Conference on Disarmament Holds Thematic Plenary Discussion on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held a thematic plenary discussion on item 1 of its agenda on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, with a focus on nuclear disarmament verification.

Ambassador Yuri Borissov Sterk of Bulgaria, President of the Conference on Disarmament, recalled that in 2019 the United Nations General Assembly had adopted resolution 74/50 on nuclear disarmament verification, which encouraged the Conference on Disarmament to address this matter and requested the Secretary-General to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to consider nuclear disarmament verification issues.

Jørn Osmundsen, Special Envoy for Disarmament Affairs of Norway and Chair-designate of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, said the first Group of Governmental Experts, in a report adopted by consensus, had identified a series of principles to guide nuclear disarmament verification. Nuclear disarmament verification should conform with international law and the principles laid out by the final document of the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I, 1978) and by the United Nations Disarmament Commission Principles of Verification (1988), and it must conform to applicable international legal non-proliferation obligations, national safety and security requirements, and the need to protect otherwise sensitive information. Nuclear disarmament verification must be effective in ensuring compliance by the parties with obligations under the relevant treaty while also being mindful of the need for efficiency in the application of financial, human and other resources. A future nuclear disarmament verification regime must be non-discriminatory to the parties of the treaty, he added.

Pavel Podvig, Senior Researcher, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Strategic Weapons, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said verification was defined as a set of national and comparative activities, tools, procedures, analytical processes and fundamental judgements about what was happening with regard to specific activities defined in an agreement. There was a rich foundation on which nuclear disarmament verification could be built on. There was a great interest and investment in developing technical tools that would allow dealing with verification and nuclear weapons. These emerging and sophisticated technologies could be very important and effective tools of verification, especially if combined with a degree of confirmation. Key to building a robust verification regime was interaction between people. It was through inspections and notifications that confidence in verification was built; a shift to remote monitoring that removed the human component from the verification process could be counterproductive. Technical tools were important but they should be deployed in a way that increased trust and human interaction.

In the ensuing discussion, speakers noted that the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic had underlined the need for deeper international cooperation; innovative and creative ways to work multilaterally had emerged which had yet to be used in the disarmament context. Stressing the importance of human security, speakers encouraged considering gender issues in addressing disarmament issues. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the cornerstone of the global disarmament regime. In implementing it, nuclear-weapon States should seek to build confidence with non-nuclear-weapon States. Speakers expressed hope that the outcome document of the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would foster the development of nuclear disarmament verification measures.

Speaking in the discussion were Finland, Republic of Korea, United States, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Spain, Argentina, Germany, Russian Federation and Japan.

The Conference on Disarmament will meet again at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 12 May to continue its thematic plenary discussion on nuclear disarmament verification.

Introductory Remarks

Ambassador YURI BORISSOV STERK of Bulgaria, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, recalled that in 2019 the United Nations General Assembly had adopted resolution 74/50 on nuclear disarmament verification, which encouraged the Conference on Disarmament to address this matter and requested the Secretary-General to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to consider nuclear disarmament verification issues. The Conference had all the reason to give due consideration to the report of the Group established under resolution 71/76 and to discuss the role of verification in the frame of the Conference and more specifically to seek a common understanding on the next possible practical steps regarding nuclear disarmament verification.

Statements by Keynote Speakers

JØRN OSMUNDSEN, Special Envoy for Disarmament Affairs of Norway and Chair-designate of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, said the first Group of Governmental Experts, in a report adopted by consensus, had identified a series of principles to guide nuclear disarmament verification. Nuclear disarmament verification should conform with international law and the principles laid out by the final document of the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I, 1978) and by the United Nations Disarmament Commission Principles of Verification (1988), and it must conform to applicable international legal non-proliferation obligations, national safety and security requirements, and the need to protect otherwise sensitive information. Nuclear disarmament verification must be effective in ensuring compliance by the parties with obligations under the relevant treaty while also being mindful of the need for efficiency in the application of financial, human and other resources. A future nuclear disarmament verification regime must be non-discriminatory to the parties of the treaty, he added.

Mr. Osmundsen explained that the first Group had reached seven conclusions, including that advancing nuclear disarmament was an ongoing undertaking, and there was need for a continued international examination of the issue in all its aspects, including verification. A credible verification regime in which all States had confidence would be essential for maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. Confidence-building measures may complement nuclear disarmament verification arrangements between the implementing parties of a specific treaty. Engagement in nuclear disarmament verification must be strictly in line with applicable international legal non-proliferation obligations as well as other legal requirements. All States could contribute to aspects of nuclear disarmament verification and no State was restricted from developing verification techniques and methodologies. The Group recommended that all United Nations Member States, as well as relevant parts of the international disarmament machinery, in accordance with their respective mandates, consider the report.

The new Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification was appointed last fall by the Secretary-General and Mr. Osmundsen said he had been nominated as Chair-Designate in January this year. The mandate according to resolution 74/50 was to “ further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, including, inter alia, the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, building on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the views of Member States […] ;” The Group had consented to conduct the first formal session in November this year, with the three following sessions in 2022. At the first session, the Group would formally elect the Chair of the Group and decide on a work programme.

PAVEL PODVIG, Senior Researcher, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Strategic Weapons, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said verification was defined as a set of national and comparative activities, tools, procedures, analytical processes and fundamental judgements about what was happening with regard to specific activities defined in an agreement. There was a rich foundation on which nuclear disarmament verification could be built on. Normally, each State reached its own judgment with regards to its obligations. With nuclear disarmament verification, it could be challenging to do so, however, as there were safety and security issues that could prevent States from revealing how they had come to certain conclusions about their obligations related to nuclear disarmament. Judgement on compliance with obligations was important, as was the issue of how to judge a violation, especially when dealing with nuclear disarmament. Disarmament verification processes required dealing with nuclear weapons and sensitive information in a way that had not been done before. There was a great interest and investment in developing technical tools that would allow dealing with verification and nuclear weapons.

Mr. Podvig said too much focus should not be put on technical issues: a disarmament process could be built to carry out verification that would not require dealing with, or looking at, the weapons directly, or knowing how many weapons there were. Verification could not exist in a vacuum. The treaty between the United States and Russia allowed the exchange of data regarding their nuclear forces that was really detailed. On-site visits, the use of radiation detection equipment and other intrusive verification measures that were now standard used to be considered unthinkable. Regarding emerging and sophisticated technologies, they could be very important and effective tools of verification, especially if combined with a degree of confirmation. Key to building a robust verification regime was interaction between people. It was through inspections and notifications that confidence in verification was built; a shift to remote monitoring that removed the human component from the verification process could be counterproductive. Technical tools were important but they should be deployed in a way that increased trust and human interaction. The standard definition of effective verification was that the verification system should allow the detection of significant violations in time to mount a response that would deny the violator benefits of the violation. The verification process should be designed in a way that was more cooperative, to increase confidence and trust.

Discussion

In the ensuing discussion, speakers noted that the urgency had increased in the face of the threat posed by nuclear arms. The devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic had underlined the need for deeper international cooperation; innovative and creative ways to work multilaterally had emerged which had yet to be used in the disarmament context. Stressing the importance of human security, speakers encouraged considering gender issues in addressing disarmament issues. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the cornerstone of the global disarmament regime. In implementing it, nuclear-weapon States should seek to build confidence with non-nuclear-weapon States. Speakers expressed hope that the outcome document of the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would foster the development of nuclear disarmament verification measures.

Touting bilateral treaties like New START, which had robust verification obligations and long records of strong compliance, speakers warned against the danger posed to all when a State stopped complying with its verification obligations. They called on those States that were not in compliance with their verification-related obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to take the necessary steps to comply with those obligations. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification was a prime example of “effective measures” that helped to create the environment for future nuclear disarmament. The New START treaty offered a solid foundation for nuclear disarmament verification measures, as the parties had been exchanging verification related data for several years. Since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons — which complemented rather than substituted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — useful discussion had taken part amongst States parties on verification, under article 4.

Verification was merely a means to an end, and it should be approached in the context or as part and parcel of nuclear disarmament, in line with article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification had generated results that had already strengthened confidence that multilateral verification was indeed possible. There simply was no nuclear disarmament without verification, some speakers emphasised. The verification regime should be able to certify the reversible nature of nuclear armaments and the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. It was essential that nuclear-weapon States take part in the negotiations on verification lest they be ineffective. Verification measures must be robust, reliable and economically viable, some speakers said. Such measures should also be linked directly to specific treaties. The Conference should not shy away from hard questions, such as the link between nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament, speakers said.

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