CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FAILS TO ADOPT DRAFT PROGRAMME OF WORK PROPOSED BY THE POLISH PRESIDENCY

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held a discussion on the draft programme of work put forward by the Polish Presidency, which was based on the proposal by the United Kingdom from 19 February. The Conference did not adopt the draft programme after the Russian Federation blocked the consensus.

Ambassador Piotr Stachańczyk of Poland, President of the Conference, presented the draft proposal, explaining that, while it did not have an explicit negotiating mandate, it allowed for eventually launching negotiations, which was in line with the Conference’s purpose.

Norway noted that if the purpose of the Conference had been to maintain the status quo, one might perhaps say that it had been a success. Belarus stated that adopting any programme of work, as imperfect as it was, could nonetheless be a step forward, and was ready to join consensus. Belgium welcomed the British proposal as it provided for balanced discussions on nuclear disarmament, not limited to legal measures only. Japan believed that the proposal would give a chance to deepen discussions on a number of issues and lay the ground for negotiations in the Conference.

Russian Federation stressed that the draft proposal could not be considered as comprehensive or balanced, and the consequences of its adoption were not considered. Netherlands thanked the President for putting forward a draft programme of work, based on several months of discussion, which was the best chance of moving ahead. Bulgaria said that the proposal on the table could give an opportunity to discuss issues in a comprehensive manner, which would provide a good basis to resume substantive work. Canada was ready to show flexibility and compromise and support the proposed programme of work, while its priority remained fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations.

Republic of Korea was of the opinion that in-depth deliberations could be conducted and benefit future negotiations on any issues on the agenda. Germany stated that the draft decision contained an innovative approach to overcome the standstill of the Conference and should be supported. China said that merging the British and Russian proposals would be the best way forward, and hoped that the President would make efforts to reach an agreement on the programme of work. Spain described the President’s initiative was positive because it was an honest way to try everything possible to carry out the work the Conference was supposed to be doing.

Venezuela believed that the Conference should consider the Russian proposal in a constructive manner. Cuba wanted to hear how the proposal on the table would contribute to the compliance with the Conference’s negotiating mandate. Italy said that the fact that four draft programmes of work had been put forward was a sign of engagement by the Conference members. Finland expressed support to the President for his efforts and stood ready to endorse the proposal which was put forward. Mexico argued that there was no consensus regarding the proposal on the table, and further consultations needed to be conducted to produce a new version of the document.

Turkey said that it would continue its fight against terrorism and underlined the importance of international cooperation. India hoped that the President would continue consultations in the inter-sessional period, noting that the Group of 21 proposal should also be taken into account. United States said that the President’s proposal, while not perfect, was the last and best chance to reach consensus for this session. United Kingdom emphasized that, if progress was to be made, nuclear-weapon States had to fully engage in discussions.

The Conference will next meet in public on Tuesday, 2 August at 10 a.m.

Statements

Ambassador PIOTR STACHAŃCZYK of Poland, President of the Conference, said that he had held further consultations on the proposed draft programme of work, which had also been discussed at the previous session. That proposal had been broadly known, as it had been presented back in February. While the proposal did not have an explicit negotiating mandate, it allowed for eventually launching negotiations, which was in line with the Conference’s purpose. The proposal was flexible because States could raise any issues which they deemed important and necessary. Moreover, the proposal did not eliminate other proposals, which could be further considered. All the remarks presented thus far had been noted by the President. The Conference could not focus on more than one very flexible item, given time constraints.

Norway said that its national position on the Conference as an institution was comprised of three points: the Conference had to be open to any country wishing to be a member; the rigorous application of the consensus rule should be considered and modified; and there was a need to be more open towards civil society. To keep repeating the phrase that the Conference on Disarmament was “the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community” did not change the realities: the Conference was certainly not the “single”, nor was it fully “multilateral” and definitely not “negotiating”. The most productive and well-functioning part of the so-called disarmament machinery, as designed in 1978, seemed to be the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. If the purpose of the Conference had been to maintain status quo, one might perhaps say that it had been a success. However, if nothing real happened, issues would be taken elsewhere. If the Conference was to survive, it had to deliver something that was perceived as being useful and relevant. The Ambassador of Norway bid his farewell as he was leaving Geneva.

Belarus believed that the draft programme of work was not fully comprehensive, and the formulations in it were not clear as to which items on the agenda were covered. Belarus reserved the right to propose discussions on any items on the Conference’s agenda. The draft did not reflect the desire of the Conference to respond to the new hybrid challenges the world was facing; in that context, the Russian initiative ought to be taken into consideration. Adopting any programme of work, as imperfect as it was, would nonetheless be a step forward, so Belarus would not block a consensus if one were to emerge.

Belgium attached great importance to the revitalization of the Conference, but was concerned that, despite many proposals on the table, there seemed to be no readiness to move forward. Ideally, there would be a mandate to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, but that was out of reach for the time of being. Belgium welcomed the British proposal as it provided for balanced discussions on nuclear disarmament, not limited to legal measures only. Belgium supported the decision to go ahead and take action on the item.

Japan fully supported the President’s efforts on the adoption of the programme of work. Action ought to be taken as soon as possible. The proposal on the table had merits, and the engagement of nuclear-weapon States was essential for advancing nuclear disarmament. The proposal would also give a chance to deepen discussions on a number of issues and lay the ground for negotiations in the Conference.

Russian Federation said that the victims of the attack in Istanbul had been citizens of different countries, which, once again, proved the need to unite efforts of the world community in fighting the global terrorist threat. The Conference today was facing a challenge which could define its future. There was a danger that the Conference could be turned into a debating club on one single issue. The Polish draft proposal could not be considered as comprehensive or balanced. The consequences of the adoption of that programme of work were not considered; if adopted, would the mandate of the United Nations Disarmament Commission not be duplicated? Russian Federation was thus strongly opposed to the proposed draft programme.

Netherlands said that the Conference should seek for new ways forward. It was regrettable that the British proposal was described as hasty even though it had been on the table for months. Netherlands thanked the President for putting forward a draft programme of work, based on several months of discussion. It was the best chance of moving ahead. The Conference should negotiate, Netherlands agreed, and fissile material cut-off negotiations remained its utmost priority, which was the topic ripe for negotiations. The Conference continued to be in the deadlock of repeating arguments; in the absence of agreement on what to negotiate, discussions were an honest attempt to bring about a start of negotiations. If the Conference could agree on substantive discussions, that would bring its work forward.

Bulgaria appreciated efforts by the President to bring the Conference back on track. Bulgaria had already expressed its support for the British proposal, but its priority remained commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The proposal on the table could give an opportunity to discuss issues in a comprehensive manner, which would provide a good basis for the Conference to resume its substantive work.

Canada said that there seemed not to be an agreement on a topic for negotiations acceptable to all. The proposed draft programme of work was only the second best for Canada, whose priority would be to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. Canada was ready to show flexibility and compromise and support the proposed programme of work.

Republic of Korea stated that, if the Conference was truly the single negotiating forum on disarmament, any disarmament agreement negotiated outside of the Conference should be called illegitimate. Republic of Korea believed that in-depth deliberations could be conducted and benefit future negotiations on any issues on the agenda. Better was not the enemy of the best. Republic of Korea was ready to support the proposal on the table.

Germany supported the President’s proposal as it stood, and expected that the decision, once taken, could serve as a precedent for 2017 and allow for substantive discussions next year. The Conference’s relevance was questionable at the moment. 2016 was the right moment to take next steps, and the draft decision seemed to be offering such an opportunity. Simply calling for negotiations without legal provisions would not be appropriate, said Germany. The draft decision contained an innovative approach to overcome the standstill of the Conference and should be supported.

China had been in favour of an early agreement on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. To emerge the British and Russian proposals would be the best way forward. It was hoped that all parties would show flexibility and that the President would make efforts to reach an agreement on the programme of work.

Spain believed that the President’s initiative was positive because it was an honest way to try everything possible to carry out the work the Conference was supposed to be doing. What alternatives were there? Discussions to be held in August would not be void and empty, as there would certainly be issues to discuss. A substantive, innovative discussion could be held, and Spain supported the initiative on the table.

Venezuela attributed greatest importance to the work of the Conference. Venezuela took note of the proposed initiative and shared the view that the Conference should in a constructive fashion consider the Russian proposal.

Cuba had a number of questions which it would like to see clarified. Cuba supported the work of the Conference, but would like to hear how the proposal on the table would contribute to the compliance with the Conference’s negotiating mandate. The proposal seemed to include what the Disarmament Commission was already doing. Why had a specific item on the agenda been selected, as important as it was? There were other important items not included in the proposal. Cuba asked why the priority had been given to one proposed draft programme of work over all others. Once Cuba received clarifications on those questions, instructions would need to be awaited from the capital.

Italy believed that it was of utmost importance to preserve the negotiating role of the Conference. An agreement on a programme of work was essential. The fact that four draft programmes of work had been put forward was a sign of engagement by the Conference members. Italy was ready to support any constructive effort. The proposal by the United States on the fissile material cut-off treaty was welcome, but it was regrettable that it had not been possible to reach a consensus on it. In Italy’s view, the Russian proposal also deserved due attention. Italy appreciated the President’s initiative as an attempt to put the Conference back on track.

Finland expressed support to the President for his efforts and stood ready to endorse the proposal as put forward.

Mexico stressed that any programme of work would need to include a negotiating mandate. Mexico could not support the draft programme of work as it stood, as the President’s initiative was not balanced or comprehensive. There was no consensus regarding the proposal on the table. Further consultations needed to be conducted with the view of producing a new version of the document. Any subsequent consultations would need to include all four proposals: those by the United States, Nigeria, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

Turkey stood ready to support the proposal as tabled by the President. Turkey would continue its fight against terrorism and underlined the importance of international cooperation.

Russian Federation reiterated that the draft programme of work put forward by the President should be examined over its comprehensiveness and balance. Those elements were enshrined in the core documents of the Conference and declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. Focus on one unique item on the agenda to the detriment of all others could not considered as comprehensive. That would create an undesired precedent for the future. The Nigerian proposal, which would include all four items on the agenda, was highly preferable. Russia believed that a balance had to be struck between discussions and negotiations. It had been suggested to the authors of the British draft that additional items be added to the document. Russian Federation had been promoting the idea of a more balanced British draft proposal, but the United Kingdom had made no efforts in that regard. Russia would thus put forward its own proposal which would do away with the flows from the British proposal. The Russian proposal was open and transparent, and Russia had demonstrated its readiness for a compromise.

India said that it was unfortunate that there were still gaps which needed to be addressed. It was hoped that the President would continue consultations in the inter-sessional period. The Group of 21 proposal should also be taken into account. Consensus on the expansion of the Conference was also still elusive. The Conference-civil society forum earlier this month had been a useful event and a sobering experience to get to grips to the views expressed of the Conference.

United States said that the President’s proposal, while not perfect, was the last and best chance to reach consensus for this session, and encouraged the Conference to take action on the text as tabled.

Ambassador PIOTR STACHAÑCZYK of Poland, President of the Conference, underlined the importance of the draft decision for the Conference and the whole United Nations disarmament system, and stressed the flexible character of the proposal. Regarding the questions posed to him, the President referred to his detailed remarks from the plenary meeting on 28 June.

The President then submitted the draft proposal for a formal adoption by the Conference.

One delegation, Russian Federation, expressed an objection to the draft proposal and informed that it could not join the consensus.

The President acknowledged that the proposal submitted to the Conference had not reached consensus and noted, with regret, that the draft proposal had not been adopted.

United Kingdom said that the proposal circulated in February reflected the belief that the Conference wanted to make progress on disarmament, namely nuclear disarmament. For that progress to be made, nuclear-weapon States had to engage in discussions. The United Kingdom understood the reservations by the Russian Federation, given that they had been offered by the United States significant reductions in nuclear arsenals, to which they could not reciprocate. The United Kingdom would continue to look for ways to engage both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC16/030E