CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held the first public plenary meeting of the third and last part of its 2019 session, during which it addressed the issue of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Conference heard statements by Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Aliyar Azeez, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva, and Robert Müller, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Zerbo recalled that the Conference on Disarmament had negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 23 years ago and said that over the past year and a half, one State – Tuvalu - had signed the Treaty and two more had ratified it – Thailand and Zimbabwe - bringing the number of signatures at 184 and ratifications to 168. In these days of supposed paralysis of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, this was real progress that should be cherished, he said. The preparations for the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference had revealed the differing viewpoints on key issues and the widening gaps between States parties but the Non-Proliferation Treaty had proved strikingly resilient in the past and open to positive change agents from outside. A successful outcome of the Review Conference would be one that recognized the achievements in the architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament and preserved it for the future while creating space for dialogue and movement on both ‘front burner’ and ‘back burner’ issues.

Mr. Azeez said that disarming was a complicated and protracted exercise; once armaments were in place, it was a human tendency to seek to use them, not just to ensure safety but to achieve advantage over others perceived as rivals or competitors. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had come into force in 1970 and it contained three key pillars of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear disarmament. Mr. Azeez stressed the need for early negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material and then emphasized the need to preserve the existing disarmament architecture, which had been developed over decades with painful efforts and a vast amount of resources and which must not be left to disintegrate.

Mr. Müller stressed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the most outstanding success under the Conference on Disarmament’s core issue of nuclear disarmament, was a key instrument of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. And yet, more than two decades after the conclusion of negotiations, the Treaty was still to enter into force. Its universalization and particularly action by the remaining Annex II States to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay would be crucial for progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Today, many of the important achievements in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were in imminent danger; as tensions rose, it was all the more important to preserve at a bare minimum the progress achieved to uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

During the discussion, delegates said that the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 had been a significant milestone and were alarmed by the current impasse in the global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation frameworks. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime remained central to the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture contributing to global peace and security, speakers said, noting the urgency of its entry into force. Urging the remaining Annex II States to sign and ratify the instrument, they also noted that all States must be on board to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The political, legal, and other commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament had relatively little value if not upheld by a solid, neutral professional, and robust verification systems, delegations noted, commending the Treaty’s world-class International Monitoring System. Taking part in the discussion were Viet Nam, Zimbabwe, Finland on behalf of the European Union, Argentina, Russia, Republic of Korea, Australia, Egypt, France, United Kingdom, Myanmar, Pakistan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United States.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Conference on Disarmament observed a minute of silence in memory of Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Meena Singelee thanked the President and the members of the Conference on Disarmament for their condolences on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Conference on Disarmament will next meet at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 31 July 2019.

Statements

LASSINA ZERBO, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, recalled that the Conference on Disarmament had negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 23 years ago and said that over the past year and a half, one State – Tuvalu - had signed the Treaty and two more had ratified it – Thailand and Zimbabwe - bringing the number of signatures at 184 and ratifications to 168. In these days of supposed paralysis of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, this was real progress that should be cherished, he said. Turning to the Treaty’s verification regime, Mr. Zerbo said that the International Monitoring System was nearing completion and that several important stations had been installed or certified in the past several years. The certification of the last remaining hydroacoustic station in Crozet Islands, France had marked the major milestone on the way to the completion of the verification system; five stations had been verified in Chine, two primary seismic stations and three radionuclide stations.

The International Data Centre continued to process analyse data registered at monitoring stations and to share them with 1,300 institutions in 130 countries, and it continued to develop capabilities, resulting in a far better detection threshold than many had thought would be possible than the Treaty had been negotiated, Mr. Zerbo stressed. The permanent Technology Support and Training Centre, inaugurated last month in Austria, offered a modern, purpose-built location for all the Treaty’s technologies and for future capacity-building and training exercises, in a clear sign that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was here to stay and that it was a part of the collective legacy to future generations.

The preparations for the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference had revealed the differing viewpoints on key issues and the widening gaps between States parties, noted Mr. Zerbo and recalled that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, had proved strikingly resilient in the past and open to positive change agents from outside. One example was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had saved the Non-Proliferation Treaty at times of high tensions in the past and could do so again. A successful outcome of the Review Conference would be one that recognized the achievements in the architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament and preserved it for the future while creating space for dialogue and movement on both ‘front burner’ and ‘back burner’ issues. Building trust and confidence was key – despite the temptation to focus on the fraying of relationships, there were positives from which hope could be drawn, said Mr. Zerbo and welcomed the recent resumption of talks between the United States and Russia in Geneva.

ALIYAR AZEEZ, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva, noted that disarming was a complicated and protracted exercise; once armaments were in place, it was a human tendency to seek to use the arms, not just to ensure safety but to achieve advantage over others perceived as rivals or competitors. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Non-Proliferation Treaty) had been negotiated in a strategic security landscape where the interests of a few States had determined how it had evolved. Envisaged to be integral to global efforts at strengthening international peace and security, the Treaty had come into force in 1970 and contained three key pillars of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear disarmament. Between 1965 and 1990, the world had witnessed the signing of arms control treaties between major powers; the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty were among the key agreements to control the number of nuclear weapons.

The implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had led to a varying degree of compliance by State Parties and it had allowed nuclear weapons States to retain their arsenals while making nuclear non-proliferation imperative. The uneven playing field that had emerged from its implementation, its structure, its use or abuse by Parties, as well as approaches of States that had chosen to stay outside the framework of the Treaty, had led to many questions, including those related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Most States, especially developing ones, considered this as their sovereign right, but practical concerns placed in the path of peaceful uses of nuclear energy still denied them the opportunities to effectively realize this right.

Mr. Azeez stressed the need for early negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material and then emphasized the need to preserve the existing disarmament architecture, which had been developed over decades with painful efforts and a vast amount of resources and which must not be left to disintegrate.

ROBERT MÜLLER, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria to the Conference on Disarmament, at the outset, emphasized that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and progress on nuclear disarmament were crucial for international peace and security. Non-proliferation and disarmament regimes were highly interconnected via complementary and mutually reinforcing treaties, he said and stressed the unique mandate of the Conference on Disarmament and the centrality of the need for progress on nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the most outstanding success under the Conference on Disarmament’s core issue of nuclear disarmament, was a key instrument of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, he said, recalling that as of today, 184 signatories had committed themselves to the Treaty and to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and the purpose. And yet, more than two decades after the conclusion of negotiations, the Treaty was still to enter into force. Its universalization and particularly action by the remaining Annex II States to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay would be crucial for progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Traditionally, Mr. Müller continued, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations had often paved the way to facilitate negotiations on multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. In the past, the most important reductions had been achieved through bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the New START Treaty, while in the area of non-proliferation, the 2015 Vienna agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had been a historic achievement. Today, many of those important achievements were in imminent danger. A renewed nuclear arms race would not only be against the spirit of decade long nuclear arms control but could also be detrimental to non-proliferation efforts. As tensions rose, it was all the more important to preserve at a bare minimum the progress achieved to uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Discussion

DUONG CHI DUNG, Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva and President of the Conference on Disarmament, speaking in his national capacity, recalled that the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 had been a significant milestone and said that the current impasse in the global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation frameworks was alarming. Viet Nam consistently supported all efforts towards nuclear disarmament and cessation of a nuclear arms race, globally and regionally. Universal accession to the fundamental legal framework on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament was crucial to the assurance of a world free of nuclear weapons, he said and stressed that the Conference on Disarmament had an important role to play in the discussion towards such goal.

Zimbabwe recalled that in February this year, Zimbabwe had joined the community of nations which had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and which were saying “no” to the testing of nuclear weapons. The ratification of the Treaty was Zimbabwe’s practical demonstration of the strong commitment to its international obligations and responsibilities. Universalization of the Treaty was not only about the Annex II States alone: while their ratification was indeed needed for the Treaty to enter into force, all States must be on board to achieve the goal of universalization. The ultimate goal was to eliminate nuclear weapons and Zimbabwe believed that the Treaty contributed to that objective.

Finland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, underlined that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiated in this chamber, was one of the key pillars of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture contributing to global peace and security. While the Treaty was still to enter into force, it had established a de facto norm against nuclear testing, as demonstrated by the fact that only the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had conducted nuclear tests in the 21^st century. The efforts to promote entry into force of the Treaty remained a priority, and the European Union called on all States, particularly those listed in Annex II, notably China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Pakistan, to sign and ratify the Treaty without any preconditions and further delay. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization had provided the world with a truly global, hi-tech monitoring system for nuclear explosions and had demonstrated the ability to provide independent and reliable data that helped deter non-compliance and respond to threats to international peace and security. Maintaining a highly sophisticated verification system, including further development of on-site inspection verification capabilities, required substantial financial input and all States should honour their financial obligations and step up their political support, concluded the European Union.

Argentina stressed the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the importance of the Treaty’s ratification by the Annex II States. Nuclear moratoria by countries with nuclear weapons were not enough, Argentina said, noting that there was a Treaty which carried a decisive force. The 2020 Review Conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an opportunity to renew the call for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The political, legal, and other commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament had relatively little value if not upheld by a solid, neutral professional, and robust verification systems. Initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification were positive steps in this direction.

Russia recalled that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose catalysing role had been emphasized during the negotiations, had not worked. Russia, which possessed one of the largest nuclear arsenals, was not ignoring its responsibilities concerning the demilitarization of the shared home and remained ready to take all steps to create a world free of nuclear weapons. Again and again, Russia expressed its openness to substantive discussions on this topic of particular importance to international peace and security, however, the United States approach to international peace and security was showing a sharp change of course, as Washington was returning to the strong-arm position of upholding its security interests. This was to the detriment of ensuring security by the consistent reduction in weapons. The main instrument of the United States was an unlimited increase in strategic potential, including offensive nuclear capacity and defensive missile defence components.

The United States was thus seeking to gain an enormous military advantage over its military, political, and economic rivals. This explained the United States decision to leave the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the lengthy silence regarding the e4xtension of the START Treaty which would end in February 2021. Russia denounced the silence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its support for Washington, which enabled such a behaviour. After 2 August, there would be no prohibition of the development and deployment everywhere of two previously prohibited clusters of missiles, able to carry nuclear warheads. The United States had received a silent assent to go on breaching treaty obligations, thanks to the support of its allies. The world might be on the eve of a new era when all achievements in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament risked being set back to zero, and when the future was one increasing mistrust and tension between States. It was doubtful that the future generations would be thankful to America.

Republic of Korea said that the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were closely intertwined and stressed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was essential in preventing qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons. Its entry into force, therefore, must be a priority. The Republic of Korea recognized the positive efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with its commitments concerning the cessation of nuclear tests. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin which required efforts by all States. In this sense, the Republic of Korea welcomed recent measures that aimed to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States, in particular, the newly initiated process within the P5.

Australia said that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime remained central to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and that, although not yet in force, the Treaty had created a powerful norm against nuclear testing. Its world-class verification system was largely operational and had more than proved its worth. The International Monitoring System was a global collaborative endeavour that Australia took pride in. Time and effort were needed to ensure that the Treaty’s verification system was fully effective and complete, that all international monitoring stations were operational, and that the data the system generated were available to all Member States.

Egypt underlined that nuclear disarmament remained a top priority and recalled that non-nuclear weapons States had been consistently calling for the full implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to ensure the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons continued to exist in staggering numbers, with an increasing role in military and security policies, concepts, and doctrines of nuclear weapons States, which had, regrettably, placed the concept of nuclear deterrence above the objective and purpose of the Treaty for over five decades. Egypt continued to believe that the goals envisioned by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were essential to achieving the long-aspired objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and that the nuclear weapons States had a special responsibility to take steps towards its entry into force.

France stressed the continued relevance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and said that its universalization was within reach, as it required the ratification by only eight more States. France strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty without any delays. France was one of the first States to have signed and ratified the Treaty in 1998 and remained the only State which had permanently and transparently disassembled its nuclear testing site in the Pacific in 1998. Furthermore, France had significantly reduced its nuclear arsenal and had ceased the production of plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons. The start of the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, an indispensable complement to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, was a priority in order to allow the double quantitative and qualitative limitation of arsenals, without which the goal of a world without nuclear weapons remained an unreachable horizon.

United Kingdom remained a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty politically, financially, and technically, and viewed its entry into force as an essential step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In the context of the next year’s Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – which continued to offer a framework that was central to the shared goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons – the United Kingdom said that significant further disarmament was difficult to foresee in the current security environment. Some countries were expanding their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a reckless path of breaching arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as developing destabilizing new delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Like all other the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, the United Kingdom considered Russia solely responsible for the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Its talk of unswerving compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties was empty rhetoric not born out by the evidence. All States must remain resolute in working to deter such threats and to face down those who were seeking to undermine the decades of progress. Against this complex security backdrop, the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent remained essential, both to its security and that of its NATO Allies, for as long as the global security situation demanded. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained as relevant and important now as it had ever been, it required constant nurturing to ensure it remained effective. That was why the United Kingdom was working with international partners to ensure that the 2020 Review Conference reinforced hared interest and sought to advance its goals.

Myanmar stressed the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements and that its first task was the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work with a negotiating mandate. In this context, Myanmar welcomed the substantive discussions on agenda items which could lead to a greater understating of States’ positions and might bring the Conference on Disarmament back to action in years to come. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were a top priority for Myanmar, which also highlighted the importance of starting the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances.

Pakistan recalled that the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978 had recognized the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons and that, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each State to security should be kept in mind. Over time, however, there had been a progressive erosion of the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. The prime objective of the disarmament process – the attainment of equal and undiminished security for all States - was being ignored; a selected few States continued to perpetuate the unequal status quo to their continued strategic advantage. On the other end of the spectrum lied the more recent initiative that trivialized national security concerns, which, in highlighting the humanitarian and moral imperative, ignored the vital strategic considerations that underpinned nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament could not progress without addressing the security concerns of States that relied on nuclear weapons, Pakistan stressed.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stressed that the discussions should not name and point finger at some countries and objected to portraying the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the main obstacle to the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty while ignoring other issues critical to nuclear disarmament. Accession to any international treaty was a sovereign right of a State, in line with its security priorities and needs. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remained committed to building a lasting and durable peace regime and move towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as clarified in the Joint Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-the United States Statement signed in June 2018. Thus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea declared that it would no longer make and test nuclear weapons nor use or proliferate them and had taken various practical measures.

China said that in the current global situation, the relevance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must be strengthened and reiterated its commitment to promoting its entry into force as soon as possible. In the context of the eroding global and regional security, uncertainty, and instability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained problematic. Against such a complex backdrop, the recently issued Tenth White Paper on National Defence expanded the views on the pursuit of the national defence policy which was defensive in nature and followed a path of peaceful development. China, the world’s second-largest economy, had never and would never follow the beaten path of great powers and seek hegemony, expansion, or spheres of influence – those were distinctive features of the national defence in the new era. The White Paper pointed out the nuclear strategy of self-defence and the commitment to the ‘no first use’ policy in all circumstances. Since it could not ignore the security environment, China was advancing the modernization of its armed forces including by removing institutional barriers; introducing new command system, military policies, and institutions; and adopting a new defence spending policy.

Indonesia said that due to time constraints, it would submit its statement in writing.

Mexico welcomed the initiative to seek progress on topics on the agenda and negotiating mandate of the Conference on Disarmament and firmly condemned nuclear tests under any circumstances. Mexico said that, due to time constraints, it would submit the statement in writing.

United States recalled Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, the redrawing of borders in Europe by force, its cyber-attacks, and its efforts to weaponize outer space. The United States shared the concern of many countries about several strategic offensive arms systems, unveiled by President Putin in his March 2018 speech. The United States would continue to maintain the nuclear testing moratorium and called upon all nuclear weapons States to declare and maintain a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Russian propaganda remained ineffective in deflecting the focus away from the country’s very threatening build-up of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons that had been ongoing for over ten years, the United States said, noting that its Nuclear Posture Review was a very clear response to Russia’s behaviour as well as to the build-up of nuclear forces by other States that were in strategic competition with the United States.


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