PAKISTAN EXPLAINS TO CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT RATIONALE BEHIND ITS POSITION ON A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

Pakistan this morning placed before the Conference on Disarmament the rationale of its position on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The Secretary-General of the Conference urged all countries to show flexibility. Australia, Norway, India, Japan, Germany and Belarus as President also addressed the Conference.

Ensuring Pakistan’s security was its supreme national interest, Pakistan said. It had to respond to capabilities and not intentions. When its neighbour had conducted a nuclear weapon test in 1974, it had posed new challenges to Pakistan’s security. No effective measures had been taken to reverse nuclear proliferation in South Asia and all proposals and initiatives made by Pakistan for bilateral arrangements had been rejected. Their neighbour had announced an ambitious nuclear doctrine which aimed at acquisition of a nuclear arsenal consisting of 400 nuclear weapons. Significant progress had already been made to achieve their capabilities with international collaboration from those who had committed themselves not to do so. Pakistan could not accept a treaty that would freeze existing asymmetries or imbalances in fissile materials stockpiles between Pakistan and its neighbour and had to ensure that the asymmetry did not erode the credibility of its deterrence.

Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, reminded all delegations that many Members States had strategic concerns vis-à-vis each disarmament issue that was on the agenda of the Conference, be they of a bilateral, multilateral, regional or global nature. At the same time, Member States had made certain positions of their own flexible enough to move ahead the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference had not yet started consideration of article I of any treaty, or document. It was thus very hard to see how the adoption of a programme of work could hamper in any way the strategic security concerns of any country. All countries had to show flexibility and be flexible enough to let the Conference start the procedures. One would never succeed by never trying, said Mr. Ordzhonikidze.

India said the Conference on Disarmament’s role was not to engage in regional and bilateral issues. Pakistan’s statement was unhelpful and it should not use exterior issues to ground the Conference on Disarmament from getting back to substantive work.

Japan said it understood Pakistan’s situation and the situation in the region and the difficulties. Japan’s position was however different on one point: that according to Pakistan the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was only for non-proliferation purposes. This was a misunderstanding. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was an indispensable step towards nuclear disarmament.

Germany said that whether the Conference should or not deal with regional issues was an interesting question. It was true that many issues were connected with one another and it was important to understand what these issues were. It was however difficult to understand why a Member State would be so reticent to engage into negotiations. One could make all these points in the negotiations.

Australia said that the changing global strategic environment required the Conference to re-double efforts to move the disarmament agenda forward. For too long the Conference had not been delivering its promise. The task was now to adopt a programme of work for 2010 and to move towards an early implementation. Dialogue was not enough; they had to move towards treaty negotiation.

Norway said that the thirtieth State had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions and this meant that the Convention would enter into force on 1 August 2010. The first meeting of the States parties would also take place by the end of this year. Norway hoped that the Oslo process might inspire the Conference to look for new ways to achieve the progress so urgently needed.

The President of the Conference, Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov of Belarus, said that caution was not always favourable. He agreed with Mr. Ordzhonikidze that it was important for the Conference to make progress and delegations would have time to analyse what had happened today before the next plenary.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 25 February 2010.

Statements

PETER RICHARD WOOLCOTT (Australia), in his first address to the Conference on Disarmament, ensured Australia’s full support to the Conference. The changing global strategic environment required them to re-double efforts to move the disarmament agenda forward. For too long the Conference had not been delivering its promise. Some said it was sleepwalking. A real breakthrough had been achieved in 2009, when the Conference had adopted a programme of work. Australia regretted that it had not been possible for the Conference to seize that momentum.

The task was now to adopt a programme of work for 2010 and to move towards an early implementation, said Mr. Woolcott. Dialogue was not enough; they had to move towards treaty negotiation. Australia appealed to all delegations to show flexibility. Many had already shown leadership in finding flexibility. Australia’s commitment to nuclear disarmament was deep and comprehensive. The report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament had provided a welcome forward looking statement of what could be done now to activate the disarmament agenda. Australia looked forward to an engaged discussion on the ideas and practical steps proposed by the report. The first step was to get the Conference back to work.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said he wanted to place before the Conference the rationale of Pakistan’s position on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. However, first he wanted to remind everyone that the Conference on Disarmament did not operate in a vacuum. The positions taken at the Conference could not be divorced or isolated from the realities prevailing in the international political system. Nor could a delegation pursue an objective in the Conference that was inconsistent with the policies of its Government.

At the time of their independence, the two largest countries of South Asia had inherited a disputed legacy; this flawed inheritance continued to bedevil their relations even today and their troops remained in eye ball to eye ball confrontation along the Line of Control. Ensuring Pakistan’s security was the supreme national interest. They had to respond to capabilities and not intentions. When its neighbour had conducted a nuclear weapon test in 1974, it had posed new challenges to Pakistan’s security. No effective measures had been taken to reverse nuclear proliferation in South Asia and all proposals and initiatives made by Pakistan for bilateral arrangements had been rejected. The only option for Pakistan had therefore been to develop its own nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan had however decided not to conduct a nuclear weapon test, hoping to avoid further confrontation. However, in 1998, five nuclear tests had been conducted on Pakistan’s borders, accompanied by belligerent statements and dire warnings. Ironically, the focus had been once again on Pakistan to show restraint and not to follow suit. But as there had been no hint of substantive action to reverse nuclear proliferation in their region, Pakistan had had no choice but to conduct its own test in order to ensure the credibility of its deterrence capability, said Mr. Akram.

Pakistan had offered to stabilize the nuclear deterrence that had emerged by offering the Strategic Restraint Regime proposal in 1998. Unfortunately, this proposal continued to be rejected by the other side, said Mr. Akram. On the contrary, their neighbour had announced an ambitious nuclear doctrine which aimed at acquisition of a nuclear arsenal consisting of 400 nuclear weapons. Significant progress had already been made to achieve their capabilities with international collaboration from those who had committed themselves not to do so.

At the initial consideration of the issue of fissile materials in the Conference on Disarmament during the 1990’s, Pakistan had made is position crystal clear that it could not accept a treaty that would freeze existing asymmetries or imbalances in fissile materials stockpiles between Pakistan and its neighbour. Pakistan had to ensure that the asymmetry did not erode the credibility of its deterrence, said Mr. Akram.

Turning to the present situation, Mr. Akram said that some States had embarked on nuclear cooperation agreements with their neighbour in clear violation of their international commitments, as well as their national laws. In this regard, it was already enough to just quote Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which said that each nuclear-weapon State party undertook not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. These nuclear cooperation agreements also violated the commitments undertaken by the 45 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group. Several experts had highlighted the dangers of such policies.

At the beginning of 2009, with leadership changes in one of the major powers and proponents of these nuclear deals, there had been a ray of hope that concerns and doubts about the nuclear cooperation agreements would lead to restraint that would prevent further destabilization in South Asia, said Mr. Akram. For this reason, Pakistan had not blocked adoption of the Conference’s Programme of Work. Unfortunately, their optimism had been short lived. When included in Government, several opponents of the deal had become its ardent proponents. More ominously, by June 2009, it had become clear that the deal had been part of a larger dangerous strategic design. At the same time, other P-5 States, as well as some of the most vociferous champions of non-proliferation of the Conference, had jumped most enthusiastically on this gravy train.

Mr. Akram cited Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Washington-based Stimson Centre, who had said that it was an unfortunate fact that the biggest potential profit takers in nuclear commerce happened to be the permanent members of the Security Council. When the P-5 placed other interests, such as profit taking, over proliferation concerns, nuclear dangers would grow.

The carte blanche that had been offered to Pakistan’s neighbour, along with the commitments to build up its strategic and conventional capabilities, had encouraged its hegemonic ambitions which were aimed at charting a course of dangerous adventurism, whose consequences could be both unintended and uncontrollable. Pursuit of aggressive doctrines amounted to be oblivious to the dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearised environment, said Mr. Akram.

This situation confronted Pakistan with a clear and present danger. In its meeting on 12 January 2010, the National Command Authority of Pakistan had concluded that Pakistan could not be oblivious of these developments in its neighbourhood and, accordingly, it would not compromise on its security interests and the imperative of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence, said Mr. Akram.

The specific concerns that arose for Pakistan in the context of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty were that the transfer of unlimited amounts of fissile material to its neighbouring country would enable it to build up is strategic reserves, which would enable it to divert its own indigenous stocks for weapons production. Second, since the safeguards arrangements were not foolproof, there was danger that imported fissile material designated for civilian use would be secretly diverted for weapons making purposes. Third, that situation should increase the existing asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles between Pakistan and its neighbour. Fourth, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that had been proposed would only ban future production of fissile material and would thus be only a non-proliferation and not a disarmament measure, said Mr. Akram.

The argument that these issues should be addressed during the negotiations was, for Pakistan, an invitation to go down a blind ally in total darkness, said Mr. Akram. It was imperative, in their view, to have a-priori knowledge of what they were seeking to negotiate. The Conference could also not expect Member States to endorse efforts that undermined their security. A large number of delegations in the Conference recognized that Pakistan’s position was legitimate and justified and that its concerns needed to be taken into consideration. Also, any attempt to take the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty out of the Conference would be an empty initiative.

Responding to those States among the P-5 and the Nuclear Supplier Group who had argued about the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty being one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime and viewed the start of negotiations on it as critical for the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mr. Akram said that it was those countries that had violated their own national and international commitments, thereby reducing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime to a farce. Therefore it was these countries, not Pakistan, who by their acts of omission and commission were responsible for the impasse on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Had they not been so fast and furious to conclude these nuclear cooperation agreements with scant regard for Pakistan’s security imperatives, the situation inside and outside the Conference could well have been different.

Mr. Akram also said that the Conference had been unable to progress for the last twelve years. One should not forget those major powers who were responsible for this long hiatus, or the issues on which this impasse had existed. Some delegations were still not ready to negotiate legally binding treaties on nuclear disarmament, agreements on Negative Security Assurance or Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space, issues that had been on the agenda of the Conference for decades. Pakistan remained ready to engage in substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament, Negative Security Assurances and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In Pakistan’s view there was no reason for an impasse on the Conference, even if there was no consensus on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The Conference could begin its substantive work at the earliest, for instance on nuclear disarmament, an objective which they all shared.

HILDE SKORPEN (Norway) said that, on the occasion of the thirtieth ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, this meant that the Convention would enter into force on 1 August 2010. The first meeting of the States parties would also take place by the end of this year. Norway hoped that the Oslo process might inspire the Conference to look for new ways to achieve the progress so urgently needed. The process of negotiations for the Convention on Cluster Munitions proved that, with sufficient political will, it was possible to find ways to make progress. While it was true that there were differences between the nuclear disarmament agenda and that of cluster mentions, there were also similarities. Disarmament was a tool to enhance national and human security. Valuable lessons could be learnt from the Oslo process, such as how powerful alliances could be reached when States created new cross-regional partnerships and when Governments worked together along with non-governmental organizations. Disarmament was also closely linked to development. One could not leave it to nuclear States alone to decide when the time would be ripe to do away with these weapons.

HAMID ALI RAO (India) said that India had been compelled to take the floor after the unfounded remarks by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan. It would have been better if he had restrained from making some of the remarks he had made. The Conference on Disarmament’s role was not to engage in regional and bilateral issues. India’s impeccable non-proliferation record was well known and he did not intend to respond to the baseless remarks of Pakistan. This statement could only be viewed as unhelpful and Pakistan should not use exterior issues to ground the Conference on Disarmament from getting back to substantive work.

AKIO SUDA (Japan) said that he had listened very carefully to Pakistan’s statement. Japan understood the situation in Pakistan, as well as what the situation in the region was and it understand their difficulties. There were many points and arguments that had been raised by Pakistan today. Japan’s position was however different on one point: that according to Pakistan the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was only for non-proliferation purposes. This was a misunderstanding. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was an indispensable step towards nuclear disarmament. It would enable a further reduction of the total number of nuclear weapons in the world.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said it was not his intention to enter in a debate with his colleague from India. The facts that he had recounted in his statement spoke for themselves. He had also brought in facts that were internationally recognised and which did not come from Pakistan. If some of these facts were wrong, he would be more than happy to be informed about it. India argued that the Conference on Disarmament was not the forum to bring up regional security issues. However, when Pakistan raised these issues regionally, it was told that these issues could not be solved bilaterally and regionally, as these were global issues. As he had said earlier, the Conference on Disarmament was not a kind of a wonderland, it was affected by real life situations and the delegations were guided by the security concerns of their countries.

Turning to Japan’s comments, Mr. Akram said that if the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was indeed a disarmament step, then one should also agree to endeavour to reduce the stock of existing stockpiles and not only to negotiate the banning of future production.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, said he had been really concerned about what was going on at the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference was supposed to deal with strategic disarmament issues that were of paramount concern to the international community. As the Representative of the Secretary-General, he fully shared his view that the Conference had to make much more progress.

Mr. Ordzhonikidze thanked the Ambassador of Pakistan for having outlined Pakistan’s strategic concerns of a bilateral nature. At the same time, he also wanted to remind all delegations that, by looking at the world outside of this room, many Members States had strategic concerns vis-à-vis each disarmament issue that was on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, be they bilateral, multilateral, regional or of a global nature.

At the same time, these Member States had made certain positions of their own flexible enough to move forward the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference had not yet started consideration of article I of any treaty, or document. It was thus very hard to see how the adoption of a programme of work could hamper in any way the strategic security concerns of any country; it was only a document that would be discussed further on. All countries had to show flexibility and be flexible enough to let the Conference start the procedures. One would never succeed by never trying, said Mr. Ordzhonikidze.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) wondered whether the Secretariat or the Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference was in a position to make the kind of remarks that he had made. He had his doubts about it. However, to take the remarks at face value, Pakistan wished to remind him that one could not be selective about asking countries to be flexible. One could accuse Pakistan of being inflexible since May 2009. What about the inflexibility of the countries which had created an impasse during the last 12 years? The Representative of the Secretary-General had not mentioned this issue. Pakistan had only been inflexible for some months now.

Mr. Akram further wondered whether there was only the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty on the Conference’s agenda. Were they only here for that? There were many other items on the agenda, why was no one asking about the inflexibility of the other countries on those other issues? Who was stopping negotiations on those other topics? Surely not Pakistan, as it was ready to negotiate on those subjects. The Representative of the Secretary-General should be more balanced when talking about flexibility.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, said that he had not mentioned any country in his short statement, nor the subject of the agenda of the Conference, he was only mentioning the need that the Conference on Disarmament move quickly, show flexibility, approve its programme of work and move ahead with the strategic nuclear issue. Any other interpretation would be a misinterpretation of the wish of the United Nations to see the Conference on Disarmament move forward.

HELMUT HOFFMANN (Germany) said that they would have to study in detail this morning’s statements. Whether the Conference should or should not deal with regional issues was an interesting question. He was rather agnostic in this matter. It was true that many issues were connected with one another and it was important to understand what these issues were. It was also good to have an open and transparent debate.

Mr. Hoffmann also supported the comments made by Japan. Germany also felt that a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would have a disarmament effect. He however found it still difficult to understand why a member State would be so reticent to engage into negotiations. One could make all these points in the negotiations. He cited the Four Powers Negotiations on the status of Berlin. If parties had then decided to clear all their objections before the start of the negotiations themselves, nothing would ever have happened. He also expressed support for the comments made by the Representative of the Secretary-General.

MIKHAIL KHVOSTOV (Belarus), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that caution was not always favourable. He agreed with Mr. Ordzhonikidze that it was important for the Conference to make progress and delegations would have time to analyse what had happened today before the next plenary.


For use of the information media; not an official record

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