CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES SCOPE OF A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon continued its thematic discussion on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), engaging in a focused debate on the scope of such a treaty.

Main differences expressed by speakers concerned the objectives of such a treaty, which they held had a direct impact on its scope. A speaker said that it was common knowledge that certain States viewed a Fissile Material Treaty as primarily – or even only – a non-proliferation instrument, while others sought to also reflect the nuclear disarmament dimension of the treaty. Another speaker said that the intention of the FMCT was to codify the commitments by each party not to produce the material for fissile materials or other explosive devices. Another speaker held that the main aim of the negotiations should be to effectively prevent any increase in the stocks of fissile materials for nuclear purposes.

Speakers expressed diverging opinions on the scope of the FMCT. A speaker said that it should prohibit the increase in fissile material stocks, as well as the use for military purposes of any fissile material, and the ban of the transport of any fissile material for military purposes. Another speaker said that an FMCT should make the distinction between irradiated and unirradiated direct use material. A speaker said existing instruments such as the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should apply to the scope of an FMCT. A speaker said that whether stockpiles should be included in the scope of such a treaty was open to debate; however, the diversion of fissile material that States processed for use in nuclear weapons, existing and future stocks of fissile material for non-nuclear purposes and transfers of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes should all come within the scope of a FMCT ban.

Speaking this afternoon were representatives of South Africa, Algeria, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Germany.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 May, at 10 a.m., when the Conference will focus its discussion on the issue of stockpiles of fissile material.

Statements

GLAUDINE MTSHALI (South Africa) said that South Africa continued to hold the view that a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) should serve both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives in order to be effective. In that regard, it was common knowledge that certain States viewed an FMT as primarily – or even only – a non-proliferation instrument, while others sought to also reflect the nuclear disarmament dimension of the treaty. The success the Conference would achieve would depend on the balance they were able to maintain.

South Africa believed that the difficulties in attempting to define the scope of a future FMT need not result in negotiations on a treaty being stalled until the matter had been resolved. What was important was that the scope of the treaty could and should be discussed during negotiations. The scope would therefore be determined by the outcome of negotiations, in the same fashion as other aspects of the treaty. Discussions in the plenary were useful in gaining and broadening understanding of the various perspectives regarding the scope of an FMT. The purpose of such discussions was to exchange views and to narrow differences. But it should not be confused with negotiations, Ms. Mtshali cautioned.

HAMZA KHELIF (Algeria) said on the issues that had been dealt with in earlier sessions, regarding concepts, this was linked to the objectives and the aims which the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should serve, which would determine the verification regime that was required. All elements and aspects were therefore interlinked. With regards to verification, Algeria did not agree with the view that the objectives of an FMCT were not the same as those of the safeguard regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had the objectives of guaranteeing the non-conversion of raw material and fissile material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Algeria believed the objectives were the same. The result of the Conference’s adoption of an FMCT would be the ceasing of the production of all fissile material. A safeguards regime restricted to these installations and fissile material would not give a guarantee that these materials would not be diverted to proscribed uses. There was a link between the uses of fissile materials and nuclear terrorism, and stockpiles therefore constituted a danger in and of themselves. Nuclear terrorism only exacerbated the problem, as stockpiles could fall into the hands of terrorists, and the stockpiles should therefore be monitored.

RUSSELL LESLIE (Australia) said with regards to scope, the intention of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was to codify the commitments by each party not to produce the materials for fissile materials or other explosive devices. The scope of remaining articles would cover definitions, entry into force formula, and verification bodies. In practical terms, it would apply to facilities that were either pre-existing and dedicated to the purpose of producing fissile materials for nuclear purposes, or current or existing facilities with the same purpose. The FMCT should make the distinction between irradiated and unirradiated direct use material. The FMCT would apply to any facilities that were capable of reprocessing spent fuel, and should apply to all enrichment facilities.

WAN KI YOON (Republic of Korea) said that to separate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) from existing instruments for nuclear control, such as the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be a mistake. Those instruments should apply to the scope of an FMCT.

MASAHIRO KIKUCHI (Japan) said that, regarding the scope of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), discussions had clearly shown that there was a consensus on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices, which would be at the core of such an instrument. Also, there was consensus that fissile material for civilian use should not come within the scope of such a treaty, as he had said this morning.

Whether stockpiles should be included in the scope of such a treaty, was open to debate, Mr. Kikuchi conceded. The diversion of fissile material that States processed for use as nuclear weapons should be subject to a ban, however. Existing and future stocks of fissile material for non-nuclear purposes should also be subject to a ban under the FMCT as well as transfers of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) said with regards to the objectives, the main aim of the negotiations should be to effectively prevent any increase in the stocks of fissile materials for nuclear purposes. The FMCT should therefore prohibit the increase in these stocks, as well as the reuse for military purposes of any material, and the ban of the transport of any material for military purposes. Fissile material stocks should be secured worldwide, as there should also be increased accountability.

For use of the information media; not an official record

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