CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CONTINUES THEMATIC DEBATE ON A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

The Conference on Disarmament continued this morning its thematic discussion on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), taking up the issues of compliance and verification of such a treaty.

Speakers raised various issues, in particular with regards to whether the treaty should have a verification mechanism, on which speakers had differing views. One speaker said that verification was an important matter, as it would create confidence, and another said that it was an essential part of any international treaty, for without it, States parties could not be sure that other parties were complying. However, another speaker said that mechanisms and provisions that provided the appearance of effective verification without supplying its reality could be more dangerous than having no explicit provisions for verification, and could provide a false sense of security.

Several speakers suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency, as it already had experience in these matters, would appear to be the most logical body to ensure verification of the treaty. Many speakers also urged the rapid beginning of negotiations on the treaty.

Taking the floor this morning were the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mexico, the United States, Japan, Iran, Australia, and South Africa.

The Conference is scheduled to meet at 3 p.m. this afternoon to continue with its discussion on an FMCT.

Statements

AN MYONG HUN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said the Conference had an important role to play for world peace and security as a multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, and today had to assume the most important mission, as peace and security were confronted with grave challenges due to arbitrary and unilateral actions. Sincere efforts in the Conference to agree upon a comprehensive and balanced programme of work had not borne desirable fruition. The Conference was not the forum serving the unilateral interests of one country, and could not be hostage to one country. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea attached great importance to the issue of nuclear disarmament, and held that discussions and negotiations in the Conference should be oriented towards achieving complete nuclear disarmament. This demand for nuclear disarmament was linked to the country's efforts to achieve denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, which was the desire and goal of the country. The nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula originated from the policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the United States to negate the ideology and system chosen by the country, and to impose its own upon them, and was the product of the unbridled policy of the United States Administration to reject diversity of the political, economic and social systems and to pursue unilateralism.

The key to a solution of the nuclear issue was for the United States to abandon its hostile policy, respect the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and refrain from hindering its political, economic and social development. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possessed the nuclear deterrence commensurate with the character of the threat against it, and it was logical that the deterrence would be strengthened as long as the nuclear threat persisted. However, the deterrence would not be needed if it was judged that the nuclear threat existed no longer. If the United States demonstrated the political will to abide by the Joint Statement and put it into action, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would rejoin the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as indicated in the Joint Statement. The United States should withdraw the financial sanctions which denied the Joint Statement and rendered the Six-Party Talks meaningless. This was not a precondition for resumption of talks, but a matter of principle.

PABLO MACEDO (Mexico) said that Mexico was of the view that a discussion of a treaty prohibiting fissile material (FMT) as well as the informal seminar that had taken place this week had been extremely useful. The working papers that had been submitted by delegations were also useful. However, Mexico could not fail to note that if the Conference did not move on to a negotiating phase soon, the value of all the present efforts would not be enough.

Mexico felt that the negotiation of an FMT would be an important step forward in achieving the goal of total nuclear disarmament. It should, however, have a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. Mexico was of the view that verification was an essential element of any international treaty for, without it, States parties could not be sure that other parties were complying. Mexico did not see why an FMT should be an exception. The other essential requirement was that such a treaty cover existing stocks. Mexico believed that a treaty that did not cover existing stocks would be merely a cut-off treaty, which would be simply an arms control instrument and not a disarmament one.

THOMAS CYNKIN (United States) said the United States believed strongly that achieving a legally binding ban on the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons was a desirable goal. One way to accomplish this goal would be through the negotiation at the Conference of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States had given considerable thought to what a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should look like. The draft treaty it had put forward set forth the essentials needed for a treaty that would meet the objective of ending expeditiously the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. Stocks of already existing fissile materials would be unaffected. The draft treaty omitted verification provisions, consistent with the United States position that so-called “effective verification” of an FMCT could not be achieved.

Mechanisms and provisions that provided the appearance of effective verification without supplying its reality could be more dangerous than having no explicit provisions for verification, and could provide a false sense of security, encouraging countries to assume that because they existed, there would be no need for Governments themselves to be wary and vigilant against possible violations. Only by focusing on realistic objectives could the Conference create the conditions necessary for negotiating an FMCT, the successful negotiation of which would be both a significant contribution to the global non-proliferation regime and an example of truly effective multilateralism.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said that Japan would like to see the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty started as quickly as possible. Regarding compliance and verification, there were two approaches, depending on what type of ban a treaty imposed. For a treaty that banned future production of fissile material for example, a verification mechanism would have to confirm that the stock of such material did not increase once the treaty entered into force. Also, it would have to track whether fissile material was being converted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons purposes. It was important, therefore, for the Conference to look both at what type of verification was required and whether such verification was feasible.

HAMID ESLAMIZAD (Iran) said on March 30th, during the last plenary meeting of the first part of the Conference, Iran's position on fissile materials had been stated, and it had said that the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was an important step towards nuclear disarmament. However, there were serious doubts on how this could serve the nuclear disarmament cause without covering the vast stocks which could easily be used for new and new types of explosive weapons. The treaty should have sufficiently elaborate mechanisms to verify compliance. The best way to proceed would be to stick to language already agreed upon, for example in the Shannon Report. Any programme of work would only enjoy the consensus of the Conference when it addressed the four core issues that enjoyed support from many of the members of the Conference.

RUSSELL LESLIE (Australia) said that the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was intended to provide an opportunity for States to provide assurance to their treaty partners that they accepted the norm for the prohibition of fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes. With regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there was an existing mechanism for providing assurance to the international community, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency's ( IAEA) safeguards regime. The IAEA annually published its conclusions regarding nuclear material under the control of States parties. In the case of the 36 countries that were signatories to the Optional Protocol, and for the 77 non-nuclear weapon States that were signatories to the comprehensive agreement but not the Optional Protocol, an FMCT would provide the necessary impetus for them to comply with those safeguards. A focused application of appropriate verification measures of those facilities that were of direct relevance to the FMCT was important. The first step was to secure the acceptance by States of the norm against the new production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Without that commitment there could be no concept of compliance.

JOHANN KELLERMAN (South Africa) said South Africa shared the view on the interlinkage between the issues of compliance and verification in the context of a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). On verification, South Africa believed this was an important part of international agreements on nuclear disarmament and arms control. Verification sought to determine the truth or accuracy of a given situation. The elimination of nuclear weapons was not possible without the development of adequate verification. A future FMT should first and foremost result in verifiable assurances that fissile materials were no longer being produced for use in nuclear weapons. South Africa did not believe that verification on fissile materials would be ineffective. A verification system should include an element to deal with facilities previously used for the production of fissile materials, an element adapted to deal with weapons-grade materials that were declared as excess, and an element to deal with materials once they had been reworked into non-sensitive forms.

Given the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) experience in these matters, the agency would appear to be the most logical body to ensure verification of the treaty. There could be little doubt that the activities of the IAEA would increase significantly, and South Africa's working paper on the scope of the treaty acknowledged this, along with the cost factor.


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