Conference on Disarmament Holds Thematic Discussion on Negative Security Assurances

The Conference on Disarmament today held a thematic discussion on its agenda item 4 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or negative security assurances.

Ambassador Salomon Eheth of Cameroon, President of the Conference on Disarmament, opening the thematic discussion, introduced the panellists.

Usman Jadoon, Director General (United Nations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, said a negative security assurances treaty negotiated and concluded in the Conference on Disarmament could prove beneficial on multiple counts, including in the domain of security; non-proliferation; ethical-moral grounds; and restoration of the international confidence in, and revitalisation of the disarmament machinery by ending the Conference’s longstanding impasse. Views differed on three key questions for concluding a multilateral treaty on negative security assurances. The first was who would give the assurance, nuclear weapon States belonging to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, or all nuclear armed States. The second was who would be eligible to receive the assurance, or the question of exclusions. The third was where to negotiate the treaty. Given the right amount of political will and resolve to forge a treaty on negative security assurances, these differences could be bridged.

Marc Finaud, Head of Arms Proliferation at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, said the most effective and radical means of eliminating the risk of use of nuclear weapons would of course be their total elimination. However, in the meantime, if all States that had verifiably renounced nuclear weapons were protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this would greatly contribute to the goal of lowering the risk of a nuclear war. The most comprehensive negative security assurance would be a no-first use policy, i.e. the commitment by all nuclear armed States to limit the case of use of nuclear weapons to retaliation against an attack with nuclear weapons. Before such a policy was adopted by all nuclear armed States, the need to clarify the conditions under which non-nuclear-weapon States could benefit from negative security assurances would remain. There were other ways and means to reduce the risk of any use of nuclear weapons, such as de-alerting, hotlines, and confidence- and security-building measures.

In the discussion, many speakers said the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as mandated by the General Assembly. Pending this, there was an urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional, irrevocable and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Some speakers said that declarations and resolutions were positive but were still guarantees with conditions attached and did not provide complete guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and did not meet the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. A conference could be convened under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament to establish a sub-committee mandated to initiate negotiations to draft a legally binding instrument to provide effective guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States on the use of negative security assurances. A number of speakers called for pursuing efforts towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Speaking in the discussion were Kenya on behalf of the G21, Iraq, Egypt, United States, Argentina, Indonesia, China, Ukraine, Spain, Syria, France, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Germany, Russia, Republic of Korea, India, Algeria, Brazil, and Iran.

Israel, Iran, Germany, and the United Kingdom spoke in point of order.

The United States spoke in right of reply.

The next public plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 15 June to hold a thematic discussion on agenda item 5 on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons.

Opening Remarks by the President of the Conference

Ambassador SALOMON EHETH of Cameroon, President of the Conference on Disarmament, opening the thematic discussion on agenda item 4 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or negative security assurances, introduced the panellists.

Keynote Speakers

USMAN JADOON, Director General (United Nations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, said the issue of negative security assurances had now been on the international agenda for 55 years. Over the years, while the Conference had remained unable to meet the expectation by commencing negotiations on an international treaty on negative security assurances, such assurances had been extended in different forms and formats, including as unilateral declarations; United Nations Security Council resolutions; and protocols to treaties establishing regional nuclear weapons free zones. However, these arrangements had neither been homogenous nor uniform, and had generally been qualified with various conditions, which even kept changing with time and circumstances. As a result, they had not been able to fully satisfy the intended beneficiaries.

A negative security assurances treaty negotiated and concluded in the Conference on Disarmament could prove beneficial on multiple counts, including in the domain of security; non-proliferation; ethical-moral grounds; and restoration of the international confidence in, and revitalisation of the disarmament machinery by ending the Conference’s longstanding impasse. Views differed on three key questions for concluding a multilateral treaty on negative security assurances. The first was who would give the assurance, nuclear weapon States belonging to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, or all nuclear armed States. The second was who would be eligible to receive the assurance, or the question of exclusions. The third was where to negotiate the treaty. Given the right amount of political will and resolve to forge a treaty on negative security assurances, these differences could be bridged.

Negative security assurances could be termed as the lowest hanging fruit on the Conference on Disarmament tree. One concrete manner of moving forward would be to aggregate in a matrix all of the existing measures covered under the negative security assurances provided through unilateral declarations or through the United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as through the protocols to the various nuclear weapon free zone treaties. It would help identify the significant overlap and common elements that could be the point of departure for fleshing out other details of the treaty.

MARC FINAUD, Head of Arms Proliferation at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, said he had addressed the 2018 and 2019 sessions of the Conference on Disarmament and referred to a background paper co-authored with John Borrie from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research that had mapped all the existing unilateral statements or legally binding commitments made by the nuclear armed States regarding assurances of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This mapping had demonstrated the diversity of positions of nuclear armed States, including changes over time, and in particular the variety of conditions required by such States to implement their assurances as well as a number of points that would need to be clarified because of the ambiguity of the way they were formulated. In this sense, the demand of non-nuclear-weapon States for a clear, single, and legally binding formula of negative security assurance by all nuclear armed States was more relevant than ever. It was now high time to consider the issue of negative security assurances in the context of nuclear risk reduction. There was a new importance and urgency with the growing recognition that the risk of use of nuclear weapons had never been so high since the Cold War.

The most effective and radical means of eliminating the risk of use of nuclear weapons would of course be their total elimination. However, in the meantime, if all States that had verifiably renounced nuclear weapons were protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this would greatly contribute to the goal of lowering the risk of a nuclear war. More and more experts and decision makers agreed that the most comprehensive negative security assurance would be a no-first use policy, i.e. the commitment by all nuclear armed States to limit the case of use of nuclear weapons to retaliation against an attack with nuclear weapons. Before such a policy was adopted by all nuclear-armed States, the need to clarify the conditions under which non-nuclear-weapon States could benefit from negative security assurances would remain.

There were other ways and means to reduce the risk of any use of nuclear weapons, such as de-alerting, hotlines, and confidence- and security-building measures, in particular in zones of potential conventional conflict or tensions such as the Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization contact zone. Recommendations had been formulated by independent experts, particularly of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe Network or the European Leadership Network, and should now be implemented by their respective governments.

Discussion

Many speakers said the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as mandated by the General Assembly. Pending this, there was an urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional, irrevocable and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Some speakers said that declarations and resolutions were positive but were still guarantees with conditions attached and did not provide complete guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and did not meet the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. A conference could be convened under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament to establish a sub-committee mandated to initiate negotiations to draft a legally binding instrument to provide effective guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States on the use of negative security assurances.

A number of speakers called for pursuing efforts towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in accordance with the numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and in implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. One State said that while it was not willing to negotiate universally and legally binding negative security assurances, it had extended them to parties to some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. Some speakers said that the possible adoption of an agreement granting negative security assurances must not undermine the assurances already granted by nuclear weapon States as part of nuclear weapon free zones, nor should they replace obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Some speakers said that various pledges made by the five nuclear weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as nuclear weapon free zones did not provide adequate assurances to the legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States, as they were either non-binding, limited in scope, or subject to conditions. Therefore, it was prudent for non-nuclear-weapon States to keep urging for an early agreement on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances. One State said that against the backdrop of the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it was more important and urgent than ever for the Conference to launch negotiations on an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. This should become the priority of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The political will would inevitably appear. Another speaker said that to move on in the field of disarmament, the international community had to first ensure the compliance with existing arms control and non-proliferation international instruments.

Speakers said that States that had given up their pursuit of nuclear weapons demanded complete security assurances, not doctrines or declarations from nuclear weapon States.
They expressed their support for nuclear weapon free zones, regretting frustrated attempts to create a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Nuclear weapon free zones were a positive step towards a nuclear weapon free world. One speaker said that the no-first use doctrine was not compatible with all nuclear doctrines. It was the choice of many nuclear weapon States not to adopt this doctrine as it was highly controversial. Some speakers said that reviving security assurances served as a concrete objective to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and further promote international peace and security. Therefore, the discussion today was not only timely but highly pertinent. One speaker said that his country provided legally binding security assurances to about 120 States, adding that the number would continue to grow. The next step was the prompt conclusion of legal arrangements related to the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in southeast Asia. The creation in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction was also supported. The Conference on Disarmament was a unique forum in terms of being a multilateral forum for negotiations and it had the mandate and opportunities related to negative security assurances.

Some speakers said that the enhancement of negative security assurances would contribute to strengthening the relevance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, they said negative security assurances should not be non-conditional and automatic. They should apply to States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that were in full compliance with the treaty. Other speakers said they supported the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States as a matter of priority. Some speakers said that nuclear disarmament was the main priority and guarantee not to be attacked by nuclear weapons and directly related to their complete and irrevocable elimination. Until this happened, the question of negative security assurances was a crucial element for States that did not possess nuclear weapons. The current security situation in the world was of great concern. The deterrence policies and modernisation of nuclear arsenals reinforced the belief that there was a great need to conclude relevant international treaties. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum to deal directly with the issue of negative security assurances as part of a balanced programme of work.

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