CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES

The Conference on Disarmament held a plenary meeting this morning in which it discussed negative security assurances.

During the discussion speakers said that at least some nuclear weapons States resisted the idea of signing a legally binding instrument containing negative security assurances by arguing that a political declaration would bring the same effect. This was false for three reasons. Firstly, a declaration, even if it was confirmed by a resolution, did not create an obligation under international law duly contracted among parties according to their own legislation. Only through due process could a State confirm its consent to limit its own sovereignty by means of a negotiated international legal instrument. Secondly, the refusal to work on a treaty was equivalent to denying an obligation and indicated a State intending to maintain the possibility of using nuclear weapons against any perceived enemy. Thirdly, some nuclear weapons States, while declaring that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against unarmed States, established exceptions either based on their judgement on compliance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by non-nuclear weapons States or, more generally, on their own vital interests. Non-nuclear weapons States that received so-called positive security assurances by placing themselves under nuclear umbrellas did not receive the benefit of negative security assurances by default.

On the other hand, assurances granted within the framework of nuclear weapons free zones were insufficient and inadequate as well; these zones did not cover all parts of the world and the Middle East was a case in point. A universal, international, legally binding and non-discriminatory instrument was the only way to move nuclear weapons States farther from using these weapons. The world favoured this type of agreement and it would meet the concerns of non-nuclear weapons States on the one hand, and would promote the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on the other. The credibility of any treaty depended on its ability to meet the concerns and interests of all parties. The military doctrines of some States that argued that nuclear weapons could be used on non-nuclear weapons States made the need for this treaty all the more pressing. The use of nuclear weapons, with their indiscriminate and total destruction, would be a violation of international human rights law, and subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

It was also noted that the peaceful use of nuclear energy was not a privilege conceded to specific countries, but the legitimate right of sovereign States. It could be said that the provision of negative security assurances was essential to the existence of non-nuclear weapons States and the promotion of nuclear disarmament around the globe. Non-nuclear weapons States demanded that nuclear weapons States unconditionally assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in all cases. Over the years, nuclear weapons States had made unilateral declarations, but they were free to reverse their commitments at any time as these declarations were not legally binding. All these facts proved that the current declared commitments could do little to solve the problem at all and it was vital to establish an international, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

On a broader note, a speaker reminded the Conference that the programme of work remained blocked, despite the best efforts of the presidents, and they feared that like Cassandra they would still be wringing their hands over a dead Caesar many months from now. Unless they were able to move forward on the negotiation of a fissile material treaty and begin substantive work on the other topics on the agenda, the mantra of this Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum would continue to sound like a work of fiction.

Speaking this morning were Brazil, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Italy. Chile, as President of the Conference, also took the floor.


The next public plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 15 March 2011 when the Conference will discuss agenda items 5, 6, and 7 concerning new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armaments.

Statements

PEDRO OYARCE, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Chile), said that during their last discussion on negative security assurances on 10 February they had highlighted the close linkage between the issue of negative security assurances and the non-use of nuclear weapons. The overwhelming majority of States valued unilateral declarations regarding negative security assurances and the nuclear weapons free zones as positive, but insufficient, steps forward. This applied in particular because unilateral declarations were subject to conditions and reservations and could be revoked. On the other hand, adherence to protocols on nuclear weapons free zones was not entirely sufficient either. Mr. Oyarce asked whether it would therefore be worthwhile to pursue a multilateral treaty to codify these commitments by nuclear weapons States and could such a treaty incorporate the States outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and constitute a movement toward the general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? Should the Conference negotiate a partial prohibition treaty or one restricting the use or threat of use as a first step, if there was no agreement on a treaty completely banning the use of nuclear weapons? In order to move ahead on any discussion of the eventual negotiation of a future instrument on negative security assurances, a few basic elements should be considered, such as the definition, scope and structure of an eventual instrument. It would also be essential to identify the States providing assurances, beneficiaries and conditions, and to agree upon how to verify the compliance of those assurances.

LUIZ FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil) said that at least some nuclear weapons States resisted the idea of signing a legally binding instrument containing negative security assurances by arguing that a political declaration would bring the same effect. Mr. Soares gave three reasons for why this was false. Firstly, a declaration, even if it was confirmed by a resolution, did not create an obligation under international law duly contracted among parties according to their own legislation. Only through due process could a State confirm its consent to limit its own sovereignty by means of a negotiated international legal instrument. Secondly, the refusal to work on a treaty was equivalent to denying an obligation and indicated the intention of keeping the possibility of employing nuclear weapons against any perceived enemy. Thirdly, some nuclear weapons States, while declaring that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against unarmed States, established exceptions either based on their judgement on compliance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by non-nuclear weapons States or, more generally, on their own vital interests. Non-nuclear weapons States that received so-called positive security assurances by placing themselves under nuclear umbrellas did not benefit from negative security assurances by default.

The state of the debate on this question indicated that some States did not want to relinquish the possibility of attacking non-nuclear weapons States with nuclear weapons. This also showed they intended to keep nuclear weapons deployed and ready for use. The question of negative security assurances seemed a dead end, but at least it could serve as a thermometer, a gauge, in measuring the risk of utter destruction. The existence of this Conference and their presence there had no other aim than to search for ways to ensure peace and security. Their basic tool for achieving this end was the constant effort, through their words and ideas, to create political awareness and a movement that would bring about decisions. The essential decision was the initiation of actions that would lead to the ban of nuclear weapons.

SO SE PYONG (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said that negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States was a vital issue for nuclear disarmament. It was an escapist act to merely pursue non-proliferation while avoiding the issue of assuring non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the result of the threat posed by existing nuclear weapons. It was regrettable that some countries differentiated between the existence of nuclear weapons and their proliferation and persisted with their assertions on the issue of non-proliferation alone. High handed policies on nuclear weapons, which were based on a double standard, had reduced the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other disarmament conventions to dead paper that were of no use and lacked binding force, a sure way of plunging the world into a nuclear arms race. There could be no justification for the fact that certain countries took issue with the peaceful nuclear activities of countries they detested, while ignoring their obligations to disarm their own nuclear arsenals.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy was not a privilege conceded to specific countries, but the legitimate right of sovereign States. It could be said that the provision of negative security assurances was essential to the existence of non-nuclear weapons States and the promotion of nuclear disarmament around the globe. Non-nuclear weapons States demanded that nuclear weapons States unconditionally assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in all cases. Over the years, nuclear weapons States had made unilateral declarations, but they were free to reverse their commitments at any time as these declarations were not legally binding. All these facts proved that the current declared commitments could do little to solve the problem at all and they were of the view that it was vital to establish an international, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

DELL HIGGIE (New Zealand) said that given the commitment of nuclear weapons States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the elimination of nuclear weapons, New Zealand continued to view entering into legally binding security assurances as a comparatively quick and effective way by which those States could bring about a significant improvement in the international security environment. Ms. Higgie said that the Irish delegation had suggested they consider a treaty on negative security assurances negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament whose terms did not condone the possession of nuclear arsenals by States that had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ireland had explained that such a treaty could take the form of a general prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a treaty would be open for universal adherence. As Ireland pointed out, it would not add to the existing obligations of non-nuclear weapons States of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nor would it confer, a priori, any particular status on any other State. Rather its parties, motivated by a desire to genuinely advance global security, would obligate themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ms. Higgie said it seemed to her delegation that this suggestion indeed offered the prospect of their being able to step around what had seemed for some time to be a roadblock on this issue and she welcomed the views of others on it during the course of their discussion.

On a broader note, Ms. Higgie said that her delegation feared that the programme of work of the Conference would remain blocked, despite the best efforts of the Presidents, and that like Cassandra they would still be wringing their hands over a dead Caesar many months from now. Unless they were able to move forward on the negotiation of a fissile material treaty and begin substantive work on the other topics on the agenda, the mantra of this Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum would continue to sound like a work of fiction.

SHAFQAT ALI KHAN (Pakistan) said that Pakistan believed there was an urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. Negative security assurances were vital for nuclear disarmament as well as peace and security. Negotiations for negative security assurances would be less complicated yet enormously consequential. Pakistan had expressed its views on negative security assurances in detail on 10 February and an overwhelming number of States expressed the importance they attached to legally binding negative security assurances. Many delegations had highlighted the need for nuclear weapons free zones and they agreed with this, but said it was no substitute for a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. The universalization of nuclear weapons free zones at this time was impossible since States in some regions already had nuclear weapons or were under nuclear umbrellas. The nuclear weapons States should be able to agree to the universal guarantee of assurances that they were already willing to extend to individual States. They had heard statements arguing that negative security assurances should be treated in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and while they appreciated this view, they felt negotiating negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament would not come at the expense of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the two tracks should be pursued simultaneously.

HAMZA KHEZIF (Algeria) said the granting of negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States that were party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was only logical. It was of great importance as it had serious repercussions for the safety and security of people, especially in those States that were not covered by a nuclear umbrella. No one could deny the legitimacy of this demand. In this context, the Algerian delegation believed that the issue of negative security assurances was ripe for negotiations in both moral and political terms. Assurances granted within unilateral declarations by nuclear powers were not legally binding and subject to conditions, as had been elegantly expressed by the ambassador from Brazil. On the other hand, assurances granted within the framework of nuclear weapons free zones were insufficient and inadequate; such nuclear weapons free zones did not cover all parts of the world and the Middle East was a case in point. Algeria was of the opinion that a universal, international, legally binding and non-discriminatory instrument was the only way to move nuclear weapons States farther from using these weapons. The world favoured this type of agreement and it would meet the concerns of non-nuclear weapons States on the one hand, and would promote the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on the other. The credibility of any treaty depended on its ability to meet the concerns and interests of all parties. The military doctrines of some nuclear powers, who counted on nuclear deterrence as part of their security policy, relied on the pretext of self defence for the argument that nuclear weapons could be used on non-nuclear weapons States and made the need for a treaty on negative security assurances all the more urgent. The use of nuclear weapons, with their indiscriminate and total destruction, would be a violation of international human rights law, and would fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN DARYAEI (Iran) expressed deep appreciation for the manner in which the Conference’s President was conducting the proceedings as well as for the earlier statement from the Ambassador from Brazil. Non-nuclear weapons States had decided to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite its discriminatory nature, with the understanding that they would not be the target of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons States recognized this legitimate demand in 1978, and they made individual, unilateral declarations of security assurances to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These assurances remained partial, declarative and limited with no legal burden on the part of nuclear weapons States, and it was alarming that some military doctrines still envisaged the use of these weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. The international community should not await the deployment of such weapons to act. It seemed as if the world had not learned the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Iran remained convinced that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons was the total elimination of such weapons; prior to that goal being reached, nuclear weapons States needed to provide legally binding, negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States. These assurances were not an optional choice of nuclear weapons States; based on the security concerns of all they were the legitimate right of countries who renounced the use of nuclear weapons in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This needed to be done as a matter of urgency.

AKIO SUDA (Japan) elaborated on previous statements made by Japan concerning the issue of negative security assurances. Mr. Suda said that all States should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. He also recalled the requirement for nuclear weapons States to fully respect their negative security assurances and to provide stronger assurances to non-nuclear weapons States that were party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, where appropriate, played an important part in providing negative security assurances and they should be strengthened where they already existed. He also stressed the importance of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone.

KWON HAERYONG (Republic of Korea) said regarding the statement from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on negative security assurances, it was their attempt to develop nuclear weapons that was the reason for much of the insecurity in that part of the world. Mr. Kwon strongly urged them to abandon their nuclear weapons and their nuclear weapons programme.

MARIA ANTONIETA JAQUEZ-HUACUJA (Mexico) said a complete prohibition of all nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against their use, but until that time it was only fair that nuclear weapons States entered into legally binding commitments that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. Nuclear weapons free zones were not an end in themselves and they should not replace efforts at nuclear disarmament. It was important to remind everyone that no country was certain that these weapons would not be used against them and this was why they needed standards and rules. The vast majority of countries wished to provide legal certainties to those countries that had chosen other means of protecting themselves.

JON YONG RYONG (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), in response to the statement made by the delegation of the Republic of Korea, said that in their intervention, the delegation of South Korea had disregarded the substance of the issue on the Korean peninsula. They neglected to consider the root cause of the nuclear issue on the peninsula and only wanted to flatter the super power. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea’s nuclear deterrent promoted stability on the Korean peninsula and contributed to international peace and security. The country had reiterated its position that it rejected the UN Security Council resolutions 17, 18, and 1874 and it would not be bound by them. Those resolutions reflected the unilateral demands of the United States, contrary to the UN Charter and international law which provided for sovereignty and equality in international relations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would continue to take resolute actions as long as hostile policies against it persisted.

TAMAR RAHAMIMOFF-HONIG (Israel) reiterated Israel’s well known position on this issue. Israel reiterated its support for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, but said this could not be detached from the realities of the Middle East and the conduct, statements and policies of some countries in the region. There was extreme hostility from countries in the region, non-recognition of States’ rights to exist and now internal instability. The political reality in the region required a step-by-step approach and the foundations of a peaceful future must be based on reconciliation and mutual respect.

MOHAMED HATEM EL-ATAWY (Egypt) said regarding nuclear weapons free zones in the Middle East, these zones were no substitute for a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances for multiple reasons, one of which was that nuclear weapons free zones did not work for every region. The Middle East already had a State with nuclear weapons for example. They were encouraged that numerous delegations expressed support for the conference that would take place in 2012 and they should start making preparations for this conference in earnest. They should try to help the peace process in that area by establishing undiminished and increased security for all countries in the region. All countries should come together to discuss the matter and he urged all countries to participate in the 2012 conference.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN DARYAEI (Iran) spoke again to react to comments by Israel that he felt were made to distort the facts about and divert public opinion from the real situation in the Middle East, which was that the nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime was what contributed to instability in the region. It was not acceptable to use baseless and false excuses to defy international norms and regulations so they needed to pay attention to the reality in the region and stick to the topic at hand, which was negative security assurances. These were baseless ideas used to preserve the nuclear weapons option for some countries.

ABDULMAOLA AL NUQARI (Syria) said considering the specificities of the Middle East compared to other regions, a nuclear weapons free zone was part of the security concept that States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the region had in mind. They understood this to be a commitment by all, not just an Israeli commitment, but one taken by the international community. Advancing a security argument could lead to the destruction of the whole world. Establishing a nuclear weapons free zone could lead to the establishment of justice and peace in the Middle East region.

HAMZA KHEZIF (Algeria) recalled with reference to the Middle East nuclear weapons free zone that this issue went back to the decision adopted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1995 and it was part of a package that was accepted by the Arab countries for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As to the argument that the nuclear weapons free zone could not be established in a void, Algeria said that they had agreed to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to its extension in good faith and with good will in the hopes of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone.

GIOVANNI MANFREDI (Italy) pointed out that the zone in the Middle East would be one free of weapons of mass destruction, which included nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons among others and it was common sense that political sensitivities in the region would represent an obstacle to the negotiations, but establishing such a zone would ultimately help reduce tensions in the region. Italy was looking forward to the start of negotiations on this zone next year at the 2012 conference and they would actively participate if invited.

Concluding Remarks

PEDRO OYARCE, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Chile), in summing up the day’s discussion, said that he felt that they had advanced their discussion on negative security assurances and the multidimensional aspects they entailed. There was repeated emphasis on a legally binding instrument and setting a high standard for negative security assurances. Nuclear weapons free zones should go hand in hand with an instrument, as they were no substitute for a legally binding agreement, and the regional context must be taken into consideration when discussing the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones.



For use of the information media; not an official record

DC11/020E