CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HOLDS DISCUSSION ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE AGAINST THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference on Disarmament today discussed the fourth core issue of the Conference, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or so-called negative security assurances.

During the discussion, speakers pointed out that the demand for negative security assurances had been on the international arms control and disarmament agenda since the 1960s. Many people said that non-nuclear weapons States who had agreed to give up their nuclear ambitions by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had a legitimate right to guarantees from nuclear weapons States that those weapons would not be used against them. Many speakers said that unilateral assurances were well and good, but they were not sufficient; these assurances could be amended at any time and were no substitute for a universal, legally binding instrument.

Throughout the discussion delegates noted that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was the complete elimination of these weapons. But since complete nuclear disarmament remained elusive, this gap could be bridged through an international legally binding agreement on negative security assurances, especially relevant for those countries that were not part of any military alliance and did not have the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence to ensure their security in a nuclear weaponized world. Negative security assurances were cost free for nuclear States since they did not require any additional burden on them in terms of nuclear disarmament or nuclear arms reduction. The option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States was not only strategically untenable, but also morally reprehensible. While nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction between nuclear weapons States might be justifiable, the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States could only be compared to the most hideous form of genocide.

Numerous speakers expressed their support for nuclear weapon free zones as a way to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Nuclear weapon free zones made a valuable contribution to international security and stability by building trust and confidence and encouraging all parties to work together in order to facilitate the early entry into force of their respective protocols. In particular, nuclear weapon free zones were an important manifestation of the negative security assurances concept and they were the concrete building blocks for what ultimately would be the realization of a world free from nuclear weapons. The 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference called for the concrete advancement of the process leading to a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone.

There were many speakers who cautioned that nuclear weapon free zones were a panacea. While acknowledging the value of nuclear weapon free zones, it was noted that in several cases the signature or ratification of such protocols by nuclear weapons States had been accompanied by unilateral declarations or reservations aimed at retaining the possibility of using nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. Further, there were areas of the world in which it was difficult to envisage nuclear weapons free zones being established because of the presence of nuclear weapons in them or States covered by nuclear umbrellas. It seemed illogical that any non-nuclear weapons States’ possibility of receiving negative security assurances should be negated by the sovereign decisions of its neighbours based on their own perceptions of their national security.

There was also some difference of opinion about the proper forum for the discussion of legally binding negative security assurances; should the discussions take place in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Conference on Disarmament? As had been the case in previous meetings, speakers pointed out that until the Conference adopted a programme of work, they could not commence substantive work on any of the agenda items they had spent the last two weeks discussing.

Speaking today were Switzerland, Pakistan, the Philippines, Ukraine, Canada, Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Brazil, Belarus, Hungary on behalf of the European Union, Algeria, Italy, Argentina, Japan, China, South Africa, Turkey, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Chile, Cuba, Malaysia, India, Australia, the United States, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Austria, Serbia and New Zealand.

The next public plenary of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 February, at 10 a.m.

Statements

MARIUS GRINIUS, President of the Conference on Disarmament (Canada) said that today they would focus on negative security assurances and at the end of the meeting he would be happy to discuss what they should tackle next week.

JÜRG LAUBER (Switzerland) said that States that had renounced nuclear weapons through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be protected from having nuclear weapons used against them. Switzerland welcomed the latest steps by the United States and the United Kingdom in the disarmament area. Negative security assurances did not constitute a sufficient response to non-nuclear weapons States. These assurances could be amended and the only way of filling these gaps was the development of legally binding security assurances. This would be of benefit to the entire international community because any such instrument would strengthen the non-proliferation regime as a whole as well as the attractive status of non-nuclear weapons States. It would make it possible to build bridges with States outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and it would also allow a significant step forward to the general prohibition of nuclear weapons and making them illegitimate. An instrument of this type would be an essential step toward nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should get down to substantive debate on this issue and the appeal to make progress in this area was quite clear. Many substantive issues still needed to be clarified, and scope and structure needed to be discussed in depth as well as the question of definitions.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said that the demand for negative security assurances had been on the international arms control and disarmament agenda since the 1960s. Pakistan supported negotiations on negative security assurances because the principle of non-use of force or the threat of the use of force, as enshrined in the UN Charter, extended to the use of nuclear weapons as well. It was therefore their obligation to create conditions in which non-nuclear weapons States could feel secure against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While it was regrettable that complete nuclear disarmament remained elusive, this gap could be bridged through an international legally binding agreement on negative security assurances, especially relevant for those countries that were not part of any military alliance and did not have the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence to ensure their security in a nuclear weaponized world. Negative security assurances were cost free for nuclear States since they did not require any additional burden on them in terms of nuclear disarmament or nuclear arms reduction. New doctrines envisaging the development of tactical nuclear weapons and their possible use eroded the confidence of the non-nuclear weapons States. The option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States was not only strategically untenable, but also morally reprehensible. While nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction between nuclear weapons States might be justifiable, the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States could only be compared to the most hideous form of genocide.

EVAN P. GARCIA (Philippines) said that the Philippines believed that the overall disarmament and non-proliferation architecture needed to be reviewed, taking a critical and honest examination of all bodies, particularly the Conference on Disarmament, which was forged during a time of vastly different geo-political circumstances, the fundamental assumptions of which no longer existed. Thus, elements such as the rule of consensus needed to be reviewed. They did not exist in a vacuum, and they needed to take into account the dynamics of global security realities. Negative security assurances were indeed a vital element of the overall global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In particular, nuclear weapons free zones were an important manifestation of the negative security assurances concept. The 2010 Review Conference called for the concrete advancement of the process leading to a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone. Such zones were the concrete building blocks for what ultimately would be the realization of a world free from nuclear weapons.

MYKOLA MAIMESKUL (Ukraine) said the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation would be an important step towards implementation of article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which would contribute to the further strengthening of non-proliferation and security. Ukraine had complied with its commitment to remove a substantial part of its enriched uranium from various research institutes by the end of 2010. Ukraine had proved that it remained a consistent and reliable participant in multilateral efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Real and effective disarmament and non-proliferation should be pursued simultaneously with global security assurances. Ukraine fully supported the deliberation of an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was their understanding that security assurances would considerably enhance global peace and security and promote peace, stability and confidence. Ukraine also supported the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, including in the Middle East.

JONATHAN TAN (Canada) said Canada believed that negative security assurances must be invariably linked to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada also believed that nuclear weapon free zones made a valuable contribution to international security and stability, and they encouraged all parties to work together in order to facilitate the early entry into force of their respective protocols. Canada remained of the view that discussion of legally binding negative security assurances would most logically take place in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, not in the Conference on Disarmament, and that these assurances should be seen as a key benefit of adherence to the treaty for non-nuclear weapons States. This said, Canada supported the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including its proposal for the Conference to hold discussions on negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States and it remained flexible regarding the venue of these discussions. Canada believed negative security assurances would provide yet another incentive for compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Member States and further dissuade concerned States from pursuing nuclear weapons.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN DARYAEI (Iran) said that since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world had witnessed the development of nuclear weapons and the expansion of nuclear arsenals which could destroy the planet many times over. The continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of States had kept the fate of civilization and humanity itself under threat. The use of nuclear weapons was a crime against humanity and the international community should double its efforts to get rid of the threats posed by nuclear weapons once and for all. It was extremely dangerous that some nuclear weapons States in their nuclear doctrines saw the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. A matter of concern was the recent increase in the number of cases in which some high level officials of certain States had threatened non-nuclear weapons States. All of these vicious developments had put non-nuclear weapons States under the threat of possible use of nuclear weapons. The international community should not await the deployment of such weapons to react. It was repugnant that the threats and dangerous doctrine were proclaimed by some States. Such an approach destroyed the confidence around the Non-Proliferation Treaty and should be condemned.

SO SE PYONG (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said that the Conference on Disarmament should focus due attention on this agenda item as nuclear disarmament was directly linked to the survival of humankind. Of all the weapons in the world, only nuclear weapons remained out of control with no relevant instrument. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remained consistent in its support for total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. The delegation took the opportunity to reiterate its readiness to start negotiations on a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons States should refrain from nuclear threats and provide non-nuclear weapons States with negative security assurances. Nuclear weapons States should also revoke the provision of “nuclear umbrella” to their allies and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories in order to push forward nuclear disarmament and prevent the danger of nuclear war. Negative security assurances were essential to the existence of non-nuclear weapons States and the global process of nuclear disarmament. The demand of non-nuclear weapons States was an unconditional and binding assurance by nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any case. Most of the nuclear weapons States were opposed to forming a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances. The current international relations which allowed a certain country to use nuclear weapons as a means of threats should no longer be tolerated.

LUIZ FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil) said that the Conference on Disarmament started discussing the topic of negative security assurances in 1980. As of today, there was no universal legally binding treaty containing negative security assurances. In the view of the Brazilian delegation, the principle of non-use of nuclear weapons was connected to the aim of disarmament. No doubt States possessing nuclear weapons, regardless of their situation, should provide guarantees to non-nuclear weapons States. Brazil expected the Conference on Disarmament to adopt its programme of work as soon as possible, with the inclusion of a working group on negative security assurances. The resistance of nuclear weapons States to embark on negotiations of a universal legally binding treaty granting non-nuclear weapons States negative security assurances undermined the security of States that had renounced nuclear weapons, as it was an indication that nuclear weapons States might actually consider using these weapons, even if only in “extreme cases”. It reinforced the misconception that the possession of and right to use nuclear weapons would deter aggression and increase security. The concept of “nuclear deterrence” in the second decade of the 21st century was outdated, impractical, and unacceptable. Nuclear weapons were not needed to deter non-nuclear weapons States. The logical conclusion could only be that “deterrence” and its collateral doctrines could only apply to nuclear weapons States among themselves. It was regrettable that some non-nuclear weapons States continued to feel the need to have their security based on the arsenals of a protector State. A universal, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances would reinforce the notion that international security must be based on the rule of law, rather than the use of force. An agreement on negative security assurances, although not constituting a disarmament measure, would radically change the configuration of the debate on disarmament.

MIKHAIL KHVOSTOV (Belarus) said the legitimate demands of States that had renounced the use of nuclear weapons through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been met by nuclear weapons States. The lack of progress in this area had engendered a whole range of progress and had undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Declarations contained a number of reservations which only served to nullify the declarations and raise the status of nuclear weapons. The call for effective agreements containing assurances that renounced the use or threat of use of force had fallen on deaf ears. It was high time that the world saw a universal, legally binding agreement that provided assurances to States that did not posses nuclear weapons. Belarus would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established regarding negative security assurances, and the State would be happy to help lead efforts in this area. Mr. Khvostov pointed out that Belarus was recognized in the preamble to the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Budapest Memorandum should be complied with.

DIMITRIS ILIOPOULOUS (Hungary), speaking on behalf of European Union, said that the European Union recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapons States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear weapons States. Positive and negative security assurances strengthened the non-proliferation regime and could play an important role by serving as both an incentive to forego acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and as a deterrent. The European Union would promote further consideration of security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The European Union reaffirmed the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, provided for by the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear weapons free zones; and the unilateral statements by each of the five nuclear weapons States, in which these States gave security assurances regarding the use of nuclear weapons recognizing that such security assurances strengthened the non-proliferation regime. The European Union called on nuclear weapons States to reaffirm existing security assurances and to sign and ratify relevant protocols on nuclear weapons free zones, recognizing that treaty-based security assurances were available to such zones.

IDRISS JAZAIRY (Algeria) said that genuine disarmament measures constituted the best safeguard against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This item had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since its inception in 1978. Since then efforts had been made to obtain assurances from nuclear weapons States, but the results of these efforts had been extremely modest. Non-nuclear weapons States such as Algeria who had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty had committed themselves to not obtaining nuclear weapons and thus they should expect assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. Negative security assurances would increase confidence in, and thus strengthen, the non-proliferation regime and thus lead to peace and stability. The current regime was not sufficient to meet the needs of non-nuclear weapons States and unilateral positions and assurances did not constitute legally binding agreements. The Middle East nuclear weapons free zone had not been established yet. Mr. Jazairy said that he understood the difficulties and divergences on the negotiations of this issue; some people thought the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the appropriate place to discuss this while others felt the Conference on Disarmament was the proper forum.

GIOVANNI MANFREDI (Italy) said that negative security assurances were central to any serious endeavour toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The rationale behind the renewed interest in negative security assurances was that they were one of the two instruments necessary to render nuclear arsenals progressively more marginal in the national defence equations of nuclear weapons States in line with their common ambition for a nuclear free world. The goal of negative security assurances was to reduce the number of potential targets for nuclear warheads. If, on one hand, they prevented the expansion of nuclear arsenals by denying, through an international legally binding instrument, further production of their key ingredient, and on the other hand encouraged their draw down by reducing the number of targets, they were in effect intent on marginalizing the scope and relevance of doctrines of nuclear deterrence in national defence strategies. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, rejecting out of hand a possible disarmament treaty on the grounds that it was unverifiable was not logical. Usually disarmament and non-proliferation agreements dealt with hardware; negative security assurances were an exception. They dealt with intangibles, with human intent, which, by its very nature, was not quantifiable and therefore not verifiable. But this was no reason to reject them. A treaty on negative security assurances may not contain verification clauses, but there was nothing to prevent it from having provisions on sanctions in case of violations. To argue that sanctions, once a nuclear device had been used, would be pointless was also unconvincing. Negative security assurances served to ban both the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and sanctions against threats were a valid solution.

HECTOR RAÚL PELEAZ (Argentina) said that strengthening nuclear weapons free zones and creating new zones would make a substantial contribution to the reassurances that non-nuclear weapons States had continually called for. The Latin American zone was now the most important one in terms of area and population. Not all nuclear weapons States had signed up to existing protocols and others had made interpretive statements or reservations at the time of ratifying the instruments; these conditional statements undermined assurances given to Sates that had given up the nuclear option. States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would need to continue to make efforts to comply with that treaty, including on the issue of assurances. Argentina welcomed the movements by certain nuclear weapons States to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and hoped this would move would lead to an extension of the “no first use policy”. However, these agreements were unilateral and revoking them would highlight the fragility of the existing regime. The arbitrary nature of these agreements showed the fragility of assurances given to non-nuclear weapons States and the only real assurance would be the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

JARMO SAREVA, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, said that there was another meeting this afternoon and due to the long list of speakers the Conference meeting would carry over until the afternoon as well. The other meeting that was scheduled to start at 3 p.m. would now begin whenever the Conference on Disarmament plenary was done.

AKIO SUDA (Japan) noted that on signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1979, Japan, as a non-nuclear weapons State, emphasized in its official statement that “the nuclear weapons States must not have recourse to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear weapons States.” This position remained unchanged and Japan lent its basic support to the concept of negative security assurances. In order to be assured of this and advance nuclear disarmament, it was fundamentally important that all States possessing nuclear weapons reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. It should be noted that this was one of the steps that nuclear weapons States were called upon to engage in under action 5 of the Final Document of the last Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They should recognize that negative security assurances could make a significant contribution to reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances were indeed the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapons States. Nuclear weapons States should make their existing negative security assurances pledges credible to the rest of the world and should provide stronger negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States that complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, once nuclear weapons free zones were established upon ratification of protocols by nuclear weapons States, parties to such agreements would have legally binding assurances. Negative security assurances had long been on the agenda, and the Conference on Disarmament should further undertake practical and substantive discussions to enhance their credibility and effectiveness.

LI CHIJIANG (China) said that non-nuclear weapons States were totally justified and reasonable in requesting assurances. Destroying nuclear weapons and unconditionally agreeing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapons free zones and non-nuclear weapons States, would be the best way to address these problems. The Conference on Disarmament should start as early as possible its substantive work on negative security assurances. China’s stance on negative security assurances had always been clear and it had committed itself not to use nuclear weapons first or against nuclear weapons free zones or non-nuclear weapons States. China had also signed and ratified all the relevant nuclear weapons free zones treaties and protocols.

MICHIEL COMBRINK (South Africa) said that since becoming a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, South Africa had always argued that genuine security could not be achieved by the non-nuclear weapons States abandoning the nuclear option alone. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remained the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. Also, pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, efforts aimed at concluding a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The South African delegation regarded the provision of security assurances as a key element of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that remained the primary nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agreement. All States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were bound by the grand bargain of the treaty, whereby the five nuclear weapons States agreed to legally binding commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament on the basis of which non-nuclear weapons States had foregone the nuclear weapons option. Regrettably, despite some progress on the reduction of the overall number of nuclear arms, there had been little substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. Continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the development of new types of weapons and qualitative improvements to existing arsenals had led to increased insecurity among non-nuclear weapons States. As States that had renounced the nuclear weapons option, the provision of security assurances in a codified manner would serve as a measure of confidence as they worked toward the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.

OÐUZ DEMIRALP (Turkey) said that negative security assurances were firmly anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. It was incumbent upon all of them to implement the relevant articles of the 2010 Action Plan. Turkey was of the opinion that nuclear weapon free zones played a significant role in and contributed to enhanced security and global peace. Such initiatives in Latin America, Africa and other areas were pioneers of such zones. Turkey would like to see a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and their methods of delivery. In recent years, extensive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament had enabled Members to be better acquainted with each others views and positions and Turkey felt there was ample opportunity to have more fruitful discussions on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

GERARD CORR (Ireland) said that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. States like Ireland, which had taken on the legal obligation never to acquire nuclear weapons, should have a guarantee that such weapons would never be used against them. In view of the widely acknowledged legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapons States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances, the absence of a treaty on negative security assurances, and any sign of the beginning of negotiations on one, was difficult to understand. They sometimes heard that unilateral declarations were sufficient to meet the needs of non-nuclear weapons States, or that the most appropriate way of providing security assurances was by means of the protocols to treaties establishing nuclear weapons free zones. Ireland did not accept either of these arguments. Unilateral declarations were not legally binding and could be changed or abandoned at any moment. In addition, most of the 1995 declarations contained caveats which were open to interpretation. Such declarations were insufficient due to their non-legally binding nature. While acknowledging the value of nuclear weapons free zones, Mr. Corr noted that in several cases the signature or ratification of such protocols by nuclear weapons States had been accompanied by unilateral declarations or reservations aimed at retaining the possibility of using nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. Further, there were areas of the world in which it was difficult to envisage nuclear weapons free zones being established because of the presence of nuclear weapons in them or States covered by nuclear umbrellas. It seemed illogical that any non-nuclear weapons States’ possibility of receiving negative security assurances should be negated by the sovereign decisions of its neighbours based on their own perceptions of their national security.

JO ADAMSON (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom’s Strategic and Defence Security Review concluded that the State could provide a minimum nuclear deterrent with a reduced weapons capability, cutting the number of warheads and missiles, thereby making a tangible step towards their long term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom had long been clear that they would only consider using their nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of their NATO allies, and they remained deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale they would contemplate their use. The United Kingdom had long supported a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including nuclear weapons. They were committed to the way set out in the final document of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010. They would work hard with their American and Russian colleagues towards a conference in 2012, wanting to ensure the widest possible participation in the region. The United Kingdom reiterated their call for Conference on Disarmament to agree to a programme of work, which would enable them to make further progress in controlling proliferation and multilateral disarmament.

VICTOR VASILIEV (Russian Federation) said that Russia unswervingly supported the desire of non-nuclear weapons States to obtain negative security assurances. This would help to universalize the treaty, build confidence and ensure predictability in relations among States. The obligations of nuclear weapons States pertaining to negative security assurances had become legally binding via the protocols on nuclear weapons free zones. As had already been pointed out, in the preamble to the New START Treaty there was affirmation of the Budapest Memorandum. Russia also had a bilateral agreement with Mongolia to respect its nuclear-free status and the number of such agreements would certainly increase as the nuclear weapons free zones increased. Russia had also been active in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The Conference on Disarmament did have a mandate to work on the subject of negative security assurances. The Conference on Disarmament had knowledge and expertise on this subject based on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in the past.

PEDRO OYARCE (Chile) said that countries that had renounced nuclear weapons should be accorded assurances and this subject was in the competence of this Conference. They had a body of instruments that needed to be interpreted. Today’s considerations showed that it was necessary to supplement the disarmament and non-proliferation regime; the question was how to best contribute to a legally binding agreement. Unilateral assurances were not sufficient and they had to be irrevocable. Assurances involving nuclear weapons free zones were positive, but geographically limited. Without prejudice to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, they would not represent a substitute for universal agreements that were legally binding. Respect for the status of these zones was fundamental; therefore the establishment of further zones must be a political objective. Priority had to be given to mobilizing a process that would bring them closer to negotiation. Chile hoped that the Conference would adopt a programme of work promptly and that within this programme there would be a working group set up to address these negative security assurances.

LUIS AMOROSO (Cuba) said mankind could not live in peace when there were more than 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world, more than 12,000 of which were ready to be deployed. Considering these weapons of mass destruction could be used in terrorist acts, Cuba reiterated that the best way to avoid nuclear terrorism was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the best thing was universal security assurances that were clear and unambiguous and met the needs of all parties. Cuba also believed that the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones was a major contribution by States to disarmament and non-proliferation. The need to rapidly establish such a zone in the Middle East was a priority. Cuba reaffirmed that multilateralism was the essential focus for dealing with issues related to nuclear proliferation.

ISMAIL MOHAMAD BKRI (Malaysia) said that given the present global security concern, Malaysia stressed the urgent need for the international community to revive meaningful negotiations on various multilateral and legally binding instruments on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, including negative security assurances. Malaysia firmly believed that negative security assurances had now become even more crucial for the safety and security of States, in particular for those who had opted to forego their nuclear options by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Malaysia firmly believed that effective measures to protect non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would not only strengthen international peace and security, but also positively contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it should also be in the interest of nuclear weapons States to address the issue of negative security assurances. Malaysia wished to underline that against the present backdrop of the international security environment where security and stability continued to be challenged by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it was vital for nuclear weapons States to demonstrate their full commitment to nuclear disarmament in order to prevent the potential decline in international confidence in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

HAMID ALI RAO (India) said that India had been consistent in its support for global, complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapon free world. India believed that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to humankind and the best assurance against their use or the threat of their use was their complete elimination. Non-nuclear weapons States had a legitimate right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. India supported the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States as a priority. Negative security assurances had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since 1979. Despite this, the goal of a universal, unconditional, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances had remained elusive. India believed that progressive steps for the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons were essential to achieving the goal of their complete elimination. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, and reducing nuclear dangers including the possibility of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons were steps which were gaining increasing international support. As part of its credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India had espoused the policy of “no first use” against nuclear weapons States and no use against non-nuclear weapons States. India was prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.

PAUL WILSON (Australia) said that Australia would welcome stronger and more effective assurances from the nuclear weapons States with fewer caveats. Australia was a strong supporter of nuclear weapon free zones, freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The protocols of these treaties provided negative security assurances and a commitment not to test nuclear weapons within these zones. Australia encouraged the development of other zones, including in such regions as South Asia and the Middle East. Australia recalled the importance which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Membership attached to all States in the region taking relevant steps and confidence-building measures to the realization of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Action 7 of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference consensus action plan had placed an important responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament to help build the conditions for a more secure world through negative security assurances. Action 7 did not exclude the possibility of an internationally legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, and Australia saw value in further elaboration of concepts in that regard. For Australia, the key word in Action 7 was “effective”. An important test for effectiveness was whether the security assurances would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

LAURA KENNEDY (United States) said the United States would not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States that were party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. The United States would continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. The United States was not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack was the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but it would work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted. This was a comprehensive assurance extending to all corners of the globe. It was in the interest of the United States and that of all other nations that their 65-year record for nuclear non-use be extended forever. The United States had long supported properly crafted nuclear weapon free zones which, when rigorously implemented under appropriate conditions, could contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability. The United States believed that the most appropriate way of implementing legally binding negative security assurances was through adherence to the protocols establishing nuclear weapons free zones. Such treaties could only be negotiated on a regional basis with compliance by all regional parties and under appropriate conditions unique to each region. The United States was not persuaded that a global convention on negative security assurances was practical or achievable, but it was willing to engage in a substantive exchange of views regarding different national perspectives on negative security assurances.

ABZAL SAPARBEKULY (Kazakhstan) said that Kazakhstan was a firm and consistent supporter of the fundamental goal of non-proliferation and disarmament. They had made and continued to make their contribution to the process of reducing the nuclear threat. The historic decision of Kazakhstan to shut down its nuclear test site and give up one of the largest nuclear arsenals remained as its full and undeniable implementation of its disarmament commitments. Kazakhstan attached great importance to the Conference on Disarmament and viewed it as one of the most important mechanisms for strengthening international security. There was no doubt that the forum had great potential and was bound to make a meaningful contribution to the disarmament process. Unfortunately, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community was still unable to start substantive work on its very important agenda items. Therefore, Kazakhstan reiterated their call for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament. In that regard, they strongly supported the idea of the conclusion of an internationally, legally binding instrument on security assurances by nuclear powers to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Only such assurances could effectively keep in check the aspirations of certain non-nuclear States to acquire nuclear weapons, which they regarded as a guarantee of their own security.

NINA S. DJAJAPRAWIRA (Indonesia) said that a number of initiatives had been made and no State objected to the concept of negative security assurances; yet, no single legally binding instrument was on the way to guarantee the attainment of the negative security assurances for States which did not possess nuclear weapons. The existing framework for negative security assurances was insufficient. Indonesia believed that, given geographical limitations, the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones was not sufficient to guarantee the aforementioned security assurances, and neither was the declaration by States that possessed nuclear weapons. These zones and unilateral declarations may constitute efforts to provide security assurances, however they were no substitute for universal, legally binding security assurances which were designed to convince States not to pursue the nuclear weapons option. In order to curtail nuclear proliferation, every nuclear weapon State must be willing to provide assurances that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States that did not possess these weapons. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, Indonesia wanted to stress the urgent need for an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure States that did not possess nuclear weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In order to obtain that objective, the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee or a working group dealing with negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament was pertinent.

ABDUL HANNAN (Bangladesh) said that Bangladesh understood that five nuclear weapons States made unilateral declarations offering voluntary negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States during the mid-1990s. Such unilateral declarations were important steps toward negative security assurances. However, these declarations represented only political commitments, having no legally binding obligations. UN Security Council resolution 984 also did not make sure assurances were strictly binding. Therefore, those unilateral declarations were not adequate to dispel the security concerns of non-nuclear weapons States. Moreover, implementation of such declaratory arms controls measures depended on the good intention of their providers. Bangladesh therefore underlined the importance of negotiating a legally binding framework for providing negative security assurances. Bangladesh believed that such negotiations should take place in the Conference on Disarmament as it could bring all nuclear weapons States on board. Some may argue that negative security assurances could be ensured through the creation of nuclear weapons free zones and accession to their protocols. Bangladesh supported the idea as an interim step, pending conclusion of a global agreement on negative security assurances. They had supported the creation of nuclear weapons free zones in various parts of the world. However, Bangladesh subscribed to the view that use or non-use of nuclear weapons against any country was a problem of a global rather than a regional nature. They also understood that the idea of nuclear weapons free zones may not be applicable to every region, including their own. Therefore, the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones could be a complete and permanent solution for ensuring negative security assurances globally. A global, legally binding instrument would be the most appropriate and effective option for ensuring negative security assurances for a country like Bangladesh.

MOHAMED HATEM EL-ATAWY (Egypt) said pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, there was a need for nuclear weapons States to make negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States. This request for negative security assurances was not a new one. Those States that declined nuclear weapons insisted on their legitimate right for assurances not to have nuclear weapons used against them or to be threatened with nuclear weapons. Unilateral, conditional assurances were also not sufficient. Recently, there had been a change in the stance of some nuclear weapons States and this was welcomed and encouraged. However, this still did not fulfil the legitimate request of non-nuclear weapons States. Moreover, nuclear weapons States still would not affirm that they did not plan to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. They had heard from many nuclear weapons States that the priority should be nuclear weapons free zones, rather than establishing legally binding obligations on their non-use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon free zones were not a substitute for the legal obligation to provide security assurances. In fact, they complemented each other.

STEPHANIE KARNER (Austria) said that the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan recognized that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian effects and referred explicitly to international humanitarian law. For Austria, the only guarantee against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. For this very reason, Austria repeatedly voiced its support for a complete ban on nuclear weapons. In the absence of such a comprehensive ban, Austria supported all measures that could serve to increase global security and prevent the use of nuclear weapons. As a non-nuclear weapon State, Austria subscribed to the reasoning that those countries, who voluntarily renounced the option of a nuclear weapons programme, should benefit from a guarantee that these atrocious weapons would never be used against them. As such, negative security assurances would not only contribute to their disarmament efforts, but also to non-proliferation, providing a strong incentive for States to forego the acquisition and/or production of nuclear weapons. In fact, this thinking seemed to enjoy growing support as more nuclear weapons States incorporated negative security assurances into their national security and defence strategies. Austria welcomed this development and the growing support of nuclear weapon free zones and negative security assurances granted in this connection. Austria called on those nuclear weapons States which had not yet extended negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States to join this trend.

UGLJESA UGI ZVEKI (Serbia) said that Serbia, as a State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, attached great importance to the issue of obtaining broader international guarantees to assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Serbia appreciated the value of the so far existing protocols and treaties in support of the internationally recognized nuclear weapons free zones. Therefore, the most appropriate way forward to achieving a common goal, a world free of nuclear weapons, was the region-by-region extension of binding negative security assurances through establishing new nuclear weapons free zones. All activities and initiatives that might be undertaken in this regard would be unreservedly supported by the Serbian Government.

DELL HIGGIE (New Zealand) said that New Zealand, as a member of the New Agenda Coalition, had frequently made clear its views on negative security assurances during meetings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. New Zealand continued to call upon nuclear weapons States to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapons States parties, whether as a separate agreement reached in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or as a protocol to that treaty. In the Conference on Disarmament, however, the delegation of New Zealand had expressed some hesitation about the prospect of negotiating negative security assurances in that forum. By their very nature, negative security assurances were commitments between those countries that had nuclear weapons and those that that did not. To them, an issue arose with regard to the potential conferring of the status of nuclear weapon States outside of the range of rights and obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given New Zealand’s broader view that negative security assurances would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, they remained open to active participation in the debate on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament. Ms. Higgie said that any real deepening of the debate there would first benefit from the provision of information from those States that possessed nuclear weapons as to what they had done in terms of giving unilateral assurances to non-nuclear weapons States. Without information of this kind, it seemed that it would be difficult to develop a universal approach to security assurances that would provide genuine confidence and greater security to all.

LUIS FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil) noted that the robust debate was a positive sign, but as he listened to this debate he got the impression that on the issue of negative security assurances there were some variations of emphasis and different points of view. The overwhelming majority of participants wanted something like a legal instrument on security assurances. In the Conference on Disarmament consensus was needed. But in the specific case of security assurances, the position of nuclear weapons States was fundamental. For his delegation, the first priority had to be nuclear disarmament, followed by security assurances. This debate indicated quite clearly why they were not moving forward; it was not an institutional or a Rules of Procedure failure.

Concluding Remarks

MARTIN GRINIUS, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Canada), said in terms of next week’s meetings, they would be devoted to the remaining substantive issues, namely: new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; a comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armaments. The meeting was then adjourned.


For use of the information media; not an official record

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