CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HOLDS FOCUSED DEBATE ON A TREATY BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held a focused debate on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices.

Ambassador Vaanchig Purevdori of Mongolia, President of the Conference, said that the meeting today would be devoted to agenda items 1 and 2, with special focus on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. With regards to the issue of a Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty (FM()T), in 2014, there had been discussions on it under the Coordinatorship of Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany, who had concluded that it was urgent to continue discussions. He hoped that today’s debate would contribute to the continuation of in-depth discussions and deliberations on this issue and he hoped they could come up with suggestions on how to proceed with the work of the group of governmental experts.

Speaking in the discussion were United Kingdom, Pakistan, Japan, South Africa, Republic of Korea, France, United States, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Canada, Indonesia, Australia, Turkey, China, Argentina, India, Algeria and the Russian Federation.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Monday, 2 March, when it will hold a high-level segment.

Statements

VAANCHIG PUREVDORI (Mongolia), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that the meeting today would be devoted to agenda items 1 and 2, with special focus on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. With regards to the issue of a Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty (FM()T), in 2014, there had been discussions on it under the Coordinatorship of Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany, who had concluded that it was urgent to continue discussions. . He hoped that today’s debate would contribute to the continuation of in-depth discussions and deliberations on this issue and he hoped they could come up with suggestions on how to proceed with the work of the Group of Governmental Experts.

United Kingdom said that the FMCT would represent a considerable advance compared to the current situation, when some States had declared moratorium, which was not monitored. An FMCT would thus put in place a necessary requirement for nuclear disarmament. With regards to transparency, the United Kingdom believed in confidence-building measures and produced a report in 2006 on the fissile material production and consumption. The United Kingdom was careful, nonetheless, not to release information which was proliferation sensitive. Information was also withheld for certain security reasons. The United Kingdom had been working on asset verification, which had to be efficient and applicable. The United Kingdom did not interfere with fissile materials which could not be used for weapons. The FMCT would have measures similar to those applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was the most appropriate organization to apply the FMCT verification. The impact on the International Atomic Energy Agency of that role should not be underestimated. The United Kingdom hoped that the Conference would be able to agree on the schedule of activities before long.

Pakistan believed that a fissile material treaty should provide undiminished security for all States. A treaty which overlooked or circumscribed the security of any State would not work. The treaty should also make a genuine contribution towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and not merely be a non-proliferation instrument. The treaty had to cover the past production or existing stockpiles of fissile materials, and should not discriminate between the different nuclear weapons States, or between nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear weapons States. Pakistan stressed that, in order to be effective, the treaty should be free of any loopholes and provide a robust verification mechanism. In 2014, during the informal discussions, Pakistan had provided substantive views on all aspects of the treaty including definitions, scope and verification. The lack of consensus on negotiating an FMCT based on the Shannon mandate should not prevent the Conference from commencing negotiations on other core issues on its agenda. Unfortunately, some proponents of FMCT were neither willing to negotiate on other issue on the Conference’s agenda, nor were they ready to broaden the scope of the treaty to explicitly include the existing stockpiles of fissile materials. The Shannon Mandate was no longer valid or acceptable as the negotiating mandate, which should be accepted as reality.

Japan said that it had, for many decades, been firm in its call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. An FMCT which aimed at quantity capping by banning production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons was the next building block towards the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. An FMCT ought to ensure non-increase of the quantity of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, lay a firm legal basis for the irreversible disarmament process, and reduce the discriminatory nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime as much as possible by obliging nuclear-weapon States to ban production of such materials in a verifiable manner. The Shannon Mandate did not exclude the possibility of including the existing stocks in the scope of the Treaty, so negotiations should start based on the mandate as it stood. In any case, further work on nuclear weapon free zones, negative security assurances and verifications, as practical building blocks, ought to be continued.

South Africa welcomed the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts by the United Nations Secretary-General mandated to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. South Africa did not subscribe to the view promoted by some that a fissile material treaty was the only issue ripe for negotiation. While there might not be an agreement on one issue or another, that should not prevent the Conference from dealing substantively with all the issues on its agenda. An FMT should be non-discriminatory and verifiable, and fulfill both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Stocks ought to be included in a verifiable future treaty in order for it to be truly credible and to have a true nuclear disarmament character.

Republic of Korea saw the merit of establishing a Working Group to review the methods of work as had been discussed in previous meetings, which would facilitate the substantive work of the Conference. The Republic of Korea believed that putting an irreversible capping on the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons would not only limit vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, but also contribute to future disarmament efforts by enhancing confidence. An FMCT was the most ripe and urgent agenda item for negotiation, as in 2014 the Conference had held a very interactive and in-depth discussion on an FMCT according to a schedule of activities. The Group of Governmental Experts had been working through almost all of the elements to be incorporated in a future treaty. Issues of the existing stockpiles and future production could be handled separately and in a different manner.

France said that negotiation of an FMCT was the issue of highest priority for France, as President Hollande recently stated. It was a commitment that the international community had taken a long time ago, and restated in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1887. Negotiating an FCMT was in line with the imperative goal of working on a safer world for all, and free of nuclear weapons. France believed that such efforts ought to be made through tangible, realistic and progressive actions. FMCT represented the next logical step forward in international efforts towards disarmament. France was going to submit a draft text of a treaty on the cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons. The central tenet of the future FMCT had to be the final cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissile materials for future use; in order to be effective and credible, such measures ought to be followed by dismantling production facilities, which would make it irreversible. The treaty also had to be realistic and should not limit the production of fissile materials for civil use or use in the space. Credibility of the future treaty rested on the treaty’s future verifiability. The International Atomic Energy Agency, with its undeniable expertise in that area, would have an important role to play in the verification system of a future FMCT. France believed that negotiating an FMCT was realistic, which was why France was taking an initiative and would propose a draft text to the disarmament community.

United States stated that negotiation on an FMCT consistent with the Shannon mandate remained its priority in the Conference. An FMCT remained a central component of US nuclear disarmament agenda, and was a goal overwhelmingly endorsed by the international community. The Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT was not aimed at bypassing the Conference, but rather at illuminating a path forward on FMCT, a path for the Conference itself to follow. All those who shared the priority goal of nuclear disarmament should also acknowledge that it could not be achieved without taking the step of capping fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons. The United States regretted that the Conference had not yet undertaken that long overdue step, and would continue to urge negotiation of an FMCT in that body on the basis of Decision CD/1299.

Italy welcomed the recent London P5 Conference and the ongoing P5 process that was increasing transparency and building confidence among the Nuclear-Weapons States. In Italy’s view, the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Collective efforts would thus need to be focused on a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference. Italy reaffirmed its full support to the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan which included concrete steps on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Italy believed that the discussions on FMCT during the 2014 session had confirmed the level of maturity of that topic. Substantive and fruitful discussions held within the Group of Governmental Experts were welcomed.

Germany said that a clear task for the Conference was to commence negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty as an important step towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Group of Governmental Experts was a take at driving the discussion forward. A constructive exchange of view on particular topics regarding fissile material had taken place in 2014. Germany was aware that FMCT negotiations would not be easy, but the issue of stocks had to be addressed in their course. Approaching substantive talks about an FMCT would be an important step towards overcoming the Conference stalemate.

Czech Republic was a supporter of the long-standing objective of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as of general and complete disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Czech Republic believed that the constructive and overall positive discussions in the Group of Governmental Experts would meet its mandate. The FMCT would constitute a significant achievement to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The Czech Republic believed that such a treaty would complement the set of legal provisions indispensable for reinforcement of global security and strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It was crucial to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty with the emphasis on an appropriate balance between definitions, scope and verification with a transparent and independent governing and decision making body.

Canada said that what was needed was to focus substantive discussion on technical issues, which addressed everything on the agenda. FMCT would be a practical and realistic option, but not the only or the last step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In 2012, 166 UN Member States had voted to adopt a resolution which proved broad international desire to move ahead in this field. The Group of Governmental Experts had been able to engage in robust and substantive discussions, thanks to the spirit of cooperation and flexibility of all 25 experts. Canada hoped that the Conference would seriously review the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. The vast majority of States in the Conference recognized that the Shannon mandate was a starting point for negotiations, which would require a compromise on many sides to reach a consensus on what would be a valuable treaty. Canada believed that the issue of stocks should be included in the negotiations and that this issue must not be a pre-condition to the start of negotiations. An FMCT was not an end in itself, but a step in an ongoing process. It was time for the members of the Conference to decide whether they were ready to come down to the difficult and lengthy task of negotiating.

Indonesia was highly committed to advancing a balanced FMCT which addressed the concerns of nuclear weapons States as well as non-nuclear weapons States. There was a wide agreement that the treaty should be based on CD/1299, which allowed for future negotiations to address all aspects of the treaty, including its eventual scope. The future treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable. It would need to take into consideration the obligations of both nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear weapons States under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It should lay a firm foundation for gradual reduction of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. The verification of the FMCT should be able to deter and detect non-compliance of the future treaty provisions in a timely manner. Indonesia also emphasized the importance of initial mandatory declarations by States parties.

Australia stated that an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons remained a priority for the Australian Government. The Group of Governmental Experts discussions had been a valuable opportunity to make progress on the crucial element of disarmament. Australia was looking forward to seeing the French draft text of a treaty, as announced by President Hollande. Australia believed that a treaty should be practical and effective, and retain its focus on the objective of capping the availability of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and ensuring that fissile material was not diverted for use in weapons. Emphasis should be on a treaty which was focused, effective and cost-effective. The Shannon Mandate was the starting point, and not the end point of negotiations. Until negotiations started, Australia remained committed to working a consensus report from the Group of Governmental Experts.

Turkey believed that starting negotiations on an FMCT would be a significant and sensible step in the process of nuclear disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons. An FMCT would contribute to the development of a verification regime that in the future might provide a basis for verification of nuclear disarmament. It would strengthen the existing disarmament and non-proliferation framework, in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A future treaty should include the issue of stockpiles and effective verification. A flexible approach could allow the Conference to move ahead without spending too much time on the modalities of a mandate. A number of structural elements would need to be addressed in connection with further progress on that topic. The definition of fissile material included in a future FMCT was key to the Treaty, as that was directly related to the scope and verification aspects.

China stated that a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty with a verification system was conducive to nuclear disarmament and realization of a final objective of nuclear weapons free world. China supported a balanced programme of work, which would include negative security assurances, and the mandate contained in CD/1299. Member States of the Conference should accommodate each other’s concerns and properly handle outside factors affecting its work. Conference membership included all States with significant bearings on the FMCT, so the treaty ought to be negotiated in this forum. China had participated in the Group of Governmental Experts, which constituted neither negotiations not pre-negotiations, and would not replace the Conference’s substantive work, the only appropriate forum for such discussions. A future treaty should be reasonable, effective and economically affordable.

Argentina continued to believe in the ongoing dialogue as the only way out of the gridlock. FMCT should be one of the instruments towards general disarmament. A definition of fissile materials should include International Atomic Energy Agency’s proposals, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium. It was essential to preserve countries’ sovereign right to the right to development and their peaceful use of fissile materials. The stocks were a politically sensitive issue, but their existence in unspecified locations introduced an uncertainty in the future treaty, which was why Argentina believed that any agreement had to have a credible verification mechanism attached to it. Any verification mechanism should not create additional onuses for the non-nuclear weapons States.

India supported the negotiation in the Conference of a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable FMCT, which met India’s national security interests. India had supported the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on an FMCT in the Conference in 1995 and 1998, and had not stood in the way of consensus in 2009. It was unfortunate that the Conference had been prevented from commencing substantive work on FMCT again in 2015. India was interested in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime that would add a measure of strategic predictability and a baseline for future global nuclear disarmament efforts. India did not favour reopening of the Shannon Mandate. India was participating in the Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT, whose work amounted to neither pre-negotiations not negotiations on an FMCT, which should take place in the Conference on the basis of the agreed mandate.

Algeria underscored the importance of undiminished security for all States in the context of disarmament processes. The FMCT should be understood in that context. On the objectives of an FMCT, Algeria said that such a treaty would need to lead to a path towards future nuclear disarmament. Prohibition of production should also include stockpiles of nuclear fissile materials, as any standard which would ignore the existing stocks, which were substantial, would not promote peace and stability. Algeria would like the negotiations to be held within the Conference, because it covered 65 very politically and geographically different States. The treaty should not establish a legal situation which would undermine the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Russian Federation had over the years undertaken practical steps towards ending the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In Russia, the issue of production of fissile materials for arms was a closed issue, but Russia was in favour of substantive discussions on this topic at the international level. It was important to focus on concrete, specific objectives, on the ground of the Shannon Mandate, which should serve as a starting point. Every effort to revise this mandate would only exacerbate the existing differences. The treaty should not place obstacles to the use of fissile materials for peaceful purposes. An appropriate mandate for verification ought to be found under the FMCT. Russian Federation suggested that, as the issue of the FMCT was being discussed, it was also topical to also discuss the placement of weapons in outer space. Russian Federation was against taking separate issues from the Conference’s agenda to be discussed in alternative fora.

Pakistan, commenting on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, said that Pakistan had been invited to partake in the Group, but had decided not to accept it. The creation of the Group of Governmental Experts would undermine the work of the Conference, as in Pakistan’s opinion, the deliberations of the GGE had not and would not reveal anything new on the subject that had not been raised in the CD,. Watching the same movie in a different theatre made no sense. Two nuclear-weapon States were not part of the Group of Governmental Experts process, which made any outcome decided by the Group of Governmental Experts meaningless. Important question to ask was what relevance the work of the Group of Governmental Experts would have on the Conference. So-called “sign posts” agreed on in the Group of Governmental Experts were irrelevant for Pakistan.

The Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament said that the following week, there would be 28 dignitaries addressing the Conference in eight meetings, from 2 to 9 March. A tentative programme was posted online, and was subject to changes. The normal plenary meeting on prevention of an arms race in outer space would take place on 3 March, from 4 p.m. Regional coordinators and P6 would meet on 27 February in the afternoon.

India was delighted that there was such a high level interest in the Conference, which would affect the regular meeting, and asked whether the plenary discussion on prevention of an arms race in outer space could be postponed to the week after, on 9 March, after the high-level segment was over.

VAANCHIG PUREVDORI (Mongolia), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that P6 Members were continuing their consultations on the draft proposals on three issues. On 27 February, the President was planning to start consultations with Regional Coordinators on the proposals. The next plenary would take place on Monday, 2 March at 10 a.m. to start the high-level segment.


For use of the information media; not an official record

DC15/012E