CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PROPOSALS ON A CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM AND ON A PROGRAMME OF WORK

The Conference on Disarmament this morning discussed proposals by the Russian Federation to open negotiations on a convention on chemical and biological terrorism as well as on a programme of work.

Ambassador Tehmina Janjua of Pakistan, President of the Conference, stated that this was the last public plenary meeting under the Presidency of Pakistan, but it would continue to use the remaining time for meetings to try to bring the Conference closer to a consensus.

Brazil said that Non-Nuclear Weapon States had no alternative but to take the lead and set the nuclear disarmament process in motion again. France believed that the next logical and effective step would be to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Morocco said it was ready to support any initiatives which would help develop the climate of confidence, while taking into account the priorities and concerns of all States. Norway said that it was unable to support the main views in the Russian paper as the main challenge for the international community was the lack of implementation of the existing treaties rather than the lack of legal instruments.

South Africa opined that nuclear weapons could not be treated as a matter relevant only for a few countries which possessed such weapons; instead, it was the business of all countries and all peoples. Germany said it had a tendency, at least for the time being, to rely more on the existing measures than to use the Conference for devising new instruments to combat biological and chemical terrorism.

Syria believed that chemical threats were imminent and there were numerous reports about Daesh, which was expanding beyond Syria and Iraq, and other groups possessing such weapons. Switzerland said that if there was no consensus on the Russian proposal, perhaps the text could be reworded to make it more broadly acceptable. All delegations needed to show flexibility in order to break the deadlock. The United States stressed that it was not necessary to negotiate a new convention on chemical and biological terrorism as there were a number of other, already existing instruments.

The Russian Federation said that there had been specific situations which could not be resolved through the existing legal channels and instruments. What would the Conference on Disarmament be doing otherwise, given that the traditional items on its agenda could not be supported by consensus?

Ambassador Mazlan Muhammad of Malaysia bid his farewell to the Conference, as his term of duty was coming to an end.

In concluding remarks, Ambassador Janjua of Pakistan stated that numerous consultations had been held, through which it had become clear that nobody could be excluded in a forum that operated on the basis of consensus. While the adoption of a programme of work should continue to be the first and most important priority, a schedule of activities of discussions on substantive issues should also be given attention.

The next public meeting of the Conference will take place on Tuesday, 31 May at 10 a.m., under the Presidency of Peru.

Statements

Ambassador TAHMINA JANJUA of Pakistan, President of the Conference, expressed her appreciation for the level of participation at the informal event on women and disarmament held the previous week. Facilitating consensus on a programme of work had been the top priority for the Pakistani Presidency. Pakistan would continue to use the remaining time for meetings to try to bring the Conference closer to the consensus. The latest Russian proposal had merged elements of the United Kingdom’s draft with Russia’s own earlier proposal. Delegations were invited to express their views on that and other draft proposals.

Brazil noted that progress in nuclear disarmament seemed to be a distant goal under the current circumstances. The root causes of the longstanding impasse lay in the wide-open gap between the majority of States, which saw nuclear weapons as a threat to international security, and those who believed that such weapons increased security and could be relied upon indefinitely. To bridge the cognitive gap at this point seemed to be a difficult task. The Non-Nuclear Weapon States had no alternative but to take the lead and set the nuclear disarmament process in motion again. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones should play an active role in nuclear disarmament negotiations and should not merely be considered as areas of retreat from nuclear politics. Brazil raised the possibility of a hybrid treaty to be complemented by protocols on the elimination of nuclear arsenals and on the non-discriminatory verification regime to be implemented after the dismantlement of all nuclear weapons. Brazil disagreed that progress on nuclear disarmament had to be conditioned to the maintenance of a hypothetical international strategic stability. Multilateral negotiations on a prohibition treaty would represent a major, if intermediate, step in the right direction.

France informed that, following internal arrangements, France had transferred to the United States responsibility to coordinate the P5 process. Speaking in its national capacity, France said that the P5 process served to develop common approaches to the disarmament agenda in accordance with the five countries’ commitments and obligations. The P5 had worked to implement the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan, in particular to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence. Since assuming the coordinating role in July 2015, France had tried to give a new momentum to the process in gathering the group on a more frequent basis. Stronger and deeper P5 cooperation was essential to make progress in a concrete manner for the benefit of all NPT parties. Nuclear disarmament could not be achieved overnight; an incremental and pragmatic approach was the only effective way ahead. Productive results could only be ensured through a consensus-based approach. France was looking forward to pursuing the dialogue with its four partners and to deepen the work on reporting and transparency. France believed that the next logical and effective step would be to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Morocco believed that the large number of initiatives to revive the work of the Conference was a good sign of the collective awareness of the need to move the Conference from its standstill. Those proposals had unleashed a certain level of dynamism, which ought to be supported and encouraged. Morocco had concerns over the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by terrorist groups, which was a genuine threat which required due attention by the international community. A continued dialogue on the Russian proposal, thus, would be very much welcome. Morocco was ready to support any initiatives which would help develop the climate of confidence, while taking into account the priorities and concerns of all States. Morocco was in favour of a constructive approach and was proposing parallel discussions on various proposals put forward by the United States, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Russia.

Norway said it had studied the proposal of the Russian Federation, and fully shared the view that chemical and biological terrorism constituted a threat which had to be constructively addressed. Norway was unable to support the main views in the Russian paper. The main challenge for the international community was the lack of implementation of the existing treaties, rather than the lack of legal instruments. What was needed was to develop practical measures and Norway was ready to join such deliberations within the framework of existing Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, or within the General Assembly. The Conference on Disarmament was not seen as a productive avenue for that end.

South Africa said that for many years it had warned that the standstill in the Conference could not continue without impacting multilateralism and bringing questions about the relevance of the Conference. If some Members used the rules of procedure to block consensus, the body might as well become irrelevant. Security could not be a zero-sum game. Nuclear weapons could not be treated as a matter relevant only for a few countries which possessed such weapons; instead, it was the business of all countries and all peoples. Different countries’ priorities needed not be mutually exclusive, but all needed to recognize the legitimate concerns of others. One of the key questions regarding the Russian proposal was whether the Conference was the right forum to consider issues of terrorism. Nonetheless, South Africa would not stand in the way of a consensus. South Africa supported negotiations on a framework convention on nuclear disarmament.

Germany stated that fighting biological and chemical terrorism was very important, but a number of fora were already dealing with those issues. Germany had a tendency, for the time being, to rely more on the existing measures than to use the Conference for devising new instruments.

Syria valued the efforts made to reach a consensus on the Conference’s agenda. Syria believed that the Conference was the right place to negotiate the Russian proposal. Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations gave the General Assembly the right to make proposals on codifications of international law. The Conference was the only authorized international body to negotiate legally binding treaties on disarmament. Article 25 of the Charter read that Member States ought to implement Security Council resolutions, which did not make the Security Council a legislative body. In principle, chemical threats were imminent and there were numerous reports about Daesh, which was expanding beyond Syria and Iraq, and other groups possessing such weapons. Al Qaeda had chemical laboratories and was conducting tests, which were made possible thanks to the expertise it possessed. Syria hoped that the Conference would adopt a programme of work this year.

Switzerland emphasized the importance of the Conference agreeing to a programme of work this year; otherwise 2016 would mark the twentieth anniversary of the body’s paralysis and the process of its marginalization would continue to grow. The question of the adoption of a programme of work was urgent. Switzerland thanked Russia for its efforts to take into account various comments made on its proposal. A large number of points in the document seemed relevant to Switzerland, and it was timely to support all efforts to elaborate such an instrument which would consolidate the existing norms. Switzerland appreciated Russia’s proposed programme of work, which included elements of proposals put forward by other delegations. A strong mandate on nuclear disarmament needed to be included in any programme of work. If there was no consensus on the Russian proposal, perhaps the text could be reworded to make it more broadly acceptable. All delegations needed to show flexibility in order to break the deadlock.

United States said it had reviewed the Russian proposal and maintained a number of questions. It was not necessary to negotiate a new convention on chemical and biological terrorism as there were a number of existing instruments. If there was a gap, it was the implementation gap; the existing instruments should not be undermined.

Russian Federation said that the comments made confirmed the repeatedly stated assessments that most Conference Members either supported the proposal or were ready to join the consensus if one were to emerge. There were also those who were not fully convinced of the need to elaborate a new international instrument. Russia believed that the Security Council resolution 1540 primarily dealt with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There had been specific situations which could not be resolved through the existing legal channels and instruments. There were many channels for negotiations, but biological terrorism could not be discussed at The Hague, for example. What would the Conference on Disarmament be doing otherwise, given that the traditional items on its agenda could not be supported by consensus? What were the real chances of coming to an agreement on a programme of work this year? The Conference was the only multilateral negotiating forum in the area of disarmament, and Russia saw no obstacles to discussing the prevention of chemical and biological terrorism there. It would be good to pull the efforts together and elaborate a single, legally binding instrument in that regard.

Ambassador MAZLAN MUHAMMAD of Malaysia informed that his term of duty in Geneva was coming to an end this month. It was regrettable that the Conference had not made progress in recent years. Ambassadors from various countries holding the presidency of the Conference, including Malaysia, had not been able to break the deadlock in spite of their best efforts. Malaysia believed that there was no reason why the Conference should give priority to one agenda item over another; the Conference had enough meeting time and capacity to discuss them all in parallel. For the sake of the humanity, the Conference should move ahead.

Ambassador TAHMINA JANJUA of Pakistan, President of the Conference, informed that there would be no more public plenary meetings this week, but consultations on a programme of work would continue. This was the last plenary meeting under the Presidency of Pakistan. The Conference had witnessed a number of proposals this year, which demonstrated the interest by Members to move the work of the Conference forward. Numerous consultations had been held, and it had become clear that nobody could be excluded in a forum that operated on the basis of consensus. While the adoption of a programme of work should continue to be the first and most important priority, a schedule of activities of discussions on substantive issues should also be given attention. The new President would make a decision in that regard. Ms. Janjua believed that the duration of the Presidency was not an impediment, as different Presidents worked in a collegial manner. Member States would not change their positions even if the duration of the Presidency was increased. It was not realistic to expect States to enter negotiations on treaties which would endanger their national interests.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC16/021E