CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES A PROGRAMME OF WORK

The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon held its last public plenary of the first part of its 2011 session and discussed how to forward its work in order to agree on a programme of work.

In the discussion, Colombia suggested that a minimalist programme of work would facilitate for the Conference the preparation of their annual report. By adopting a simplified programme of work, it would take the time pressure off the Conference. Brazil noted that sensibilities had to be taken into account and while they could not prejudge results of negotiations, by using the proper words, they needed to give assurances to delegations that every aspect of fissile material would be considered.

Italy said in its opinion CD document 1864 was the document that best addressed Italy’s national security interests but they would not be the country that would prevent the Conference from arriving to a consensus on any other reasonable document on their work. Australia said that there were indispensible elements on a programme of work for the Conference. In May 2010 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference issued a document which had three actions directly concerning the work of the Conference and it was indispensible for the Conference’s programme of work to lead to implementation of these three actions. The Conference did not just need to adopt a programme of work, it needed to implement it. Pakistan said that they should move along with the sense of mutual respect and understanding and reiterated its readiness to stay engaged and its willing to consider approaches characterized by a balanced approach which dealt with all important issues in an equal manner.

Chile said it would be worthwhile asking what they were going to report to the General Assembly. If they wanted this exercise to be of practical use and not a mere reflection on the programme of work, they had to define certain parameters. This was essential for building a consensus. The United States underscored that the business of the Conference on Disarmament was to negotiate. The United States hoped that the President would be able to come up with a consensus programme of work that came up with a mandate to negotiate. The United Kingdom said the overwhelming majority in the Conference could agree on a package, but one nation could not allow the rest of the international community to move forward on this important issue. This was the situation. Cuba urged flexibility to reach a broad and balanced programme of work. The highest priority must be attached to nuclear disarmament. Cuba rejected the minimizing of the importance of nuclear disarmament and putting the focus on fissile material. The Netherlands said it was important to realize that adoption of a programme of work was not an end in itself. Just reporting to the General Assembly that they had adopted a programme of work did not mean that they had fulfiled their mandate. The task of the Conference was to negotiate and it was indispensable that the work programme allowed them to start negotiations or clearly prepared the way for negotiations. India said it was prepared to work of all four issues that had been identified during consultations as items of priority. For India, nuclear disarmament continued to be the highest priority. Without prejudice to the issue of nuclear disarmament, India was willing to negotiate a treaty on fissile material. Negotiations on use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would complement the work on nuclear disarmament.

France said it was rather pessimistic about reaching a negotiating mandate on fissile material in the Conference this year, and it believed that they should take the discussions as far as possible. Japan’s position, as was the position of many others, was that they should start negotiations based on the Shannon mandate, otherwise they would spend another year discussing the mandate of the negotiations. It believed that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was an indispensable step in the nuclear disarmament process and an indispensable step in the substantive work of the Conference this year. Iran said that nuclear disarmament remained the most important priority for itself and many others and they would like to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to discuss nuclear disarmament immediately. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons. Iran believed that the issues of stock and verification should be dealt with in a treaty dealing with fissile material. Their programme of work had to be clear on the important issue that any negotiations on fissile material that did not include stock would have no content. Germany said that it supported CD document 1864 and felt it was a good compromise. It dealt with all the agenda items and also contained a negotiating mandate for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It appeared to Germany to make imminent sense to adopt it, but alas it ran into difficulty after one Member State objected to it. Russia said a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was important and urgent to tackle, but that did not mean that other issues were less important to tackle. The situation as it was developing now was not going positively or on the right track. The mandate of the Conference was to negotiate. If they had to give an honest answer to a question on whether tomorrow they would be ready to adopt a programme of work and start negotiations, it would probably be no.

Egypt said nuclear disarmament was its top priority and it should be dealt with through a nuclear weapons convention with a specific time frame. Egypt agreed with Australia that as a bare minimum the programme of work should reflect what was agreed upon at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and supported CD document 1864 even though it did not meet their expectations. However the Conference needed to really start work and negotiate, not just tell the international community that it would. Algeria said that if the Conference adopted a simplified programme of work, it would not ensure that it would allow them to make progress on negotiations. A simplified programme of work would take them further away from the target which was to start negotiations. They should focus on CD document 1864 which was a compromise and see to what extent they could reconcile their positions in order to start negotiations.

On the question of the appointment of a new Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva and Secretary-General of the Conference, said first there would be a letter from the Under-Secretary-General in charge of disarmament, the High Representative for Disarmament, who would inform the Conference of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint Mr. so and so as Secretary-General of the Conference. Then the Conference Members would consult together. There was a sentence in the letter in front of him that was written by the President of the Conference nine years ago who said that on the basis of consultations with regional groups, he informed that they concurred with the Secretary-General’s appointment.

Wang Qun, the President of the Conference, reiterated that first they would get a letter from the Under-Secretary-General, then there would be consultations between the President and the regional coordinators, then a decision of the Conference would be taken. During the intersessional period, if all Member States agreed, a plenary of the Conference would be held to endorse the new Secretary-General and that would be followed with a letter to the Under-Secretary-General. Also, given the enormous efforts of the Secretary-General in the matters of the Conference, they would hold a special session during the intersessional session to bid him farewell.

Speaking in the discussion was Colombia, Brazil, Italy, Australia, Pakistan, United States, United Kingdom, Cuba, the Netherlands, India, France, Japan, Iran, Germany, Russian Federation, Egypt and Algeria.

The next public plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, 17 May after the intersessional break. The first part of the 2011 session of the Conference will conclude on 1 April and the second part will take place from 16 May to 1 July.

Statements

WANG QUN (China), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said they would discuss this afternoon the issue of the programme of work. The objective of this discussion was to facilitate whether there would be any evolving consensus on this issue. Today he hoped to have a general continuation of an exchange of views, with a focus on what would be the most indispensable elements in the programme of work. This was without prejudice to other input from Member States on the programme of work.

CARLOS ENRIQUE VALENCIA MUNOZ (Colombia) said Colombia was happy to discuss potential elements that this programme of work should have. Colombia had heard a number of different views on the need to think in long-term of the Conference’s schedule of activities. Strictly following their rules of procedure, the programme of work was their guide for the organization of their work, a timetable of sessions. The advantages of having a programme of work as a schedule of activities were that it would allow the Conference to sidestep the problem of procedural efforts. Also, approval of a minimalist programme of work would allow them to focus on substantive discussions, what was the mandate they wished to give themselves. They had to negotiate what they wanted to negotiate about. It was important to have this discussion and a minimalist programme of work would facilitate for the Conference the preparation of their annual report. By adopting a simplified programme of work, it would take the time pressure off the Conference. They were just finishing the first third of their 2011 session. Colombia was prepared to work on any of the formulas that they decided on, whether a simplified programme of work or one with a broad mandate. Concerning security, Colombia wondered that in their interconnected world, what was the usefulness of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction to the security of their countries, could a nuclear weapon deal with poverty or climate change or target terrorists? They should demonstrate the political will to take the Conference and the important items on its agenda forward.

LUIZ FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil) said Brazil was ready to consider with openness the proposals that they hoped the President would be able to present to the Conference. One of the tasks of any President conducting the Conference on Disarmament was to consult with delegations, but Brazil believed another task was for the President to make proposals. China had all the authority to make a proposal that could unite the delegations around it and lead the Conference to go to another phase and start discussing in a more focused way, and if not straight into negotiations, then preparing for negotiations. In previous years many proposals for programmes of work had been submitted. But sensibilities had to be taken into account. In principle a programme of work should provide for subsidiary bodies to deal with the required depth on the four core issues of the agenda. In previous proposals different words were used in order to establish working groups on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Then there was the specific issue of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and that was where they ran into obstacles as some insisted on having a reference limiting the treaty to the prohibition of production of fissile material while many others were open to the question of consideration of other aspects concerning fissile material. They had not yet reached a balancing point on this issue, but they should continue to try to find this point. They could not prejudge results of negotiations, but by using the proper words, they needed to give assurances to delegations that every aspect would be considered. Brazil believed it would be possible to arrive to a programme of work, but they had to relax and believe it was not insurmountable. Brazil hoped that the Conference would be able to report on commencement of its programme of work and activities when it reported to the General Assembly at the end of the year.

GIOVANNI MANFREDI (Italy) said that in Italy’s opinion CD document 1864 was the document that best addressed Italy’s national security interests but they would not be the country that would prevent the Conference from arriving to a consensus on any other reasonable document on their work.

PAUL WILSON (Australia) said that there were indispensible elements on a programme of work for the Conference. In May 2010 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference issued a document which had three actions directly concerning the work of the Conference. They understood that the Conference included countries which were not Member States of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But all Member States of the Treaty that were Members of the Conference were bound to contribute to ensuring that the Conference responded to the three actions. It was indispensible for the Conference’s programme of work to lead to implementation of these three actions. The Conference did not just need to adopt a programme of work, it needed to implement it.

SHAFQAT ALI KHAN (Pakistan) said that as they proceeded in their search for a programme of work, the Conference should be guided not by the quality of its drafting but the depth of the content. Another key point was they that should move along with the sense of mutual respect and understanding. Pakistan reiterated its readiness to stay engaged and its willingness to consider approaches characterized by a balanced approach which dealt with all important issues in an equal manner.

PEDRO OYARCE (Chile) said the Conference needed to think together how to reach a programme of work. This was a collective effort, not just the President’s effort. It was very clear that they must consider some sort of agreement without prejudging the priorities which did open the path to negotiations. The mandate of the Conference on Disarmament was negotiation. So they had to be clearly aware that negotiation was a responsibility incumbent on each of the States parties to this Conference. But this, by no means, may be understood, either explicitly or implicitly, as a limitation to a sovereign State’s prerogative to decide how it negotiated and if it adhered or not to any agreement resulting from a negotiation. Also , not all the agenda items were ready for negotiation. However, among the Conference members there was no unanimity as to the priorities but, at least, increasingly focused substantive debates on various essential aspects, including the technical support of experts, might prepare them for negotiations. But it would be worthwhile asking what they were going to report to the General Assembly. If they wanted this exercise to be of practical use and not a mere reflection on the programme of work, they had to define certain parameters. This was essential for building a consensus. There were many ideas and proposals, and in the forthcoming sessions other fresh initiatives would come up. A systematic review of these options would allow the Conference to examine the tools that they had at their disposition. The core question would be to determine, with realism, if there was sufficient political margin to allow the Conference to build a consensus on a viable formula. If this was not the case, they would have to keep on searching for alternatives to overcome the lack of negotiation. It was clear that they had to report to the General Assembly, and they hoped they would have positive news, if not, the appropriate decisions would be taken.

LAURA KENNEDY (United States) said the United States was happy to engage in public plenary meetings or in informal meetings, for a month or for a year. They were happy to continue this. However, the business of the Conference on Disarmament was to negotiate. The United States was happy to follow any programme, but they should not kid themselves that this was a programme, they were now discussing without negotiating. The urgency of starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty had been repeatedly endorsed, and the United States believed that the task was as urgent as ever. The United States hoped that the President would be able to come up with a consensus programme of work that came up with a mandate to negotiate. The Shannon mandate had the necessary balance. They should start negotiations because countries needed to start the process to come to grip with issues like definition and scope. It was important that they should not believe that the discussions were a substitute for negotiations.

JOHN DUNCAN (United Kingdom) said the United Kingdom agreed with much of what Australia had just said. It was important to remember what was going on outside the Conference. In the past five years, the cross regional coalition had held together despite all attempts. It remained the position of most of the nations in this room that there was a package that they could all live with, even if parts of it made them uncomfortable. The overwhelming majority could agree on a package, but one national could not allow the rest of the international community to move forward on this important issue. This was the situation.

JUAN QUINTANILLA (Cuba) said steps must be taken to move away from the paralysis in the Conference, which was the world’s sole multilateral negotiating body. Cuba was in favour of resumption of substantive work through the adoption of a programme of work, including all the agenda items. Cuba urged flexibility to reach a broad and balanced programme of work. The highest priority must be attached to nuclear disarmament. Cuba rejected the minimizing of the importance of nuclear disarmament and putting the focus on fissile material.

PAUL VAN DEN IJSSEL (Netherlands) said it was important to realize that adoption of a programme of work was not an end in itself. It would be an instrument to help the Conference on Disarmament fulfil its mandate. Just reporting to the General Assembly that they had adopted a programme of work did not mean that they had fulfiled their mandate. The task of the Conference was to negotiate and it was indispensable that the work programme allowed them to start negotiations or clearly prepared the way for negotiations. Negotiations on what? It was the view of the Netherlands that a fissile material treaty was ready for negotiation. The Netherlands was open to suggestions but it believed that there was less consensus on other issues. The Netherlands was flexible about a programme of work. It could support a reference to stocks in the mandate of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It was important that the programme of work give them hope that they could start their work.

HAMID ALI RAO (India) said on 25 January the Conference had adopted their agenda for the year and on 22 February the Conference had discussed possible elements for a programme of work. Discussions had taken place on the various agenda items, but they had not started negotiations. India welcomed this focus to discuss the programme of work in plenary meetings and hoped that the Conference could adopt its programme of work and start negotiations as soon as possible. India was prepared to work of all four issues that had been identified during consultations as items of priority. For India, nuclear disarmament continued to be the highest priority. Without prejudice to the issue of nuclear disarmament, India was willing to negotiate a treaty on fissile material. Negotiations on use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would complement the work on nuclear disarmament.

ERIC DANON (France) said France believed that they at least needed a programme of work to have a substantive input in the end. The objective of the Conference on Disarmament was to negotiate new international instruments. As the United Kingdom had said, they had to draw the line between discussions which led to nothing and discussions that would lead to negotiations. France did not agree with Brazil that seemed to be saying that what was preventing the negotiations was cut-off was the issue of stockpiles. According to Pakistan’s element there were three main elements concerning fissile material. If Pakistan told them that the question of stockpiles had been settled, that would be a real change, but France did not think that was the case. France was rather pessimistic about reaching a negotiating mandate on fissile material in the Conference this year, and it believed that they should take the discussions as far as possible. France remained open to suggestions.

Turning to another issue, Mr. Danon said that the Secretary-General of the Conference, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, would soon be leaving their horizons after serving for nine years as Secretary-General of the Conference. According to rule 13 of the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint the Secretary-General of the Conference. France noted that appointment of the new Secretary-General needed to go through steps including negotiations by the Conference. France would like to take this opportunity to approach the current Secretary-General and ask for clarification which would allow the Conference to endorse the next Secretary-General.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, said article 13 of the rules of procedure did not give very clearly a picture of the appointment of his successor. However, they had a precedent and they could follow it. First there would be a letter from the Under-Secretary-General in charge of disarmament, the High Representative for Disarmament, who would inform the Conference of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint Mr. so and so as Secretary-General of the Conference. Then the Conference Members would consult together. There was a sentence in the letter in front of him that was written by the President of the Conference nine years ago who said that on the basis of consultations with regional groups, he informed that they concurred with the Secretary-General’s appointment.

WANG QUN, (China), President of the Conference, reiterated that first they would get a letter from the Under-Secretary-General, then there would be consultations between the President and the regional coordinators, then a decision of the Conference would be taken. During the intersessional period, if all Member States agreed, a plenary of the Conference would be held to endorse the new Secretary-General and that would be followed with a letter to the Under-Secretary-General. Also, given the enormous efforts of the Secretary-General in the matters of the Conference, they would hold a special session during the intersessional session to bid him farewell.

AKIO SUDA (Japan) said the President had mentioned the issue of balance in the content of the programme of work. Japan understood that there were differences of priorities. They should be careful in talking of balance between the four agenda items. Three of the core agenda items were important in order to promote nuclear disarmament, but not prevention of an arms race in outer space. They should think of moving on these three items, if one was ready for negotiations, they should start, and if another needed more discussions, they should hold such discussions. Many had talked about a programme or schedule of work of the Conference, for a few weeks or months, it was very convenient to set up a schedule of activities or an indicative timetable or whatever you called it, but it was still not the mandate of the Conference. The programme of work was necessary for the Conference to start substantive work. If it was short of a clear plan on starting negotiations, then it was not meeting the requests of the international community. Japan was flexible on the four core issues and was ready to start substantive work on all of them. Japan’s position, as was the position of many others, was they should start negotiations based on the Shannon mandate, otherwise they would spend another year discussing the mandate of the negotiations. It believed that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was an indispensable step in the nuclear disarmament process and an indispensable step in the substantive work of the Conference this year.

MOHAMMAD HASSAD DARYEI (Iran) said the Conference on Disarmament was set up to negotiate disarmament instruments and every effort should be taken to carry out the role. Agreeing on a programme of work would help them fulfil their mandate. Iran had not received a response on whether a simplified programme of work would be conducive to their mandate. The top priority for many Member States of the Conference was nuclear disarmament. But it was the root cause of the difficulty in the work of the Conference. Iran believed that the Conference should adopt a balanced and comprehensive programme of work dealing with all the core issues with equilibrium and balance. Such a programme of work would enable the Conference to start negotiations on the four core issues. Nuclear disarmament remained the most important priority for Iran and many others and they would like to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to discuss nuclear disarmament immediately. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons. Iran also supported the start of negotiations on a legally binding treat to prevent weaponization of space. It believed that the issues of stock and verification should be dealt with in treaty dealing with fissile material. Their programme of work had to be clear on the important issue that any negotiations on fissile material that did not include stock would have no content.

HELLMUT HOFFMANN (Germany) said that the programme of work of the Conference was overdue by over a decade. According to their rules of procedure, the Conference was obliged to arrive at their programme of work at the beginning of every session. This semantic debate on the programme of work was interesting. Germany supported CD document 1864 and felt it was a good compromise. It dealt with all the agenda items and also contained a negotiating mandate for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It appeared to Germany to make imminent sense to adopt it, but alas it ran into difficulty after one Member State objected to it. In their lengthy debates on this issues, Germany had put forward the argument that they should defend their positions in negotiations. Germany believed that this was a good principle. Germany supported document 1864 but would not stand in the way if another sensible approach would emerge which started the negotiation of instruments in their field of disarmament and arms control.

VICTOR VASILIEV (Russian Federation) said the Russian Federation supported CD document 1864 but it would not repeat its views. If they were to talk about a balance of interests, then this balance of interests was reflected in specific issues, for example the Shannon mandate on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the direct balance of interests of the four core issues. FMCT was important and urgent to tackle, but that did not mean that other issues were less important to tackle. The situation as it was developing now was not going positively or on the right track. The mandate of the Conference was to negotiate. If they had to given an honest answer to a question on whether tomorrow they would be ready to adopt a programme of work and start negotiations, it would probably be no. Were they burying the Conference as it now stood? Any attempts to take issues outside the Conference, however noble the intentions might be, would result in extremely complicated and unproductive negotiations. Russian had no magic recipe but they were all responsible for the Conference and the question now was whether the Conference as an instrument would still exist when they had to discuss who the new Secretary-General of the Conference would be.

MOHAMED HATEM EL-ATWANY (Egypt) said the position of Egypt on the programme of work was well known. Nuclear disarmament was the top priority for Egypt. In recent days, they had heard of the importance of multilateral fora for nuclear disarmament. Unilateral or bilateral efforts were welcome, but they had a limited effect. Nuclear disarmament had to be dealt with in multilateral fora. Nuclear disarmament should be dealt with through a nuclear weapons convention with a specific time frame. Egypt went along with CD document 1864 as part of the cross regional consensus. Egypt agreed with Australia that as a bare minimum the programme of work should reflect what was agreed upon at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, even though document 1864 did not meet their expectations on this. They should concentrate their time and efforts to agree on a programme of work that would allow the Conference to deal with the issues and negotiate legally binding agreements on disarmament issues.

HAMZA KHELIF (Algeria) affirmed that Algeria had always been keen on adopting a programme of work to enable the Conference to start negotiations, and it had submitted several proposals. Algeria wanted to reaffirm some elements. The programme of work was not an ends in itself but rather a means to allow the Conference to make progress to negotiate disarmament treaties. Such a programme of work had to meet the security concerns of all States or groups of States within and outside the Conference. The programme should be a global one covering all of the priorities which needed to be converged to establish a safer world reflecting the principles of the United Nations Charter and priorities that should not be in conflict with one another. It should cover nuclear disarmament and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and it was also essential for it to deal with negative security assurances and cessation of an arms rate in outer space. Algeria realized that an FMCT was a priority for certain delegations who believed it was ripe for negotiations. But Algeria questioned what were the criteria used to say whether an item was ripe for negotiation or not. For Algeria, priority was for negative security assurances and negotiating an instrument to deal with this. For Algeria’s security, the issue of fissile material became a secondary matter. On the programme of work, Algeria had listened to those in favour of simplifying a work programme. Algeria was open to all initiatives that would allow the Conference to make progress. However the Conference needed to really start work and negotiate, not just tell the international community that it would. In that context, the simplified approach to a programme of work seemed to raise some questions. If they adopted such a programme of work, it would not ensure that it would allow them to make progress on negotiations. Quite the contrary, it might call into question the achievements the Conference had already reached. A simplified programme of work would take them further away from the target which was to start negotiations. They should focus on CD document 1864 which was a compromise and see to what extent they could reconcile their positions in order to start negotiations.

ERIC DANON (France) said Algeria had questioned the criteria that were used to say that cut-off negotiations were riper than others. There were two elements here. First, the priority attached to the negotiation of a cut-off treaty had been endorsed in two important fora, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the General Assembly. They both agreed that negotiations on a cut-off treaty were ripe, but did not take a similar position on, for instance, negative security assurances. There was pressure from the international community to start cut-off negotiations. The second argument was whether non-nuclear weapon States in the Conference would be ready to start negotiations on a cut-off treaty or nuclear security assurances or preventing an arms race in outer space. The reality was that the debate focused on what the nuclear weapon States were ready for, and the five nuclear weapon States, which owned 98 per cent of the world’s nuclear armaments, had announced they were ready for cut-off negotiations. But those in this room who were ready to negotiate negative security assurances owned less than 2 per cent of the world’s nuclear armaments.

HAMZA KHELIF (Algeria) said he had listened with interest to what France had to say, but did not wish to react to him now. Most of the delegations that had spoken had referred to CD document 1864 and the fact that it agreed to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Algeria had been behind document 1864 and supported it. But that document also included paragraphs that provided for an evolving nature of the other mandates in order to reach negotiating mandates; that was the spirit behind document 1864.

HELLMUT HOFFMANN (Germany) said in comparison to the sophisticated argument of France, he had a more basic problem with his colleague from Algeria. On the one hand, he called into question the ripeness of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Yet this issue had been settled in document 1864 and Algeria had negotiated it. So Germany was not sure where Algeria stood, was it trying to distance itself from document 1864?

HAMZA KHELIF (Algeria) said this was one of the handicaps of formal meetings. Algeria was in no way calling in question negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, but it did underscore the importance of national security assurances which in its opinion and many others was ripe for negotiations. The chapeau of document 1864 referred to the rolling or evolving nature of the mandate, and Algeria wished to underscore this.

PAUL WILSON (Australia) said his wished to respond to Egypt. His comments had been related to the effective implementation of these actions, that was the import of his comments, but they could discuss it at another time.

WANG QUN, President of the Conference on Disarmament, said this concluded their discussion on a programme of work. This was the last public plenary meeting of the Conference before their intersessional break. As President, he would continue to consult delegations on a bilateral basis on the programme of work. He would also prepare for the meetings after the intersessional break on how they could better advance their work. He had consulted with all the other P6 colleague and they encouraged delegations to send experts from capitals for the informal discussions. The next public plenary would be on Tuesday, 17 May at 11 a.m.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC11/026E