UN EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR LAUNCHES HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN

John Holmes, the United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, today launched the Humanitarian Action Plan to help vulnerable people in Afghanistan in 2009. Following the launch, he briefed journalists at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. He was accompanied by Nesar Popal, Advisor to the Presidency of Afghanistan, and Bo Asplund, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator.

John Holmes, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said today the Humanitarian Action Plan for Afghanistan for 2009 had been launched. The situation in Afghanistan was serious, and was getting worse, in particular due to the escalating armed conflict and the severe drought which had been raging for two years in some parts of the country. There was a need for increased humanitarian assistance to those most in need. The plan was the first such coordinated plan for some years for Afghanistan, and was an essential step to improving the response between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations agencies on the ground. The biggest needs were to be found in the areas of the consequences of armed conflict and drought - the biggest single need was to increase food assistance, in particular because of the effects of food prices.

The overall plan was for $ 604 million for humanitarian assistance throughout 2009. Of that amount, $ 354 million was for food, and almost $ 100 million was for mine action, to remove the large number of mines that were still in the country. There were many other areas to be covered - water and sanitation, protection concerns, and others. The humanitarian priorities were against a background of chronic poverty, as indicators were very poor; Afghanistan was very close to the bottom of the UNDP human development list.

Bo Asplund, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, said that this was the first time in seven years that there was a comprehensive Humanitarian Action Plan, and its formulation had involved NGOs and all agencies at work in the field, with the Red Cross as observers, and in dialogue with the Government. It was a precise plan, and had been carved out away from the development and recovery processes. It was a satisfactory piece - it was not a flash appeal that had been done quickly without analysis, it was a solidly grounded document.

In response to a question on whether there was an interest by the Taliban in de-mining as they had done before when in power; what had been the change in the mining situation since 2001; and whether the number of mines had increased over the last seven years, Mr. Asplund said the plan requested a large amount of money for de-mining. In the past, in some instances, the Taliban had sought collaboration from the United Nations system to de-mine. The work now extended into areas that were contested, but there was no massive undertaking on the part of the Taliban to de-mine territories that they held for shorter or longer periods. The number of mines had not increased - it had decreased

Answering a question on whether the explosion of a bridge in the Khyber Pass would affect humanitarian routes and the expanded assistance plans, Mr. Holmes said insecurity was a huge problem, especially for the population, but for humanitarian organizations it was a problem in terms of access of delivery. There were large areas that were extremely difficult to access, in particular for international United Nations staff and NGOs, due to the security situation. NGOs in particular had suffered grievously from insecurity in 2008 - 28 NGO workers were killed, and 72 had been abducted. United Nations agencies had suffered less, but had nevertheless had workers killed, wounded and abducted. Operations within the country continued. The World Food Programme was still able to move food around the country, and had done an amazing job in pre-positioning food supplies before the winter made moving food difficult.

Mr. Asplund said there were two main supply routes - one was between Kabul and the Pakistani frontier, and this was the main supply route for not just the foreign military presence but was also the major import route and for the Afghan private sector, humanitarian aid agencies, and others. The disruptions on the Jallalabad road had been less of a problem for the United Nations - it had come in instead through Qatar and Iran and had been able to manage. The big problems were the ring road, all the way from the Iranian border to Kabul. This was the main programme for the WFP and agencies dealing with non-food items. It was not so difficult to pre-position, but it was difficult and dangerous for the local trucking companies that the WFP and other agencies used to reach the ring road, and this was where there had been a large number of attacks. There had been some improvement on that situation over the last 6 weeks to 2 months, but not much.

Responding to a question on what was the significance of this being the first comprehensive plan in seven years; and whether this was reflective of the general situation, Mr. Holmes said the situation had gone back. After the removal of the Taliban in 2001, the general view was that this should allow the situation to improve, and the emphasis had been put on recovery and development. As time had gone on, and some of the underlying problems had emerged and the military situation had got more difficult, then it had become clear the humanitarian situation had got worse, and it was only in 2007 that the United Nations agencies had started to look at the situation in more detail. An OCHA office had been opened in Afghanistan only in 2007. There was a need for more resources, better cooperation, and more information on the situation, and this was why there was now a coordinated strategic plan with clear figures attached to it. There was a new situation which had to be looked at in a new way. On security, what the United Nations could and would try to do was to work even harder to ensure that the distinction between civilian and military actors was maintained, and that humanitarian actors could act in full respect of humanitarian principles, and to help forces opposed to the Government to be aware that humanitarian actors had no agenda other than helping people in need. This would require a lot of effort in terms of information and advocacy, and the OCHA office could help in this, in particular in taking forward the dialogue with non-State actors, ensuring that they left the humanitarian workers alone to do their work.

In response to a question on how many people would be reached with the plan; whether the plan dealt with crop substitution with the aim of encouraging farmers to grow something besides poppy; and whether the plan contained anything on education, in particular encouraging the education of girls, Mr. Holmes said the biggest figure was for food assistance, with $ 8.7 million for food assistance in 2009. On opium production, this was not being targeted directly, as there were other programmes dealing with this, but there was support for agriculture, with 290,000 farmers being helped to improve their agricultural production. It was hoped this would have an indirect effect. There was also $ 12.5 million for education, and improvement of education standards and access to education was viewed as absolutely crucial, in particular improving the access of girls, and Mr. Holmes said they were determined to not let this slip back. Girls and schools had refused to be intimidated. Mr. Asplund added that if the humanitarian action plan were fully funded, then one third of the estimated population would be reached, around 10 million people. The plan covered humanitarian assistance - and education was provided to the displaced or those affected by the humanitarian situation, but this was by far the smaller share of the education programmes going on in Afghanistan. Education had become the single most important priority of the Government.

Answering a question on whether this would cover all needs or whether there would be a need for more funds; and what was the involvement of Afghans in the formulation of this plan, Mr. Holmes said that the plan could not cover all humanitarian needs, and one thing that would be done was to improve the level of information in this regard. However, it would make a significant difference on the humanitarian front. Huge amounts of money had gone on development- the question was more whether it had been well spent. The Afghan NGOs and Government had been involved in the plan, and it was very much a joint collaborative effort.

NESAR POPAL, Advisor to the Presidency of Afghanistan, added that the plan had been drafted to take into account all the needs of the Afghan people and the Afghan Government.

Responding to a question on the non-state actors, and whether OCHA communicated with Al-Qaeda, or whether this was left to the ICRC; and why there was $ 1 billion for Darfur and $ 604 million for Afghanistan, Mr. Holmes said there was no OCHA contact with Al-Qaeda, but each organization had its own arrangements. There were contacts with people at the local level of the Taliban to make sure that humanitarian operations and staff were left alone. In principle, OCHA would speak to anybody in order to get humanitarian aid through, and had no scruples in doing so - this had nothing to do with politics, it was to do with carrying out the necessary work. With regards to Darfur, there was a large range of facilities being provided as well as food, such as camps. In Afghanistan, the $ 8.7 million covered supplementary food, rather than providing all necessary food.

In response to a question on where the office would be in Kabul; how much territory actually did the Government control; why there was no mention of the possible escalation of war due to the increase of the number of American troops; and whether the plan would cover that, as well as the increase of hostilities along the Pakistani border, Mr. Holmes said the main office would be in Kabul, with five or six other regional offices. In principle, the Government was in control of all the territory, and OCHA functioned on this basis. OCHA was aware of the plans to increase the number of troops, and the plan was designed for the situation as it was now, but it was not fixed in stone, it was a living document, and it would continue to be adapted as per the new situation and needs. On fighting around the border area in Pakistan, there was a lot of fighting in Pakistan, and there was a need for humanitarian aid in Pakistan itself, where OCHA was looking into beefing up its humanitarian assistance in order to be able to deal with the significant situation there.