BRITISH DEFENCE MINISTER ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, told the Conference on Disarmament today that he wanted to send a strong message about the priority the United Kingdom gave to its disarmament commitments.

Also during the meeting, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Samir Labidi of Tunisia, announced the appointment of seven Coordinators for the agenda items. Statements were then made by Switzerland, Iran, Germany, Norway, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, in which different opinions were aired on how to move forward on a programme of work.

The international community needed a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament, Mr. Browne said, one that also addressed proliferation, so that disarmament and counter-proliferation both moved forward together. Their goal should be a "virtuous cycle", where progress on one reinforced the other. Without doing so, they risked generating the perception that the nuclear weapon States were failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations, and that would be used by some States as an excuse for their nuclear intransigence. A key milestone towards building the climate for disarmament was securing a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which, among others, would limit the ability of signatories to expand their arsenals and would provide the necessary reassurance to their neighbours and the international community. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said last month, they all had national security concerns, but without preconditions, let them at least get down to negotiations on a treaty where those security concerns could be addressed.

Mr. Browne said the United Kingdom wanted to be seen as a "disarmament laboratory" – a role model and testing ground for measures that it and others could take on key aspects of disarmament. Of paramount importance, in that connection, was the development of verification techniques that assured non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States both that when a State said it was not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons that it was telling the truth. With that in mind, over the last year the United Kingdom's Atomic Weapons Establishment had developed a technical cooperation initiative with several Norwegian laboratories, which could provide some useful insight into how further initiatives might proceed. As a next step, and following on from the research of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, the United Kingdom was willing to host a technical conference of the P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010.

Several delegations urged the adoption of the three documents before the Conference (CD/2007/L.1, CD/2007/CRP.5 and CD/2007/CRP.6). Switzerland stressed that the adoption of the three documents represented the Conference's best chance of finding a way out of the impasse that had paralysed it for so long. Adopting them would allow the Conference to work on all four core issues in a balanced way, while leaving open the option of including further issues, should they arise. Germany regretted that a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (FMCT) was still not exactly "palpable". A decision to start FMCT-negotiations in the Conference must be their clear goal this year. That could only be achieved by a consensus on CD/2007/L.1. Norway underscored that that proposal had been the closest the Conference on Disarmament had been for years (to achieving a programme of work). They had to put short-term national security considerations aside and embark on a joint mission so that they could turn back the hands of the "Doomsday Clock" which kept ticking towards midnight. As they discussed whether measures under consideration belonged primarily to the disarmament or the non-proliferation category, the risk of proliferation and actual use of nuclear weapons continued to grow.

Other States emphasized the need for changes in the proposal that would include the views and concerns of all delegations. For Iran, nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pending that, negative security assurances, and the conclusion of a binding treaty on effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, should be concluded as a matter of priority. The four core issues identified by the Conference on Disarmament were of equal value and had to be subjected to equal treatment. Sri Lanka wished to make it clear that if there were States that had not come "on board", it was inaccurate to say that there was international consensus. And if they had not reached consensus it was not because they had run out of time; it was because they had serious differences of opinion. In the view of the Third World, what was needed was realism and new thinking – a new paradigm – one that frankly addressed the concerns of all, and that eschewed threats and moral grandstanding. Pakistan was of the opinion that if L.1 was adopted, a non-verifiable fissile material treaty would become received wisdom, and said substantive limitations built into L.1 had to be removed. Four elements had to be included in Presidential draft decision L.1 for it to be acceptable: the Conference had to set the task of negotiations on a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable" fissile material treaty (FMT); an FMT mandate should distinctly recognize the possibility of considering the scope of the treaty, as well as the existing stocks; an equal and balanced treatment had to be given to all four core issues; and ad hoc committees, as provided for in the Conference's rules of procedure, should conduct negotiations.


For his part, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva and Secretary-General of the Conference, underscored that a clear majority wished to keep L.1 as it was. Rather than seeing that that overwhelming majority was trying to impose something, it should be taken as a sign. Consensus was good, but it was not a final end. The final end was strategic disarmament. The document before the Conference represented the views of all four continents. Members had expressed the view of their regional groups, of their continents and of themselves. Those views should not be attacked. The draft decision should be adopted.

Ambassador Labidi, President of the Conference, announced the appointments of the 2008 Coordinators: the Ambassador of Chile, for items 1 and 2 – cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war – with a focus on prevention of nuclear war; Japan, also for items 1 and 2, with a focus on the treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; Canada, for prevention of an arms race in outer space; Senegal for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; Bulgaria for new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and radiological weapons; Sri Lanka, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament; and Indonesia, on transparency in armaments. Meetings on items 1 and 2 would be reflected together.

In 2007, the Conference was not able to reach agreement on a programme of work and so was unable to start work on substantive issues. A Presidential Draft Decision (CD/2007/L.1**) was submitted as a basis for an agreement to begin substantive work in the Conference, and successive Presidents conducted intensive consultations with a view to reaching agreement on it. Presidential draft decision CD/2007/L.1** calls for the appointment of four Coordinators to preside over substantive discussions on the issues of nuclear disarmament; prevention of an arms race in outer space; and negative security assurances; and to preside over negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Complementary Presidential Statement, CD/2007/CRP.5*, reflects an understanding of the Conference on the implementation of the Presidential decision, and the third text CD/2007/CRP.6* is a short decision stating that when the Conference adopts the Presidential decision, it will be guided by the Presidential statement in its implementation. At the end of the 2007 session, it was decided that the documents before the Conference would be held over for consideration at the 2008 session.

At the end of the meeting, Denmark was invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament for 2008 as an observer.

At 11 a.m. on Thursday, 7 February, the Conference will have a closed exchange of views with Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States, which will then be followed by a public debate.

Statements

DES BROWNE, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, noting that it was rare for a Defence Minister to address the Conference on Disarmament, said he wanted to send a strong message about the priority the United Kingdom gave to its disarmament commitments. Those were not just theoretical obligations, they were priorities against which the present Government had made real progress since it had come to power in 1997. However, over the past 15 years they had seen some nations expanding their nuclear arsenals, some surreptitiously seeking nuclear weapons under the guide of a civil energy programme, and others detonating nuclear test devices in the face of international condemnation. The proliferation of nuclear material, technology, know-how and weapons represented a grave threat to international security. Action had to be taken now to ensure such material was properly protected. While international security architecture in the form of treaties and initiatives existed, the international community had still not completely stopped proliferation, nor was it yet strong enough to permit immediate unilateral disarmament by any recognized nuclear weapon State. They needed to do more. As the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) made clear, all States parties had already agreed to strive for measures, which provided an environment for all nuclear weapon States to eliminate their holdings. Yet, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had not yet entered into force and there was an ongoing stalemate on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The Conference had played a crucial role in moving forward the debate in those areas and seeking solutions, and all were encouraged to redouble their efforts. Global problems required global solutions. The international community needed a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament, one that also addressed proliferation, so that disarmament and counter-proliferation both moved forward together. Their goal should be a "virtuous cycle", where progress on one reinforced the other. Without doing so, they risked generating the perception that the nuclear weapon States were failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations, and that would be used by some States as an excuse for their nuclear intransigence.

There was little public acknowledgment of the vast cuts so far in the warheads of the United States and the Russian Federation, especially since the Cold War, much less those made to the smaller French and United Kingdom stocks. Mr. Browne welcomed the recent news from the United States that, by 2012, their stockpile would be at its lowest for 50 years. They all needed to maintain these efforts, but also to better publicize the fact that they were on that path. Also welcome were ongoing bilateral discussions between the United States and Russia on a follow-on arrangement after the current START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) expired. The NPT Review Conference in 2010 should send a clear message to States considering withdrawal that such a decision would have consequences. They had to confront States looking to breach their obligations by developing weapons of mass destruction. The international community had to ensure that there was no space for such proliferators. The United Kingdom was committed to supporting the universal right of access to safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technology, but that could not be at the risk of further proliferation. It had therefore developed the concept of an "Enrichment Bond", whereby assistance was granted in return for a demonstrable commitment to non-proliferation. They should also strive for the early entry into force of the CTBT and for progress in its verification system. In that context, Colombia's ratification of the CTBT last week was evidence of real progress. A key milestone towards building the climate for disarmament was securing an FMCT, which, among others, would limit the ability of signatories to expand their arsenals and would provide the necessary reassurance to their neighbours and the international community. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said last month, they all had national security concerns, but without preconditions, let them at least get down to negotiations on a treaty where those security concerns could be addressed. This was the only body where all nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States could sit down together to discuss security issues of the highest sensitivity.

Just as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was a high priority for the United Kingdom Mr. Browne acknowledged that other countries had other priorities, such as negotiating a new legal instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At the United Nations, the United Kingdom had consistently supported the annual resolution on this subject. But there was no international consensus on the need to start negotiations on a new international legal instrument governing military use of outer space. For its part, the United Kingdom had reduced the number of its operationally available nuclear warheads to fewer than 160, and if possible that number would be reduced still further. The United Kingdom wanted to be seen as a "disarmament laboratory" – a role model and testing ground for measures that it and others could take on key aspects of disarmament. Of paramount importance, in that connection, was the development of verification techniques that assured non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States both that when a State said it was not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons that it was telling the truth. With that in mind, over the last year the United Kingdom's Atomic Weapons Establishment had developed a technical cooperation initiative with several Norwegian laboratories, which could provide some useful insight into how further initiatives might proceed. As a next step, and following on from the research of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, the United Kingdom was willing to host a technical conference of the P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. The United Kingdom also hoped to engage with other P5 States in other confidence-building measures.

SAMIR LABIDI (Tunisia), President of the Conference, said that, as mentioned previously, following the inter-sessional consultations he had undertaken with Conference Members, he had concluded that a full consensus had not been arrived at on a programme of work. He had also previously highlighted a number of concerns, but also areas of hope, that the work of the past year would lead to the Conference overcoming its impasse and its years of uncertainty. In that connection, he highlighted the two interventions of the Secretary-General – on 14 June 2007 and at the opening of the Conference in January 2008 – in which the Secretary-General had shown the priority he attached to Member States reaching a consensus on a programme of work. Indeed, they should continue efforts to narrow differences so as to contribute to finding a path towards the start of substantive work. A good start had been the swift adoption of the Conference's agenda, which touched on all the issues of concern to the Conference. Also, while there was a lack of consensus on a programme of work, there had been no objection made on the designation by the President of the seven Coordinators for the various agenda items, without prejudice to its future programme of work. Therefore, in 2008, those Coordinators would organize and chair debates on agenda items without preconditions, and would periodically report to the Conference on progress achieved. The Presidents of the Conference for 2008 would also work to foster a climate that would bring the Conference closer to a programme of work.

Mr. Labidi then announced the appointments of the 2008 Coordinators selected by the 2008 Presidents: the Ambassador of Chile, for items 1 and 2 – cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war – with a focus on prevention of nuclear war; Japan, also for items 1 and 2, with a focus on the treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; Canada, for prevention of an arms race in outer space; Senegal for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; Bulgaria for, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and radiological weapons; Sri Lanka, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament; and Indonesia, on transparency in armaments. Meetings on items 1 and 2 would be reflected together.

JURG STREULI (Switzerland) said that Switzerland was fully aware of the challenges the Conference on Disarmament was facing to convince all Members to complete the arduous journey towards the adoption of a programme of work. They had been close to doing so last year, and were still very close. Welcoming the clear language that the Secretary-General had used in his opening statement to the Conference (on 22 January), calling for the Conference to break its deadlock, Switzerland believed that such an agreement was still within the Conference's grasp if those words were heeded. In 2007, the Conference had been seized of three documents: draft Presidential decision CD/2007/L.1, complementary Presidential statement CD/2007/CRP.5, and draft decision CRP.6. Switzerland felt that those three documents represented the Conference's best chance of finding a way out of the impasse that had paralysed it for so long. They were the fruit of long and broad-based consultations and addressed the interests and concerns of all Conference Members. Adopting them would allow the Conference to work on all four core issues in a balanced way, while leaving open the option of including further issues, should they arise.

Draft decision L.1 called for the immediate opening of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for military purposes. Such a mandate was of the utmost importance, not only for the ban itself, but because last year's consultations had shown that that issue was a priority for many delegations. Furthermore, progress achieved during those discussions had showed that it was the ripest issue for negotiation. Switzerland reiterated its position that such negotiations should be initiated with no preconditions. The L.1 proposal also foresaw substantive discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Switzerland fully supported that objective. Switzerland believed that much remained to be done in that domain, even in the absence of a programme of work, and hoped to see a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. The twin issues of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war were also an important priority. Switzerland believed that the Conference could come up with practical solutions that could be accepted, and called on the Conference in particular to undertake frank and open discussions on the issues of negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

ALI REZA MOAIYERI (Iran) began by expressing Iran's support for the statement by Sri Lanka on 29 January 2008 on behalf of the Group of 21. The promotion of multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions should remain the core principle of any negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament. Nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority of Iran, and it was a subject of regret that the international community had not been able to give that issue its due attention. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) commitments had not been fulfilled, and the NPT's 13 practical steps (to implement nuclear disarmament) appeared to have been put on ice. Iran was gravely concerned by the thousands of nuclear weapons currently in stockpiles. Given the current state of affairs, that issue was becoming more and more present. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pending that, negative security assurances, and the conclusion of a binding treaty on effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, should be concluded as a matter of priority. The four core issues identified by the Conference on Disarmament were of equal value and had to be subjected to equal treatment. Any possible programme of work should be balanced, and acceptable to all delegations.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) reiterated Germany's unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a first step, the role of nuclear weapons had to be de-emphasized in security doctrines. Germany continued to stress the need for an overall reduction in nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels consistent with deterrence requirements in the pursuit of gradual, systematic nuclear disarmament, as provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the other hand, Germany acknowledged the nuclear arms reductions that had taken place since the end of the Cold War. Leadership was needed from the nuclear weapon States to bolster non-proliferation efforts and to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat. Germany welcomed the ratification in 2002 of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) by the Russian Federation and the United States, while at the same time stressing the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals. In particular, Germany would welcome the negotiation of a bilateral follow-on agreement to the expiring START I Treaty. Germany also renewed its call on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination, and in that context highlighted the need for Russia and the United States to implement the declarations made by their Presidents on unilateral reductions in their stocks of such weapons in 1991 and 1992.

The NPT remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Germany was convinced that those pillars remained as valid as ever today. They needed to pursue all the objectives laid down in the Treaty in a structured and balanced manner. Furthermore, Germany remained dedicated to achieving universal adherence to the NPT, as the possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT risked undermining all non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Another pivotal pillar of the non-proliferation and disarmament framework was the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to which Germany continued to reaffirm its strongest support, welcoming the recent accession of Malaysia and Colombia to that important instrument. Finally, Germany regretted that a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (FMCT) was still not exactly "palpable". In the Conference, it was obvious that among nuclear issues, an FMCT was the ripest for negotiation, an opportunity and priority that waited to be seized as the next logical step after the CTBT. Germany was convinced that an effectively verifiable FMCT would be a major achievement towards the implementation of Article VI (on nuclear disarmament) of the NPT. A decision to start FMCT-negotiations in the Conference must be their clear goal this year. That could only be achieved by a consensus on CD/2007/L.1.

BENTE ANGELL-HANSEN (Norway) said that the substantive and visionary statement by the Secretary of Defence of the United Kingdom had been highly encouraging. The central tenets of that statement mirrored Norway's views on how to bring the disarmament agenda forward. Norway wholeheartedly agreed that substantial progress on disarmament was vital to ensure further progress on non-proliferation as well. Norway commended the United Kingdom for pointing the way, and urged others to follow. The international community needed more "laboratories for disarmament".

Reducing nuclear dangers entailed responsibilities for all States. If they were to reduce nuclear dangers, they had to find common ground on both non-proliferation and disarmament. The Presidential proposal CD/2007/L.1 had been the closest the Conference on Disarmament had been for years. They had to put short-term national security considerations aside and embark on a joint mission so that they could turn back the hands of the "Doomsday Clock" which kept ticking towards midnight. As they discussed whether measures under consideration belonged primarily to the disarmament or the non-proliferation category, the risk of proliferation and actual use of nuclear weapons continued to grow. The danger of nuclear devices and weapons grade material falling into the hands of people who would not hesitate to use them was real. It was up to the Conference on Disarmament to turn the tide. They now had to do their part to deliver on the expectations voiced by many – the United Nations Secretary-General, Henry Kissinger, and others – and help to ensure that a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons became a reality.

DAYAN JAYATILLEKA (Sri Lanka) said Sri Lanka was situated in a volatile part of the world that included two nuclear weapon States. Sri Lanka therefore had a vested interest in the themes and objectives of the Conference on Disarmament. But he had listened to the speeches this morning with a growing sense of unreality. He was reminded of a statement attributed to both Hitler and Stalin "What's mine is mine, what's yours, let's negotiate". That attitude would not ensure progress in the Conference. If there were States that had not come "on board", it was inaccurate to say that there was international consensus. There was some consensus, but it was obviously not international consensus. That was not because they had run out of time; it was because they had serious differences of opinion. That was true about document CD/2007/L.1, and other issues raised today.

Great progress could not be expected on the basis of agreements forged during the period of détente. They could not expect their great Asian friends to come on board the consensus that was supposed to exist, without speculation over whether they constituted the new enemy. Progress would not be made on the FMCT issue if they continued to demonize one or two States in a volatile ark of crisis, forgetting that there was at least one State with a long-standing nuclear stockpile, and which had invaded almost all of its neighbours. Progress could not be made while there was talk of unilateral strikes on certain States, including strikes with low-yield, tactile nuclear weapons. None of that would work. Sri Lanka certainly did not believe in the moral superiority of certain countries that had invaded others on the basis of an outright lie. In the view of the Third World, what was needed was realism and new thinking – a new paradigm – one that frankly addressed the concerns of all, and that eschewed threats and moral grandstanding.

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said that the first meetings of the Conference on Disarmament session were always difficult. However, with the presence of the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, and with the appointment of the seven Coordinators today, there were some good signs. The Presidential draft decision (CD/2007/L.1) had generated momentum in the Conference last year. However, it was not the only basis or a realistic basis for starting work this year. If so, work would have started last year. It had two blind spots: it ignored the Five Ambassadors proposal, which had enjoyed near-universal support, and the Shannon mandate, on which all had agreed. Secondly, it called for its blind acceptance, as is. An aversion to changes in L.1 would erode its acceptability. The Secretary-General, in his address to the Conference on Disarmament had said that "the adoption of this decision [L.1] would not deprive any Member State of the ability to assert its national position in the subsequent phases of the Conference's work". That advice was well-meaning and sincere. Pakistan now asked the States concerned pursuing their own security interests about their confidence on that point. The way business was conducted in the Conference, if L.1 was adopted, a non-verifiable fissile material treaty would become received wisdom; substantive limitations built into L.1 had to be removed.

Pakistan required four elements be included in Presidential draft decision L.1 for it to be acceptable: the Conference had to set the task of negotiations on a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable" fissile material treaty (FMT); an FMT mandate should distinctly recognize the possibility of considering the scope of the treaty, as well as the existing stocks; an equal and balanced treatment had to be given to all four core issues; and ad hoc committees, as provided for in the Conference's rules of procedure, should conduct negotiations.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, said that he was under the impression that something happened between last year and this year, because there were assertions and claims that L.1 had generated momentum last year, but that this year, it did not do so. What had happened between last year and this year, in view of the fact that no radical moves or decisions had been taken in favour or against L.1? Addressing the statements that the "avoidance of changes in L.1 would make its adoption difficult", it was worth noting that a clear majority wished to keep L.1 as it was. True, there had been no consensus; there were differing views. The problem in the United Nations, as he saw it, was that, whatever view was being pursued, even if that were a rule of consensus, they also had another rule, which gave consideration to a majority vote. One had to hear the view of the majority in the United Nations, otherwise it was difficult to finalize documents, procedures or anything else. Of course, there was a rule of consensus, and that was in the Conference on Disarmament's rules of procedure. But they should say that the majority of delegations were perfectly content and willing and favouring something, rather than seeing that that overwhelming majority was trying to impose something, it should be taken as a sign. Consensus was good, but it was not a final end. The final end was strategic disarmament.

Furthermore, Mr. Ordzhonikidze underscored that the document before the Conference represented the views of all four continents. Members had expressed the view of their regional groups, of their continents and of themselves. Those views should not be attacked. The draft decision should be adopted.

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan), in response, thanked the Secretary-General for his view. The views of Pakistan were different. He would not elaborate on those views here, however, as that would indicate that the Secretary-General was a participant in the Conference's negotiations.


For use of the information media; not an official record

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