CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES TRANSPARENCY IN DISARMAMENT

The Conference on Disarmament this morning discussed the issue of transparency in disarmament in its last plenary meeting under the presidency of the United States.

The Conference heard from Heather Williams, Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at Kings College in London and a member of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, who spoke on the topic of transparency within the P5 process and on emerging technologies, cyber and artificial intelligence in particular, which could potentially increase risks of miscalculation in nuclear decision-making.

Vanessa Wood of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva spoke about the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, the 12-country cross-regional group focused on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan. Its flagship issue was to work on transparency and reporting and at its heart were the efforts to encourage the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties to increase reporting on the implementation of the treaty.

Trine Heimerback, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, briefed the Conference on the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, which had the recently concluded its work. Norway would work with interested States on taking forward this work and would introduce a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly this fall.

In the discussion that followed, delegations noted that transparency and confidence building measures should facilitate the building of trust to enable States to take incremental steps towards restraint. Transparency was not an end to itself but a means to enhance trust, avoid misjudgements, and relieve tensions, and it could not be a substitute for disarmament which was the core issue of the Conference. Different countries had different perspectives and experiences of transparency; the necessary preconditions were sufficient mutual trust, respect for the security concerns of each other, and a commitment to common security. Voluntary transparency measures occupied an important place among tried and tested measures that facilitated a deeper understanding of the positions of States and provided additional guarantees of compliance with agreements. One delegation noted they were struggling to understand the utility of panel discussions at a time when Member States were eagerly waiting for efforts to break the stalemate on a programme of work in the Conference. Another delegation raised a serious concern about the inaction of the Conference and its inability to launch negotiations on any agenda item for the past two decades.

Speaking were Morocco, United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Germany, Japan, Brazil and Kazakhstan.

The following members of the Lima Group - Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru - in a statement delivered by Peru, said that they did not recognize Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and supported Juan Guaidó as interim president in keeping with the Constitution. Their Governments would not participate in the work of the Conference during the presidency exercised by the representatives of the illegitimate Maduro regime.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) said that its Government was legitimately elected by the people who had voted for Nicolás Maduro and it was recognized by the majority of States in the world and the United Nations Secretary-General.

Several delegations, namely Cuba, Russia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria, Iran, China, India, South Africa, Viet Nam, Nicaragua and Cameroon, rejected any attempt to politicize the work of the Conference, exacerbate tensions, and entrench the stagnation. They categorically objected against any attempt to use the Conference to settle inter-State differences that would further deepen divisions and destabilize the work in the Conference. The Conference must remain a body dealing with nuclear disarmament and its Member States should respect the rules of procedure in full and respect the presidency of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

Cynthia Plath, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, speaking on behalf of the President of the Conference on Disarmament in her national capacity, said that it was not the politicization of the Conference that endangered its credibility, but the will and the stand of its Member States. The United States aligned itself with the statement of the Lima Group and did not recognize the representatives of the “former Maduro regime” who were in the Conference today. Finally, Ms. Plath thanked all Member States for their support to the presidency of the United States.

The Conference approved a request by Paraguay to participate as an observer in its 2019 session.

This was the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament under the presidency of the United States, which will pass over to Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) for the period from 27 May to 23 June 2019. The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be on Tuesday, 28 May, at 10 a.m. under the presidency of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

Keynote Statements

HEATHER WILLIAMS, Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at Kings College in London and a member of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, addressed the Conference on the topic of transparency within the P5 process, which she said was marked by a paradox: while all P5 members would argue that their nuclear doctrines were perfectly clear and fully transparent, misunderstandings still persisted on multiple fronts and many said more transparency was needed. Further transparency could reduce risks directly by avoiding miscalculation and creating crisis communication channels, as well as indirectly by building trust and demonstrating the commitment to dialogue and nuclear responsibility. There were five different ways that a State could demonstrate transparency, Ms. Williams said. The first was through reporting; second, clarity of doctrine to include declaratory policy; third, arms control and other confidence building measures; fourth, verification activities; and lastly, engagement with non-governmental organizations and academics. Having outlined efforts at transparency, particularly around doctrine in the P5, Ms. Williams noted that more could be done to further increase transparency and build on the recent positive momentum from the Beijing meeting under China’s leadership of the P5 process. Certainly, non-nuclear weapon States expected more to be done.

Short term, all countries within the P5 could engage in disarmament verification initiatives to promote transparency and trust with non-nuclear weapon States and to make practical contributions toward a world without nuclear weapons, including by taking steps to clarify their nuclear doctrines. Furthermore, the United States and Russia could revive their strategic stability dialogues, all P5 States could commit to continuing the P5 process beyond the 2020 Review Conference, and the P5 could issue a statement on their commitment to the testing moratorium and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In terms of emerging technologies dialogues, Ms. Williams noted that cyber and artificial intelligence could potentially increase risks of miscalculation in nuclear decision-making, while dual-use capabilities such as cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles reduced transparency and increased ambiguity. States could, inter alia, scope the problem and engage with the private sector to understand the risks and opportunities presented by emerging technologies, issue a P5 joint statement not to use cyber weapons to target the nuclear command and control systems of each other, and limit the role of artificial intelligence in nuclear infrastructure, patricianly command and control.

In addition to the P5 process, there were other fora and initiatives that might be useful for the P5 States to engage, such as the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) and Creating an Environment Working Group (CEWG), Germany’s work on emerging technology and arms control, and the Swedish stepping stone approach. There were certainly challenges to transparency, such as the geopolitical tensions and disputes among P5 members, the legacy of mistrust, and enduring misconceptions; many non-nuclear weapon States would argue that progress towards disarmament was not enough. The value of transparency on the part of the P5 could be encouraged and facilitated in fora such as the Conference on Disarmament and possibilities for additional transparency could be explored.

VANESSA WOOD, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva, noted that Australia was the current coordinator of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, the 12-country cross-regional group focused on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan. Its flagship issue was work on transparency and reporting and at its heart were the efforts to encourage the Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties to increase reporting on implementation of the treaty. This was based on the belief that the submission and discussion of national reports could promote mutual understanding among States. Furthermore, reporting could demonstrate tangibly the commitment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s nuclear weapon States to transparency and accountability, which could be key to building trust and momentum on different fronts towards the 2020 Review Conference. Since 2012, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative had seen agreement to a standardized reporting form as fundamental to any effort to promote greater national reporting. There were pros and cons to standardized reporting, said Ms. Wood. On the one hand was the argument that standardized and regular reporting allowed progress to be measured across commonly agreed objectives, i.e. the 2010 Action Plan. On the other, there were questions whether it was enough, whether a rigid standardized template missed important information, and whether such reporting was too burdensome, particularly for non-nuclear-weapon States.

While reporting had been the focus of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, it was not the only way to be transparent, said Ms. Wood and welcomed China’s successful coordination of the P5 process and the statement that the P5 Member States would hold a joint event on nuclear doctrine and the Review Conference. Also, a number of States regularly made information on their security policies available online and made statements on the subjects in the Conference on Disarmament. It was critical to engage actively with the content of reports and recognize and appreciate when countries were being transparent. Transparency in armaments had been on the agenda of the Conference for years, where it had been mostly linked to conventional weapons. However, it had not been substantively discussed in a long time and there was no reason why it could not be discussed more broadly as part of the pathway to negotiations.

TRINE HEIMERBACK, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, recalled that Norway was a chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament which had recently concluded its work. During its sessions, the Group had considered what constituted nuclear disarmament verification and principles for such verification, how it might be carried out, and who could carry out such work. There were converging views on a non-exhaustive list of seven principles for nuclear verification, including conformity with international law, parties to a specific treaty deciding on nuclear disarmament verification measures, conformity to legal non-proliferation obligations and the need to protect sensitive information, that nuclear disarmament verification must be effective in ensuring compliance to a treaty, ensuring clarity of a specific treaty as to the obligations of the parties, that a future nuclear disarmament verification regime must be non-discriminatory, and that verification arrangements should correspond to the purpose, scope and nature of the agreements.

The Group of Governmental Experts had concluded, inter alia, that verification was essential in the process of nuclear disarmament and to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and that the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament would be determined on a case-by-case basis in the context of the negotiation of legally binding agreements. In its consensus report, the Group had recommended that the United Nations Member States, as well as relevant parts of the international disarmament machinery, consider further work related to the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. During the deliberations, a number of proposals had been put forward, such as to carry out further conceptual work on a definition of nuclear disarmament verification, as well as clarification of scope, institutional matters, governance, and financing of nuclear disarmament verification. Norway, Ms. Heimerback concluded, would work with interested States on taking forward this work and would introduce a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly this fall.

Discussion

Morocco said that transparency in disarmament must include measures to build trust and confidence and reduce the risk of miscalculation. Morocco’s commitment to transparency in disarmament was illustrated by its active participation in global and regional activities and the organization of some of them. In May 2017, Morocco had organized a peer review exercise on the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention in Rabat and Casablanca, and had also organized the meeting of regional authorities on the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2016, a training seminar on good practices in export control and border security in February 2016, as well as a Moroccan-American inter-ministerial meeting on a security initiative against proliferation.

United Kingdom commended China’s efforts to increase transparency in the P5 process and particularly the inclusion of the civil society element to the upcoming Beijing Conference. As for the national transparency measures, the United Kingdom had tabled the draft national implementation report at the Preparatory Committee in New York earlier this month, which was a comprehensive statement of its national measures on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The report had been prepared according to standard reporting form agreed by nuclear weapon States in 2013 and had been a subject of consultations with civil society in the United Kingdom. The presentation of the draft report was a start of the process in which a year-long consultation would follow to gather feedback from other States and civil society. Preparing the draft report had been a lot of work, both for the United Kingdom and other States reading and analysing it, therefore, it was important to be clear on the value of reporting. Reporting increased mutual confidence, not only among nuclear weapon States, but all States. Furthermore, transparency was a core principle of nuclear disarmament, it was a starting point for dialogue, and was a tool of accountability to the public.

France said that France had produced an 80-page document which outlined national efforts at transparency and nuclear disarmament efforts in recent years. Transparency was a key component in the progressive achievement of nuclear disarmament, and France was the first State to have rendered public the total number of its nuclear arsenal. Also, France promoted transparency in terms of its doctrine, which was regularly announced by higher authorities, and it promoted dialogue in the P5 on the important subject of doctrines. Transparency, including dialogue on doctrine and nuclear posture, could strongly contribute to the reduction of risk. France applied transparency in disarmament measures; it was the only State which had irreversibly dismantled its fissile material production for weapons and had organized in 2008 and 2009 visits to the sites for experts, diplomats and journalists. Together with Germany, France had launched a technical exercise in the verification of disarmament which would take place in September 2019.

Pakistan said that transparency and confidence building measures should facilitate the building of trust to enable States to take incremental steps towards restraint and recalled the core principles of the confidence building measures, including the pursuit of disarmament measures in an equitable manner. Confidence building measures should not become an end in itself and should contribute to conflict resolution. The fundamental precondition to confidence building measures was a modicum of trust between the parties. Pakistan remained committed to confidence building measures in the regional and international context. Verification was indispensable to building confidence and specific disarmament agreements must provide for a reasonable degree of verification that would be implemented by all States parties. Nuclear disarmament verification must be pursued not in an abstract manner or as an end to itself, but within a framework of specific treaties, stressed Pakistan, and concurred with the Group of Governmental Experts that the role of verification in the context of nuclear disarmament must be decided on a case by case basis.

China said that transparency was not an end to itself but a means to enhance trust, avoid misjudgements, and relieve tensions. Different countries had different perspectives and experiences of transparency; the necessary preconditions were sufficient mutual trust, respect for each other’s security concerns, and a commitment to common security. Transparency was not a stand-alone concept; it was closely linked to the international security environment and national security policies. A substantial change was brewing today, said China; instabilities and uncertainties were rising, unilateral and bullying practices were the new forms of hegemony, and the Cold War mentality had returned to drive the security strategy of a major power which pursued its interests at the cost of integrity and international rules. It made a habit of sabotaging and tearing up deals to expand its own offensive and defensive capabilities, adding to tensions, stoking an arms race and eroding strategic stability. And while all this was happening, the Conference on Disarmament chose to discuss transparency. This was a mockery of the reality, said China. The United States kept saying that other countries made it feel unsafe, which was truly baffling. China hoped that the policy makers in the United States could look at security in a different light for if one chose to see more countries as rivals, one would probably create a greater number of enemies, even though it was not their intention to be the enemy. Security policy informed by such a mind-set was a threat in itself.

Remarks by the Panellists

HEATHER WILLIAMS, Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at Kings College in London, and a member of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, agreed that it was up to States to decide how to pursue transparency.

VANESSA WOOD, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva, remarked that the discussion today was a start of a conversation in the Conference which should now examine whether it could address some of the excellent ideas that were proposed. Transparency was obviously not a stand-alone issue and there were diverging views on what it was.

TRINE HEIMERBACK, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, encouraged Member States to engage in the further work on the consensus report by the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Discussion

Russia said that transparency issues needed to be re-articulated given the current situation in nuclear disarmament, and noted that voluntary transparency measures occupied an important place among tried and tested measures that facilitated deeper understanding of the positions of States and provided additional guarantees of compliance with agreements. However, transparency measures did not play a key role in disarmament and non-proliferation and Russia called for a balanced assessment of the effectiveness of transparency measures. Russia stressed the importance of voluntary transparency measures within legally binding agreements, which made it possible to boost confidence that parties were complying with their obligations. One such example was the Biological Weapons Convention. The field of application of transparency measures was rather limited, and became narrower in the area of nuclear disarmament. Russia held that control and verification procedures could not be considered separately from specific legally binding agreements and had to comply with those treaties. This position was a result of a long experience in nuclear disarmament. Russia also stressed that the implementation of verification measures in nuclear disarmament agreements was a very sensitive issue and as such should not be implemented by agents or institutions that were not a party to the agreement.

Iran said it was still struggling to understand the utility of panel discussions at a time when Member States were eagerly waiting for efforts to break the stalemate on a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament. The substance and the procedure of panel discussions were not acceptable to Iran, which remained concerned that injecting some irrelevant and confusing concepts and notions in the work of the Conference was counterproductive and misleading.

Germany thanked the United States for organizing the meeting on transparency and verification and said that less than 12 months was left before the Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stressing the importance of making progress, including on the issues of transparency and confidence building, especially in the current security context. Thus, it was more important than ever to make progress in an area such as transparency, which was key to building trust, and lowering risks associated with miscalculation. But transparency was not a substitute for disarmament, which was the core issue of the Conference. There were different levels of transparency on doctrines among nuclear weapon States and it would be highly desirable to have more exchanges between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States, Germany said.

Japan stressed that transparency was a basis of many issues and said that to achieve nuclear disarmament, there was a need to understand the thinking of nuclear weapon States. Japan also addressed attitudes, particularly those linked to sensitivity about information and confidentiality, and stressed that transparency was important in this regard. Engaging in a constructive dialogue and exchange, and answering legitimate questions that States might have was very important. What was important to non-nuclear weapon States was not only the information but also engaging in the discussions with reports of nuclear weapon States and responding to those reports, including in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty process. Japan urged nuclear weapon States to prepare their reports and documents in advance to enable non-nuclear weapon States to respond and constructively engage.

Brazil said that the experience accumulated through the Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, which worked on the basis of maximum transparency and mutual verification between neighbours in respect of nuclear materials, had put Brazil in a favourable position to participate in and contribute to various initiatives. One such initiative was the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which Brazil valued despite being a restrictive forum for such a fundamental conversation. It would have better outcomes, representations, and legitimacy if carried out in a multilateral format, preferably in the United Nations system. Brazil had enthusiastically engaged in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and had submitted a working paper proposing the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification under the rules of procedure of the Conference, but the lack of consensus minus one situation had prevented the adoption of this proposal.

Other Matters

Kazakhstan raised a serious concern about the inaction of the Conference and its inability to launch negotiations on any agenda item for the past two decades, and stressed that tangible progress in multilateral disarmament could be only achieved within the framework of the existing multilateral disarmament mechanism, of which the Conference was the key part. Kazakhstan reiterated its commitment to the Conference, which had made tangible contributions to maintaining international peace and security, and rejected any attempt to politicize its work, exacerbate tensions, and entrench the stagnation.

Peru, speaking on behalf of the following members of the Lima Group – Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru, said that they did not recognize Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) due to a fraudulent election process that was not in keeping with international standards for a free, fair and transparent democratic process. Their Governments supported Juan Guaidó as interim President in keeping with the Constitution and said that, while respecting the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, they did not recognize the upcoming presidency of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) of the Conference on Disarmament exercised by the representatives of the illegitimate Maduro regime, and would not participate in the work of the Conference during this presidency.

ROBERT WOOD, President of the Conference on Disarmament, speaking in his national capacity, said that the United States shared the views of the Lima Group.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) said that its Government was legitimately elected by the people who had voted for Nicolás Maduro and regretted the disrespectful behaviour of the delegation of the United States. The Lima Group was a minority group of countries whose single purpose was to damage the brotherly Governments in the region. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) objected to the use of the Conference to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. The illegal and undiplomatic behaviour of the United States and others was offensive to many delegations in the Conference, which only wished to overcome the stagnation. The United States’ presidency of the Conference had failed and had not fulfilled its role under the rules of procedure. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), whose Government was recognized by the majority of States in the world and the United Nations Secretary-General, would be taking the presidency of the Conference from 27 May to 23 June.

Cuba said that a statement by Heads of State and Government issued in Havana had expressed concern about the belligerent behaviour of the United States in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Cuba categorically rejected all attempts to distort the Conference and place obstacles to the execution of its goals, in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Russia was categorically against any attempt to use the Conference to settle inter-State differences that would further deepen divisions and destabilize the work in the Conference. The legitimacy of the delegation of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) was not in doubt and could not be protested in any way, Russia said, adding that there was no doubt about the legitimacy of that government, in line with the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was deeply concerned by the growing tendency of using the Conference as a forum and platform to launch political allegations against States and interfere in their internal affairs. Such practices would exacerbate divisions and confrontations among the Conference’s Member States, which should refrain from any action that would distract from efforts to achieve the Conference’s goals. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea condemned all attempts to remove the legitimate Venezuelan Government and interfere in its internal affairs.

Syria was looking forward to the assumption by Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) of the presidency of the Conference and urged all Member States to avoid politicization that would reflect badly on the work of the Conference. Syria rejected the interference in the internal affairs of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and international law.

Iran said that issues of a political nature should not be discussed in the Conference, adding that no one was here to judge other countries. The Conference must remain a body dealing with nuclear disarmament and its Member States should respect the rules of procedure in full and respect the presidency of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

China reiterated its belief that the work of the Conference should not be politicized by issues that did not have anything to do with its agenda, and that the equal rights of all Member States must be fully respected. China would continue to constructively participate in the work of the Conference.

India said that the international community had high expectations from the Conference on Disarmament and India remained committed to adopting a programme of work. It was regrettable that despite sustained efforts, the Conference had not been able to agree on a programme of work this year. It was important to avoid the politicization of the Conference and its institutions, including its presidency, India said, and hoped that the Conference would be able to advance its work and start negotiations on legally binding instruments on its core issues.

South Africa called on Member States to respect the mandate of the Conference and its presidency and rejected any attempt to politicize it, as those could exacerbate divisions and entrench the stalemate. South Africa was concerned about the attempts to circumvent the constitutional structure of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and said that any conflict should be resolved peacefully within the context of the country’s laws.

Viet Nam stressed the importance of focusing the work in the Conference on the important issues within its mandate and to agreeing on a programme of work. Viet Nam was disappointed that once again there was an attempt to politicize the work in the Conference and urged delegations to refrain from unhealthy practices that could threaten its legitimacy and push it into turmoil. All States should respect international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Nicaragua expressed its support for the delegation of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and rejected the efforts to politicize the Conference.

Cameroon said that in the current context, the Conference must work harder to achieve its goals and expressed its support for the future president of the Conference.

CYNTHIA PLATH, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, speaking on behalf of the President of the Conference on Disarmament and in her national capacity, said that the United States strongly and fundamentally believed that all diplomatic discussions in any multilateral fora were in fact political discussions by their very nature. The United States would continue to use those opportunities to press for issues that were of collective interest to all. It was not the politicization of the Conference on Disarmament that endangered its credibility, but the will and the stand of its Member States. Ms. Plath said that the United States aligned itself with the statement of the Lima Group and did not recognize the representatives of the “former Maduro regime” who were in the Conference today, but it looked forward to collaborating in the future with the delegation that represented a legitimately elected Government of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Finally, Ms. Plath thanked all Member States for their support to the presidency of the United States.

For use of the information media; not an official record

CD/19/26E