active role. Other issues that needed the Conference’s attention included the consideration of a simplified programme of work as well as the engagement of civil society.

AMANDEEP SINGH GILL, (India), noted that the discussions held at the side event organized by Australia and Japan were neither negotiations nor pre-negotiations. The objective of the exercise was solely to promote understanding of technical issues and to build confidence and momentum toward Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of the Shannon Mandate. India also noted that all relevant countries were not represented at the event and many of those who participated did not engage substantively. There was no change in India’s position of support for the commencement of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament as part of an agreed programme of work without prejudice to the priority they attached to nuclear disarmament. While India could continue to participate in discussions on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament plenary or in side events, these were no substitute for formal negotiations nor were they binding on delegations. On Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty issues, as well with any other matters pertaining to its national security, India could not be expected to be bound by documents to which it had not given its full consent. India was stating its position in plenary so that it could be reflected in the records of the Conference.

HELLMUT HOFFMANN, (Germany), thanked Japan and Australia for hosting the side event on fissile material last month. These discussions clearly demonstrated not only the usefulness, but the necessity, of a sustained process of engaged discussion in order to clarify complex conceptual issues if the Conference on Disarmament wanted to deal with the challenge of fissile material in a manner which satisfied the requirements of a meaningful, binding agreement. One of the merits of holding such side events was their informal nature in which views expressed were not attributed which allowed for a more open, frank and thus more fruitful debate. Mr. Hoffmann said that for the purposes of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty it would make eminent sense to base definitions on the terms of the IAEA. There were pragmatic reasons for this in the sense that there was no reason to reinvent the wheel when there was already a well working system that had been in place for more than four decades to ensure that no fissile material was produced for nuclear weapons purposes. But there was a deeper, more political point as well. If the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty had a different set of definitions than the IAEA safeguards system, there would be the clear danger of damaging the safeguards system because people would understandably ask why two different standards should be applied to essentially the same set of issues. This implication should be considered very carefully. Mr. Hoffmann said that for Germany the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty should encompass, at a minimum, the following elements: a ban on the production of “direct use” fissile material for nuclear weapons following International Atomic Energy Agency definitions; a ban on the transfer of fissile material produced for civil use before or after entry into force of an Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to nuclear weapons related purposes; and a ban on the re-use of fissile material derived from disarmament measures.

In terms of the statement from the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Hoffmann said that the points raised were all issues that should be handled in negotiations.

JO ADAMSON, (United Kingdom), wanted to amplify and update comments made earlier, namely that the United Kingdom was committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and progress on multilateral disarmament. The negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty must remain a priority for the Conference on Disarmament if the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda was to move forward. This treaty was the next logical step along the road to a world without nuclear weapons. The treaty, which should verifiably ban the future production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, must include all of the key nuclear players if it was to fulfil the ambition of the international community that it would strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework in a meaningful way. For this reason, the United Kingdom reemphasized its strong commitment to starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty within the Conference on Disarmament.

Ms. Adamson thanked Australia and Japan for organizing the side event on the definition of fissile material and she hoped the momentum generated by this event would help convince any States which continued to block the adoption of a programme of work that it was not in their interest to do so. The United Kingdom reiterated its belief that the strength of the Conference on Disarmament was the fact that it showed respect for every Member’s national security interests through its Rules of Procedure. Through the consensus rule it offered protection to these interests both at the negotiation phase and in the eventual signature and ratification phase of any treaty. This consensus rule should not, however, be employed by individual countries to prevent the Conference on Disarmament from doing any work at all. Ms. Adamson also called on countries that did not attend the side event to join them at future events as their input was needed and valuable.

HAMZA KHELIF, (Algeria), reiterated the importance of the agenda item dealing with nuclear war. The question of nuclear war was a major threat because it would be irreversible slaughter and destruction on a massive scale. Some countries had nuclear doctrines which allowed for the use of such weaponry, even against non-nuclear weapons States. Preventing a nuclear war meant eliminating these weapons at the international level. While they awaited that day it was important to find ways and means to mitigate the risk such weapons would be used. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for consultations to be held in order to arrive at steps to protect the future of mankind and avert the possibility of nuclear war.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN DARYAEI, (Iran), said that Iran attached great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating body in the field of disarmament as well as the Rules of Procedure of this august body. The first priority in the work of the Conference on Disarmament was to agree on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work to begin their substantive work and enable the start of negotiations for all four core issues. Their top priority was nuclear disarmament and while Iran did not have a problem starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the main criteria was that Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should contribute to nuclear disarmament and the best tool in this regard was the coverage of existing stockpiles of fissile material that had already been produced by nuclear weapons States; without covering existing stocks this effort was fruitless. The side event was neither negotiation nor pre-negotiations; from Iran’s point of view reflected a national initiative and had no status in the formal work of the Conference on Disarmament. Any efforts to blow this initiative out of proportion were not acceptable to Iran and they wanted to emphasize the need to avoid any work which undermined the credibility of this important body.

ARTURO HERNANDEZ BASAVE, (Mexico), thanked Australia and Japan for organizing the side event as well as all the countries that attended and said the discussion was extremely useful.

Concluding Remarks

PEDRO OYARCE, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Chile), said that with today’s discussion they had furthered the general discussion begun under the Canadian presidency. A focused analysis of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was beginning to take shape with policy and technical discussions under way. There was no doubt in his mind that they needed to move on to a new stage and this presidency was striving to do exactly that. At the next session there would be a focused analysis on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC11/018E