CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HOLDS FIRST PLENARY UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held the first public plenary meeting under the presidency of the United Kingdom, discussing ideas on how the Conference might proceed with its work over the next four weeks.

Presenting his ideas on moving the Conference forward, Aidan Liddle, President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament, proposed that the Conference create four subsidiary bodies, one for each of the core issues: nuclear disarmament, fissile material, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances. Those bodies would be allocated 10 meetings, an increase from seven last year. Their mandates should explicitly draw on the possible ways forward identified in the reports of the 2018 subsidiary bodies.

Alongside the four subsidiary bodies, Ambassador Liddle proposed appointing two special coordinators. The first would be tasked with examining emerging issues and new technologies and how they impacted on the agenda of the Conference. The second special coordinator would be tasked with examining the question of the working methods and membership of the Conference. To ensure that it would be a neutral and open process, Ambassador Liddle proposed entrusting the mandate not to an individual, but to a small group of colleagues drawn from across the regional groups.

In the ensuing discussion, Bulgaria supported the United Kingdom’s proposal, which built on the progress achieved by the subsidiary bodies in 2018, while Algeria supported the bilateral deliberations started with Member States by the United Kingdom’s presidency.

The Russian Federation appreciated the business-like approach of the United Kingdom’s presidency and the efforts of the previous Ukrainian presidency to build consensus on a programme of work. Ecuador supported the establishment of new subsidiary bodies so that they could provide further clarity in terms of expected outcomes.

The United States appreciated that the United Kingdom’s presidency had kept the idea of appointing coordinators to discuss membership expansion and methods of work. Belarus stressed that it was prepared to engage in constructive work to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament returned to its substantive consideration of the agenda items.

Cuba said that the subsidiary bodies working on substantive issues was an acceptable way out, but it continued to be concerned about the way in which the reports of the subsidiary bodies would be adopted. Canada welcomed the fact that the United Kingdom’s proposal had retained the focus on the four core issues of the Conference, while Pakistan valued the holding of informal discussions in any framework which could achieve consensus and a frank exchange of views and opinions.

Spain expressed hope that countries would not repeat the debates held last year, adding that the discussions at the Conference should add to a climate of trust and transparency ahead of the upcoming review of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in New York. Venezuela stressed that everyone should shoulder their responsibility to adopt a programme of work, in line with the principle of multilateralism.

Morocco called on all countries to set aside their immediate interests in order to come up with a balanced programme of work, which was the key for allowing the Conference on Disarmament to play its role fully. Ukraine and Egypt agreed that it was essential to build on the previous work in the subsidiary bodies in order to make progress.

Iran noted that any initiative that lacked balance and comprehensiveness for a negotiating mandate for each of the core agenda items of the Conference could hardly serve the goal of the Conference on Disarmament, which was complete nuclear disarmament. Sri Lanka emphasized that no one could afford to continue with this divisive approach anymore, and that the Conference should represent the whole range of views on disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Netherlands stressed that it was essential to move the Conference on Disarmament forward, considering that it was already in its fifth week of work in 2019. In the absence of consensus on a programme of work, Viet Nam expressed hope that the high-level segment would deliver a very meaningful message and guidance for a way forward.

Brazil said that the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies on the four core issues with more specific, substance-driven mandates could constitute a solid step forward, if framed in the right manner. As time was pressing, Switzerland stressed that it was vital not to repeat last year’s debates and to clarify a number of procedural elements with respect to the subsidiary bodies, namely with respect to the adoption of their reports.

In the current situation, the Republic of Korea stated that it would be better to take a practical and realistic approach sooner rather than later to move the Conference forward, while making a parallel effort for a programme of work. Mexico and Australia agreed that a programme of work should not be a detailed document, while China underlined that it was important to listen to the views and opinions of all countries in order to achieve progress.

Japan noted that the United Kingdom’s proposal contained elements of formality, inclusiveness, commonality and added value, while France appreciated the realism and pragmatism in the approach of the United Kingdom’s presidency.

India noted that subsidiary bodies were not a substitute for an agreed programme of work, but they could contribute to achieving a mandate for negotiating legally binding agreements through substantive work. Belgium and Germany welcomed the proposal of the United Kingdom’s presidency on a way forward, through the establishment of four subsidiary bodies on the four core issues and of special coordinators.


The next public meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Monday, 25 February at 10 a.m., when it will start its high-level segment, which coincides with the high-level segment of the spring session of the Human Rights Council.


Opening Statement

AIDAN LIDDLE, President of the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament, paid tribute to his predecessor Ambassador Yurii Klymenko of Ukraine and his delegation for their excellent efforts to achieve consensus on a programme of work. Mr. Liddle reminded that 2019 marked the centenary of the establishment of the League of Nations, and the fortieth anniversary of the Conference on Disarmament. Those anniversaries provided an opportunity to reflect on the past and future of disarmament policy in Geneva. In connection with the high-level segment of the Conference, which would take place the coming week, the United Kingdom’s delegation had been working with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office at Geneva library and archives to put together a special exhibition in the atrium outside the Council Chamber, looking back at some of the achievements of those hundred years. The launch of the exhibition would take place at 1 p.m. on Tuesday, 26 February, in the presence of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Michael Møller. Mr. Liddle also announced two more discussion events on the history and future of disarmament diplomacy in Geneva: the first in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) that would take place in Room VIII on Wednesday, 27 February, at 1 p.m., and the second that formed part of the Library Talks and that would be held on Tuesday, 5 March, at 12:30 p.m.

Ambassador Liddle repeated that he intended to continue consulting delegations to see whether there might be a way to find consensus on a programme of work. He noted that he had clearly heard the desire amongst delegations to build on the substantive and valuable work done in the Conference on Disarmament in 2018. It seemed that the best way to proceed in 2019 would be to set up new subsidiary bodies as a vehicle for continuing and deepening the discussions held last year. Ambassador Liddle proposed that the Conference should create four such bodies, one for each of the core issues: nuclear disarmament, fissile material, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances. Those bodies would be allocated 10 meetings, an increase from seven last year. Their mandates should explicitly draw on the possible ways forward identified in the reports of the 2018 subsidiary bodies. The fact that four of the five subsidiary bodies set up in 2018 had been able to agree on reports was very welcome. But in setting up new bodies in 2019, Member States should look again at the reporting requirements. The value of last year’s exercise was not just in the achievement of consensus reports, but also in the rich discussions that had been held on the technical and political challenges that countries faced, Ambassador Liddle noted. Member States should consider how the nuance of the discussions could be captured. The idea of introducing a formal element to the work of new subsidiary bodies might be a way of doing that.

Alongside the four subsidiary bodies, Ambassador Liddle proposed appointing two special coordinators. The first would be tasked with examining emerging issues and new technologies and how they impacted on the agenda of the Conference. The second special coordinator would be tasked with examining the question of the working methods and membership of the Conference. To ensure that it would be a neutral and open process, Ambassador Liddle proposed entrusting the mandate not to an individual, but to a small group of colleagues drawn from across the regional groups, who would consult widely and report on their work, with any recommendations, to the Conference.

Discussion

Morocco called on all countries to set aside their immediate interests in order to come up with a balanced programme of work, which was the key for allowing the Conference on Disarmament to play its role fully. The programme of work should ensure a balance among the different aspirations of countries, while taking into account the current realities and the mandate of negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament was not a talking shop and it should not be a symbol of lethargy. Morocco underlined the importance of establishing bodies that would examine the questions of membership expansion and methods of work. The Agenda for Disarmament of the United Nations Secretary-General could constitute the basis for the emergence of a new dynamic at the Conference and the relaunch of its work.

Ukraine thanked the United Kingdom for its cooperation during the Ukrainian presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and commended it for its proposal on a way forward. As time was of the essence, and as it was important to build upon the previous work in the subsidiary bodies in 2018, Ukraine was looking forward to a relevant draft decision to be circulated by the United Kingdom’s presidency.

Iran noted that the United Kingdom had a far greater responsibility as a possessor of nuclear weapons to ensure that all legitimate concerns of Member States were duly addressed during its presidency. Any initiative that lacked balance and comprehensiveness for a negotiating mandate for each of the core agenda items of the Conference could hardly serve the goal of the Conference on Disarmament, which was complete nuclear disarmament. Member States should fully respect the rules of procedures and they should not complicate the situation by mixing substance with procedures. The Conference on Disarmament should not be reduced to a platform for divisiveness and polarization, which would divert it from its main work.

Sri Lanka remained willing and ready to support all efforts to achieve consensus within the Conference on Disarmament and thus pave a way forward for work on all four core issues. No one could afford to continue with this divisive approach anymore, and the Conference should represent the whole range of views on disarmament and non-proliferation. Fresh thinking and initiative could be fostered first by acquiring adequate training and education in disarmament and non-proliferation, and secondly by having an agenda that was fully integrated in the disarmament and non-proliferation discourses.

Netherlands stressed that it was essential to move the Conference on Disarmament forward, considering that it was already in its fifth week of work in 2019. The proposal presented by the United Kingdom’s presidency was in line with the incremental and progressive approach advocated by the Netherlands, which was flexible about the organization of the work as long as the substance of the Conference’s work was central.

Viet Nam said that in the spirit of the fortieth anniversary of the Conference on Disarmament, and the centenary of multilateralism in Geneva, it was time to move the Conference on Disarmament forward. In the absence of consensus on a programme of work, Viet Nam expressed hope that the Conference could continue fast with a very substantial discussion. It was important to agree on the mandates of the proposed subsidiary bodies and special coordinators. Viet Nam voiced hope that the high-level segment would deliver a very meaningful message and guidance for a way forward.

Brazil reiterated that its priority was to build upon the momentum generated at the Conference on Disarmament in 2018. It was ready to adopt a programme of work with a strong negotiating mandate. However, if such a programme of work was deemed unattainable, Brazil was ready to support alternatives. The re-establishment of subsidiary bodies on the four core issues with more specific, substance-driven mandates could constitute a solid step forward, if framed in the right manner. Brazil also supported discussions on membership and methods of work, preferably led by a single coordinator. Member States should not lose sight of the Conference’s primary role in negotiating legally binding international instruments.

Switzerland emphasized that the approach adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in 2018, which was based on progressive discussions, broadening of different themes, and developing of common goals, was pragmatic and that it had allowed the Conference to reach agreement on substantive issues through the adoption of the reports of the four subsidiary bodies. It represented a return to the way the Conference had dealt with its work when it was operational and when its programme of work was but a simple calendar outlining its work. In that respect, it would be wise to return to the approach adopted in 2018. As time was pressing, it was also vital not to repeat last year’s debates and to clarify a number of procedural elements with respect to the subsidiary bodies, namely with respect to the adoption of their reports.

Republic of Korea said that it believed that all Member States were frustrated with the failure to come up with a programme of work. It was even more disturbing that such frustration did not lead to renewed determination. On the contrary, the continued failures were highly likely to lead to fatigue and lethargy. In the current situation, it would be better to take a practical and realistic approach sooner rather than later to move the Conference forward, while making a parallel effort for a programme of work. In principle, the Republic of Korea supported the appointments of coordinators for emerging issues, working methods and membership.

Mexico highlighted that a programme of work should not be a detailed document. Member States needed to cooperate and not operate in a void. Like last year, Mexico had some concerns with the establishment of subsidiary bodies due to the lack of clarity of goals. The establishment of new subsidiary bodies was not an avenue that Mexico would prefer. It could support the establishment of coordinators for the issues of membership and methods of work, as long as those themes had their own dimensions.

China stated that it would carefully study the proposal of the United Kingdom that the Conference on Disarmament establish new subsidiary bodies. The majority of Member States wanted to start substantive discussions at the Conference, and China wanted to participate constructively in that process. It was important to listen to the views and opinions of all countries in order to achieve progress.

Australia agreed that a programme of work did not need to contain excessive details, adding that what the United Kingdom had proposed already looked like a programme of work. If the Conference was to build on the work done in 2018, more countries should participate in the debate, which should be as interactive as possible, in order to understand each other’s positions. That was a way to find commonalities. Australia favoured adding a formal element to the discussions in the subsidiary bodies. As for coordinators, the more Member States worked across regions, the more likely they were to build understanding and find common ground.

Japan noted that the proposal by the United Kingdom contained elements of formality, inclusiveness, commonality and added value. Regarding the proposal to have coordinators on membership and methods of work, it was important to consider continuity and professionalism from last year’s discussion. It was also important to establish a time for the exchange of opinions in order to promote inclusiveness.

France appreciated the realism and pragmatism in the approach of the United Kingdom’s presidency. It was high time to start working on substance and to agree on a balanced programme of work immediately. At the same time, nothing prevented countries to continue working in parallel within the four subsidiary bodies on the four core issues established in 2018, in order to exchange expertise and build trust.

Belgium shared the view that adopting a programme of work did not seem realistic at the moment. The most pragmatic approach was to continue on the basis of the proposal on a way forward presented by the United Kingdom’s presidency, through the establishment of four subsidiary bodies on the four core issues and of special coordinators.

United States appreciated that the United Kingdom’s presidency had kept the idea of appointing coordinators to discuss membership expansion and methods of work. It agreed with Mexico that those issues were separate.

Belarus stressed that it was prepared to engage in constructive work to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament returned to its substantive consideration of the agenda items. Belarus was prepared and willing to continue its constructive involvement in the discussion of issues, particularly new types of weapons and threats.

Egypt looked forward to receiving the proposal of the United Kingdom in a written form, which was in line with Egypt’s views on the way forward. It agreed that it was essential to build on the previous work in the subsidiary bodies in order to make progress. Egypt also valued the early engagement of the United Kingdom’s presidency with delegations bilaterally.

India understood the difficulties in reaching an agreement on a programme of work due to the divergent views of Member States. It stressed that subsidiary bodies were not a substitute for an agreed programme of work, but they could contribute to achieving a mandate for negotiating legally binding agreements through substantive work. India agreed with Sri Lanka regarding the importance of disarmament education.

Germany would like to agree on a formal programme of work with a negotiating mandate. But as this was not possible, Germany welcomed the proposal of the United Kingdom’s presidency on a way forward and it looked forward to constructive discussions in order to achieve a speedy consensus on a way forward.

Pakistan noted that it remained committed to constructive engagement with the Conference on Disarmament and it looked forward to substantive discussions. Sharing some preliminary views on the United Kingdom’s proposal on a way forward, Pakistan said that it valued the holding of informal discussions in any framework which could achieve consensus and a frank exchange of views and opinions. It would be more appropriate to frame the titles of subsidiary bodies in line with the Conference’s agenda items, as was done last year. Pakistan had no problem reviewing the Conference’s membership, but it was still pondering over the utility of reviewing the working methods.

Spain stated that the alternative proposal by the United Kingdom’s presidency offered possible openings for finding commonalities to at least begin technical discussions. The Conference on Disarmament had to find solutions with common denominators. Spain expressed hope that countries would not repeat the debates held last year and that the discussions at the Conference should add to a climate of trust and transparency ahead of the upcoming review of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in New York.

Bulgaria supported the United Kingdom’s proposal, which built on the progress achieved by the subsidiary bodies in 2018. No major agenda item would be left behind, whereas the proposed coordinators assured equitable regional representation.

Algeria affirmed full support for the efforts of the United Kingdom’s presidency to reach a consensus on a way forward. It shared the views of other delegations on the importance of discussing substantive matters to do with the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament. It supported the bilateral deliberations that the United Kingdom’s presidency had started with Member States.

Russian Federation appreciated the business-like approach of the United Kingdom’s presidency and the efforts of the previous Ukrainian presidency to build consensus on a programme of work. It preferred to share its preliminary comments on the United Kingdom’s proposal in an informal setting.

Ecuador looked forward to receiving the proposal of the United Kingdom’s presidency in writing. It supported the establishment of new subsidiary bodies so that they could provide further clarity in terms of expected outcomes. It also supported the setting up of the two coordinators on membership and methods of work.

Cuba said that the proposal on a way forward by the United Kingdom’s presidency would have been more acceptable had it been accompanied with an idea of who the proposed coordinators would be. The subsidiary bodies working on substantive issues was an acceptable way out. Cuba continued to be concerned about the way in which the reports of the subsidiary bodies would be adopted. It would be important to distinguish between issues dealt with by the subsidiary bodies and by coordinators in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of issues.

Canada welcomed the fact that the United Kingdom’s proposal had retained the focus on the four core issues of the Conference. It found that the establishment of a coordinator on emerging issues did not warrant the same amount of attention. Furthermore, it found the proposed 10 meetings of subsidiary bodies perhaps a lot. Canada supported the idea that one coordinator dealt with both membership expansion and methods of work, and that there needed to be some sort of sameness in the approach of coordinators.

Venezuela reiterated its willingness to cooperate fully with the United Kingdom’s presidency, and it looked forward to a fruitful session in 2019. It supported all efforts to strengthen the Conference on Disarmament for the benefit of disarmament and non-proliferation, while always bearing in mind the need to establish a negotiating mandate for legally binding instruments. The consideration of non-substantive issues would not contribute to that aim. Everyone should shoulder their responsibility to adopt a programme of work, in line with the principle of multilateralism.



For use of the information media; not an official record

DC/19/10E