CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE AND A DRAFT PROGRAMME OF WORK

The Conference on Disarmament today held a thematic discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and also discussed a revised draft programme of work.

Jorge Valero, President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said panellists would make presentations that would be followed by an informal discussion. First, the floor would be open to delegations wishing to make statements on other topics.

In general statements, Russian Federation said that during a meeting that took place on 5 June, the Russian and Chinese Presidents had signed a joint declaration on strengthening global strategic stability in modern times, which was devoted to matters of international security, arms control and non-proliferation. China endorsed the statement made by the Russian Federation, adding that by issuing this joint statement, China and the Russian Federation had demonstrated a sense of responsibility for upholding global strategic stability. Cameroon, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, said that the exploration and use of outer space and other celestial bodies should be for peaceful purposes only and should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

Andrey Belousov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office at Geneva, panellist, said that the consolidated efforts of the international community related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space were becoming increasingly important. Preventive political, diplomatic and international legal measures were needed to reach this goal.
Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota, President of the group of governmental experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, panellist, said that the differences in addressing the prevention of an arms race in outer space were clear. Some believed the time for a legally binding instrument had come, and negotiations and discussions to that end should start, while others believed that transparency and confidence-building measures were needed to foster responsible behaviour in outer space.
Daniel Porras, Space Security Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, panellist, outlined certain security challenges that applied to all space sectors, which could be summed up as follows: space technology was dual-use and multi-use; some space technology was destructive; and there was little information about policies related to space activities.
Following the informal discussion, the meeting returned to a formal setting and heard statements concerning the draft programme of work proposed by the Venezuelan presidency. Mr. Valero said that after extensive consultations, the presidency had asked the secretariat to circulate a revised draft programme of work. This revised version was the result of the comments expressed last week as well as consultations held bilaterally and with regional groups.

India said that its anti-satellite test conducted on 27 March 2019 was purely defensive in character and was not targeted against any country. It also welcomed the inclusion of the concept of continuity in the draft programme of work. Russian Federation said it took a positive view of the presidency’s work on the draft programme of work. The proposed amendments deserved careful consideration. China said it was useful to maintain continuity in the Conference’s work. Indonesia advised caution with regard to reference to reports of the subsidiary bodies, as the negative security assurances item was a priority and a low-hanging fruit; it was still waiting for the presidency’s proposals on time allocation. Egypt, echoing Indonesia’s concerns, said some language should be added to ensure that negative security assurances would be considered on an equal footing with other issues.
Mexico said it had expressed its concerns about subsidiary bodies and was not therefore happy about their inclusion. Pakistan said all the proposed working groups should have similar mandates.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 18 June, to continue discussions on the draft programme of work.
Opening Remarks by the President of the Conference on Disarmament

JORGE VALERO, President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said panellists would make presentations that would be followed by an informal discussion. First, the floor would be opened to delegations wishing to make statements on other topics.

General Statements

Russian Federation said that during a meeting that took place on 5 June, the Russian and Chinese Presidents had signed a joint declaration on strengthening global strategic stability in modern times, which was devoted to matters of international security, arms control and non-proliferation. The document was a reaction to the very dramatic changes that had taken place in this area in the last several years. It outlined challenges faced by international security, in particular destructive actions by certain States were highlighted -- steps that had been taken to destroy the current architecture in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Such steps could lead to the undermining of international security in the near future.

Both Russia and China had expressed their commitment to treaties and conventions that were crucial for international security. The 5 June statement reflected the consistent nature of both countries’ positions: the document was a follow-up to similar statements that had been made previously by leaders of China and the Russian Federation. Moreover, the document reflected the close link between the approaches of both countries on disarmament.

The statement specifically highlighted the importance of ensuring equal and indivisible security for all participants in the process of disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, non-proliferation and arms control. The urgent need to establish and maintain sustainable multilateral dialogue was stressed. It would allow concerned parties to overcome differences and find consensus-based solutions to existing problems

Leaders of both countries had called for the removal of mutual concerns through consultations to increase the level of mutual trust, overcome misunderstandings, and maintain and develop a multilateral approach to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, with a central role to be played by the United Nations and its disarmament machinery. The joint statement was yet another example of countries with different cultural and historical approaches reaching unity on the international agenda’s most sensitive questions. The main prerequisites for this were the common objectives to preserve international peace, strengthen global security and strategic stability as well as a genuine desire to reach this objective for the sake of all mankind.

China endorsed the statement made by the Russian Federation. This was the second time the two Heads of State had made a joint statement on the issue of global strategic stability since 2016 – a fact which was of far-reaching strategic significance. The international landscape was witnessing mounting insecurity and instability, as a major power had been obsessed with unilateralism and bullyism. The multilateral system had been eroded, regional hotspot issues had intensified, and new security challenges had been cropping up. In the face of these challenges, the release of the joint statement by the two countries had contributed to confidence in a world that was replete with uncertainty.

By issuing this joint statement, China and the Russian Federation had demonstrated a sense of responsibility for upholding global strategic stability. Under the new circumstances, China and the Russian Federation stressed that nuclear-weapon States should forgo the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game approaches; decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy; and substantially reduce the threat of nuclear war. All international legal instruments and agreements related to nuclear disarmament should be abided by. The unequivocal devotion demonstrated by China and the Russian Federation in maintaining global strategic stability was conducive to a deepened strategic confidence among major countries. China and the Russian Federation had demonstrated strong support for multilateralism with concrete actions. In the joint statement, they had declared their support for the central role of the United Nations and the multilateral mechanism in the international arms control process as well as their readiness to strengthen and upload the multilateral arms control treaties, with the aim of consolidating the international arms control and non-proliferation system.

China and the Russian Federation had demonstrated their firm determination to encourage the political settlement of regional hotspot issues, which were impacting regional and international peace and security. They had always been important political actors promoting the political settlement of regional hotspot issues. In the joint statement, they had also reaffirmed the appeal to all parties to continue with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (concerning Iran) and to properly resolve the Syrian chemical weapons dispute under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The cooperative approach advocated by China and the Russian Federation in meeting new security challenges was conducive to the peaceful use of new technologies and strengthening of cooperation and governance in the new security domain. The joint statement was not directed at any particular country but rather at the Cold War mentality and the unilateralism, mindsets, policies and practices that disregarded international morality, strategic stability and existing international mechanisms.

Cameroon, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, said that space technology had indeed become an indispensable and integral part of our daily lives. The Group of 21 reiterated that outer space and other celestial bodies were the common heritage of humankind. It reaffirmed that the exploration and use of outer space and other celestial bodies should be for peaceful purposes only and should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

The Group of 21 recognized that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. The Group emphasized the necessity of undertaking further measures with appropriate and effective verification to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. It stressed that all States bear a responsibility to refrain from activities that could jeopardize the collective goal of preserving outer space free from weapons of mass destruction and all other forms of weaponization so as to ensure that its benefits were available to all.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space had assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter further militarization of outer space, or prevent its weaponization. The Group of 21 further reaffirmed its recognition that the legal regime applicable to outer space did not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It therefore stressed the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness.

The Group of 21, while stressing the priority of negotiating legally binding instruments for reinforcing the international legal regime on outer space, recognized that global and inclusive transparency and confidence building measures, reached through broad international consultations, could be important complementary measures. The Group recognized the value of transparency and confidence building measures, including a non-legally binding code of conduct, in promoting trust amongst States. However, such voluntary measures could not be a substitute for a legally binding treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Statements by the Panellists

ANDREY BELOUSOV, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said the prevention of an arms race in outer space should receive the full attention of the international community. He noted the growth of and the number of actors taking part in outer space activity as well as the active involvement of non-State actors, including representatives of the private sector. Preserving outer space as an area free of conflict through multilateral cooperation and close cooperation of all participants in outer space activity was timely.

Placing outer space in the process of military planning, regardless of the objectives of such planning, would naturally create a pre-requisite for a whole new set of threats to security, both in outer space and on earth. The desire of any country to gain an advantage through the launching of weapons in the near-earth orbit would lead to response measures from other countries. Response measures could be symmetrical if the States carrying them had developed space military potential or they could be asymmetrical.

The understanding that space cannot become a sphere for military confrontation, and the need to prevent new threats from outer space that may place humanity on the edge of a global catastrophe, had been at the heart of the 1967 outer space treaty. The norms and principles contained in this document were still very timely and needed in modern times. The Russian Federation was categorically in disagreement with the idea that the treaty had become obsolete because it had been elaborated under different circumstances.

Mr. Belousov cautioned against giving up the principle notion that the study, research and use of outer space should be done for peaceful purposes and that outer space activities should be carried out to maintain international peace and security. Doing so would give States the right to ignore the requirement that should ensure that their activities in outer space do not create any obstacles for outer space activities of other countries. If the international community gave up on the procedure to launch mechanisms of dialogue contained in the treaty, one had to wonder what would be obtained in return. Looking at current conceptual trends in outer space security, it seemed that some considered space as a contested domain. This notion contradicted the understanding of outer space as a common heritage of mankind, the principle of equal and indiscriminate access to outer space and use for peaceful purposes. The logical development of such a notion was the new approach practised by certain countries, making outer space a war-fighting domain.

In that context, consolidated efforts of the international community related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space were becoming increasingly important. Preventive political, diplomatic and international legal measures were needed to reach this goal. Mr. Belousov urged all members of the Conference on Disarmament to be creative and, under agenda item 3, to focus on the discussion of additional steps. In this respect, the time that the international community had to adopt preventive measures was running out fast, as the military space plans of the United States had set 2030 as a deadline for the appearance of military components of a global anti-ballistic missile system.

The Russian Federation was fully committed to the elaboration in the Conference on Disarmament of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space. Only through the adoption by States of commitments under such an agreement could the peaceful nature of outer space activities be guaranteed. Despite the fact that, formally, the group of governmental experts on future steps on prevention of an arms race in outer space had yielded no results, the Russian Federation positively assessed the work carried out by the experts. For the first time, they had found points of agreement on the most important items under discussion and had reached a common understanding on the need to elaborate a legally binding agreement and establish a direct link between such a document and the outer space treaty of 1967 and other sources of international outer space law. They also reached a joined vision related to, inter alia, the list of threats that the document should respond to and the importance of including provisions related to cooperation. The results of this work could be the foundation for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Any problems that the United States may have with the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space were simply a smokescreen; the United States’ true intentions were to have a free hand and obtain a dominant position in outer space.

GUILHERME DE AGUIAR PATRIOTA, President of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, said the group of governmental experts had held discussions along the lines of its mandate. The group of governmental experts was set up with two formal two-week-long sessions, in between which informal meetings were organized in New York. A report summarizing the work performed during the first session, provided an account of the spirit, nature and content of the session. This had happened on the heels of important progress. While its sessions had not been very long, subsidiary body number 3 had managed to pull off a significant report in 2018, which had been adopted. This document could help move forward on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was drafted in a way to reflect different views, and this negotiated reflection of various views had been adopted by consensus. The group of governmental experts had attempted to act as a second step to the subsidiary body’s report.

To give a flavour of the discussions held in the group of governmental experts, Mr. de Aguiar Patriota said the differences in addressing the prevention of an arms race in outer space were clear. Some believed the time for a legally binding instrument had come, and negotiations and discussions to that end should start. Others believed that transparency and confidence-building measures were needed to foster responsible behaviour in outer space. Some contributions followed a logic of containing harmful acts. Lengthy discussions on how humanitarian law would apply to outer space took place. While some thought it was better to avoid the issue altogether, others believed international humanitarian law simply applied in outer space. Obligations which addressed the placement of weapons in outer space would be very hard to define and implement as there could be cases where the nature of objects in space could not be easily identified and classified. Lengthy discussions were also held with regard to definitions. For instance, some referred to “space weapons” while others talked of “weapons in space”.

Verification had also been an important subject. Some believed there was no interest in a legally binding instrument if there was no verification process. Different aspects related to multilateral verification mechanisms, national technical means, and transparency and confidence-building measures were discussed. The scope of the potential of restrictions had been another discussion topic, as had been the possibility to assess intent behind the movement of certain objects in space. The sustainability of space and issues related to debris had also been discussed. There was no consensus on whether it was appropriate to address debris in a prevention of an arms race in outer space instrument or not.

Experts also reflected on export controls, and its impact on access to technology and related goods and services; the relevance of articles 2.4 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to outer space; and the fact that space was increasingly congested and contested. Experts agreed that three possible scenarios of use of force should be addressed -- namely space to space, space to earth and earth to space -- and the Conference on Disarmament should be the venue for the follow-up on their discussions. The group of governmental experts was very useful and clarified many of the concerns and positions. It showed that differences could be bridged through wording for all the issues. All the experts went back to their capitals with the draft report.

DANIEL PORRAS, Space Security Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, recalled that to help spur discussions at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research had been asked to produce a status report and a series of briefings for members of the commission. The report was produced earlier this year and was available on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research’s website. The brief focused on “shared risks,” namely certain security challenges that applied to all space sectors, which could be summed up as follows: space technology was dual-use and multi-use; some space technology was destructive; and there was little information about policies related to space activities.

First, the fact that space technology was both dual-use and multi-use meant that the same space object could be used for civilian and military purposes, and also for a variety of applications. For instance, co-orbital vehicles could be useful for both civilians and the military, and both classes of actors were actively engaged in developing this technology. It could also be used for hostile or aggressive purposes. One option for dealing with this challenge could be, as was recommended by the group of governmental experts in its 2013 report, that of notification for on-orbit manoeuvres. The owner of a co-orbital vehicle, for example, could notify other actors within a vicinity of its operations, even if they were not the subject of a rendezvous. By establishing such baselines for normal behaviours, States might be better able to interpret the nature of close-proximity operations and not become unnecessarily alarmed about what were otherwise peaceful activities.

The second challenge shared by all was related to the destructive nature of some counter space capabilities. The destruction of space objects resulted in space debris, which would continue to orbit and could have catastrophic consequences if it collided with other space objects. Current technology did not allow to accurately predict which way debris would fly. It was therefore impossible to conduct a test in a way that did not pose any risk to third parties. One option for dealing with this issue quickly was to adopt anti-satellite weapons test guidelines along the following principles: test should not create debris (no debris principle); if a test must create debris, it should be low enough so that the debris is not long-lived (low debris principle); and States should warn others about conducting such tests (notification principle).

The last challenge was the lack of policy information about space objects. Most countries did not have a space doctrine or policy, which meant that activities lacked context, particularly for rivals. In this environment where any object could be a “weapon,” any activity could appear strange or even threatening, depending on one’s perspective. To counter this, the 2013 group of governmental experts’ report recommended the development and sharing of space policies. Without a policy, there was no reference for States to base their security assessments. By enunciating and sharing their space policies, States could provide a cipher to help others understand otherwise threatening activities.

The recommendations were small, modest proposals that could be used to deal with some of the challenges that currently existed for space activities. However, they were by no means intended to solve all space security challenges in one go. By focusing on limited areas where there was some level of convergence among States, it could be possible to deal with specific threats and challenges, developing a body of rules and norms that strengthened the existing space governance framework. The three suggestions noted today could be the low-hanging fruit needed to make progress on space security, concluded Mr. Porras.

An informal discussion ensued.

Statements Concerning the Draft Programme of Work

India aligned itself with the Group of 21 statement and added that India’s anti-satellite test conducted on 27 March 2019 was purely defensive in character and was not targeted against any country. India had sizeable space assets which provided a critical backbone for its economic development and security. It had not, and would not, participate in any arms race. As regard the debris generated by this test, India had taken steps to ensure there would be minimal debris, most of which had already been eliminated. India continued to support working within the multilateral framework of the United Nations and supported the creation of a legally binding international instrument to prevent the placement of arms in outer space.

JORGE VALERO, President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said that after extensive consultations, the presidency had asked the secretariat to circulate a revised draft programme of work. This revised version was the result of the comments expressed last week as well as consultations held bilaterally and with regional groups. Efforts were made to standardize the mandates of the working groups and ensure that delegations’ interests regarding agenda items were treated equally. The presidency suggested that a new mechanism be established, based on which it would consult with the 2020 presidency so that it may use this programme of work to ensure a continuity of the Conference’s work.

Russian Federation, noting the reference to the different options for negotiations in paragraph 9 A, said that an “s” should be added to the word “negotiation”. Russian Federation said it took a positive view of the presidency’s work on the programme of work. The proposed amendments deserved careful consideration.

India said the draft had been sent to its capital for comments. There was a major change in paragraph 9 A, which was disappointing: the reference to CD/1299, which was removed from the revised draft, had been agreed on by consensus. It was not clear from the language what special processes the programme of work was referring to. India also requested clarification regarding critical infrastructure protection and multilateral arrangements and transparency, as referred to in paragraph 9 E. India welcomed the inclusion of the concept of continuity so that the Conference on Disarmament did not have to start from scratch at the beginning of each year.

China said the draft programme of work had undergone quite a number of adjustments. While China was waiting for instructions from its capital, it noted that the new content introduced in paragraph 15 was innovative. On the whole, it was useful to maintain continuity in the Conference’s work.

Indonesia, while stating that it was still awaiting its capital’s response to the revised programme of work, reiterated that the programme of work needed to be nothing more than a list of activities accompanied by a timetable. Indonesia advised caution with regard to reference to reports of the subsidiary bodies, as the negative security assurances item was a priority and a low-hanging fruit, and such reference to the four subsidiary bodies reports did not do justice to the importance of the core issues and the Conference’s agenda items. Noting that some delegations might have concerns regarding paragraph 9 B, Indonesia, while supporting negotiations on fissile materials and existing stockpiles, encouraged them to hold extensive consultations with the presidency on that matter. As it might not be appropriate to prejudge the decisions of the upcoming presidency, the language used in paragraph 15 should be examined carefully, to notably scrutinize its political and procedural implications. Indonesia was still waiting for the presidency’s proposals on time allocation.

Egypt had sent the revised draft to its capital and was waiting for instructions. Echoing Indonesia’s concerns, Egypt said some language should be added to ensure that negative security assurances would be considered on an equal footing with other issues. The reference to the Shannon mandate was important and Egypt would like it to be retained. It was not clear how the consultations proposed in paragraph 15 would be conducted and how their conclusions would be reviewed. Any attempt to ensure the continuity of the work of the Conference on Disarmament should respect the rules of procedure. An explicit reference to rule 28 could be relevant in that regard.

Mexico, while stating that it was still waiting for comments from its capital, expressed concerns about the amendments made. Mexico had expressed it concerns about subsidiary bodies and was not therefore happy about their inclusion. Mexico was concerned about the elimination of the mandate to negotiate from paragraph 9 A, B, C and D. Upon receiving feedback from its capital, Mexico would provide additional comments on the revised programme of work.

Pakistan remarked that the discussion was not being held in a very representative setting, as numerous delegations were not present in the room. Pakistan welcomed the proposition to create a fifth working group to deal with agenda items 5, 6 and 7 and cover new and emerging issues. However, a distinction had been created in paragraph 9 D, which was different from the mandates proposed in A, B, C and E. That was not acceptable as it affected the overall balance of the entire text; all the proposed working groups should have similar mandates. The Shannon mandate was no longer valid. Reference to it was a non-starter; any document that stood a reasonable of success could not include a reference to the Shannon mandate. Regarding paragraph 15, while proposing a novel idea, it did not seem to comply with rules of procedure and seemed to ignore responsibilities entrusted with individual presidencies and their prerogative to table programmes of work.

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