CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CONTINUES THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

The Conference on Disarmament this morning continued its thematic discussion on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, raising various issues, including the nature of the treaty and the negotiations thereon, important issues that ought to be contained within the text, and the urgency for beginning negotiations, despite diverging views within the Conference.

The treaty needed to be the product of multilateral negotiations; it should be verifiable and fulfil non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, a speaker said. It should also include, another speaker said, a verification mechanism, as full compliance by all States with their obligations under international instruments to which they were party was critical to the achievement of the goals envisaged in those instruments. However, a speaker pointed out, the issue was extremely complex, as it related to such issues as whether there should be verification in the future treaty, and if so, what kind, and it should therefore be carefully explored and prudently handled.

Speakers also raised the importance of the treaty being non-discriminatory, as, a speaker said, it should stipulate the same obligations and mechanisms for all States. Such a Treaty should prohibit all States from producing such material, and should put an end to the discrimination between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States, another speaker said. The issue of “stockpiles” was also raised by several speakers, with diverging views however as to whether or not it ought to be included in the Treaty. Delaying negotiations just complicated things further, and ended in increases of the nuclear stockpiles, one speaker pointed out.

Many speakers also raised the importance of beginning negotiations without delay, and several States said they were ready to do so immediately, some without imposing pre-conditions. International security required a reinforcement of common efforts with regards to non-proliferation and disarmament, a speaker said, urging the Conference to seize the opportunity to begin talks, as, another speaker said, any instrument which contributed to a norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons helped to promote the disarmament debate, and might further contribute to breaking the deadlock within the Conference.

In an announcement, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Doru Romulus Costae of Romania, said on the issue of inviting a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency to address the Conference on FMCT matters, there was a consensus on this among regional groups. The invitation would be made for Monday 22 May.

Speaking this morning were representatives of India, Algeria, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, China, Syria, the Republic of Korea and Japan.

The next plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 3 p.m. this afternoon, when the Conference will consider the issue of the scope of the FMCT.


Statements

JAYANT PRASAD (India) said India welcomed the structured discussion on the issue of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). This was part of its larger effort to explore and expand the common ground for reaching consensus on the programme of work of the Conference. The General Assembly had expressed its unanimous conviction that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and had recommended the negotiation of such a treaty in the most appropriate international forum. India continued to believe that any treaty banning the production of fissile material should be non-discriminatory: it should stipulate the same obligations and mechanisms for all States. While the nature, extent and mechanisms for verification should no doubt be determined during the negotiations, it should incorporate a verification mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all States were complying with their obligations. Full compliance by all States with their obligations under international instruments to which they were party was critical to the achievement of the goals envisaged in those instruments.

HAMZA KHELIF (Algeria) said that the Conference on Disarmament was not working in a void. The international political and security situation, and the various signals coming from everywhere, deepened Algeria’s concern regarding a new arms race. However, that should not prevent Conference members from redoubling their efforts to allow the Conference to respond to the concerns of the international community and to strengthen international peace and security. The issue of banning fissile material for nuclear weapons was one of those important concerns. Such a treaty could prevent both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of such weapons, and would mark a step towards the complete and comprehensive elimination of those deadly weapons. In addition, Algeria was convinced that the setting up of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) would guarantee the rights of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energies.

An FMCT should prohibit all States from producing fissile material, and it should put an end to the discrimination between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States. On the other hand, the implementation of the instrument should not be restricted to future production, but should include stockpiles, as foreseen by the Shannon report. Members should build confidence by agreeing to a method of verification. Verification mechanisms would provide transparency and credibility between countries. A safeguard regime should include all nuclear installations, including those that dealt with uranium enrichment, Mr. Khelif noted.

ALAIN VAN GUCHT (Belgium) said it appeared that within the Conference, everyone could agree on the need to begin the negotiations which should lead to the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Everyone knew that there were important divergences of view as to the modalities of such negotiations, and these divergences were mostly inspired by legitimate national security concerns, which were to be respected as such. However, Belgium was firmly convinced that international security required a reinforcement of common efforts with regards to non-proliferation and disarmament. The negotiation of a cut-off was the logical next step, and a number of States believed that time was ripe for negotiations. The Conference should seize this opportunity to contribute once more to a form of multilateralism that responded to the challenges that should be addressed together, of which the use of fissile materials by terrorists was not the least. Negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable cut-off should begin as soon as possible. Belgium would take part in such negotiations without imposing any pre-conditions. The structured debate this week was a new step in the right direction, and was an opportunity for the Conference to exchange views on the essential elements of a future FMCT.

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) said that it was a matter of great regret for Australia that after nearly 10 years the Conference had still to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Australia welcomed the moratoria on fissile material production for nuclear weapons declared by some nuclear weapon States, but those could not be a substitute for a binding treaty.

An FMCT did not need to be an over-complex treaty, Ms. Millar said. Nor would it have to be burdensome for non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that had committed not to produce nuclear weapons. The burden of such a treaty would fall on the five nuclear weapon States and the three nuclear capable States. An FMCT should contain basic provisions including a commitment to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, appropriate definitions and a mechanism for review. It should also deal with the status of pre-existing fissile material stocks. A most effective treaty would be one that provided for appropriate measures to verify parties’ compliance. But that should not be a precondition for launching negotiations. The priority of the Conference should be to conclude a treaty. Measures to ensure compliance should be left to subsequent, largely technical, negotiations.

DON MACKAY (New Zealand) said New Zealand had consistently supported the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), as it was a preventative measure in terms of minimising stockpile build up, and a substantive contribution to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Delaying negotiations just complicated things further, and ended in increases of the nuclear stockpiles. The longer the commencement of negotiations was delayed, the greater the stocks of fissile materials in existence. The issues of stocks and verification were sensitive, and treating them in the framework of an FMCT would be contentious, but all sides of the debate should be taken into account in the negotiations. However, delaying for this reason compromised the security of all. The launching of negotiations without preconditions as to their outcome was what was required. An FMCT dealing with stockpiles and with a verification procedure was the ripest issue for negotiation within the Conference’s remit. New Zealand very much welcomed the decision to include the International Atomic Energy Agency in the process. The potential for an FMCT to function as a supporting mechanism for nuclear disarmament was obvious. Any instrument which contributed to a norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons helped to promote the disarmament debate. However, discussion alone was not an acceptable substitute for active negotiations under a clear programme of work, and it was hoped that negotiations on the FMCT would help break the Conference’s stalemate.

GLAUDINE MTSHALI (South Africa) said that South Africa had, inter alia, endeavoured to contribute to a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) debate by its interventions in the various multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation forums, its support for various United Nations resolutions and by actively encouraging negotiations on an FMT. To that end, South Africa had submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament containing reflections on the possible scope and requirements of an FMT (CD/1671), which had been made available to delegations.

South Africa believed that an FMT had to be negotiated without any further delay. In a nutshell, Mr. Mtshali said such a treaty should be the product of multilateral negotiations; it should be non-discriminatory, verifiable, and fulfil both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Although cognizant of the difficulties associated with the past production of fissile material, South Africa believed that stocks should be included in the treaty.

ANDREW BARLOW (United Kingdom) said the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was a good idea, as if the international community was to make progress towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, then the situation in which some States retained fissile material could not remain. There were currently eight States in this situation, four of which had announced they were no longer producing such material, but the other four had not said this. An FMCT would change this, as all would have clear obligations, and this would be a clear improvement on the current situation, as there would be a ceiling on the amount of material available for nuclear weapons or devices. It was impossible to imagine the future of nuclear disarmament without such a ceiling. An FMCT was a key step on the road to nuclear disarmament, as it would also make more meaningful the efforts to reduce the stocks of fissile material. The British Government had strongly supported the case for negotiating an FMCT in recent years. Negotiations should involve the scope of the treaty, the question of verification, and the standard provisions for a treaty of this type. Multilateral negotiations could produce extremely worthwhile arms control agreements, but the Conference would not be able to do so in future unless it agreed at least to start negotiations on another achievable and worthwhile topic, and the FMCT was such a topic.

JINGYE CHENG (China) said that concluding a negotiated Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) had all along been one of the important issues on the Conference’s agenda. By banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, such a treaty would contribute to restraining the quantitative development of nuclear weapons. FMCT, together with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which aimed at restricting the qualitatitive improvement of nuclear weapons, would greatly accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, FMCT negotiations in the Conference should be based on the mandate contained in the Shannon Report. The right approach to achieve the cessation of production of fissile material was to adopt a legal approach through negotiations. China was also of the view that future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of stockpiles. In terms of universality and authority, no other bilateral or multilateral agreement could replace such a treaty formally concluded in the Conference. The issue of verification was extremely complex, as it related to such issues as whether there should be verification in the future treaty, and if so, what kind. It was therefore necessary to have the verification issue carefully explored and prudently handled.

ALABBAS HAYDER (Syria) said that his delegation supported the statements made by Pakistan and Algeria. Regarding a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Syria supported the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference to negotiate a potential FMCT, as soon as the Conference agreed on a programme of work that dealt with all the four core issues. Any FMCT should include existing stockpiles of fissile material and should also include a verification mechanism.

RUSSELL LESLIE (Australia) said the fissile materials to be covered by the treaty should only be those related to the construction of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency standards in this regard could be used as a template. Production of fissile material required three processes. For the treaty to encompass irradiation would give it a very broad scope. Stocks were also an issue. Another issue to be addressed would be the non-proscribed materials under the treaty.


WAN KI YOON (Republic of Korea) said that he would like to present the working paper of the Republic of Korean entitled “Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Explosive Devices”. Regarding uranium and plutonium, various definitions existed in the literature of different bodies, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations. Weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium were also characterized by different percentages of purity. There were thus no precise criteria for the content of uranium or plutonium characterized as “weapons grade”.

MASAHIRO KIKUCHI (Japan) said it should be emphasised that fissile materials for nuclear weapons and explosive devices should be bound, whilst materials for civil purposes were outside the scope of the bounds of the treaty. It was impossible to make a nuclear weapon from nuclear materials for civil use. The standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had been reached by consensus, were appropriate.

For use of the information media; not an official record

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