Experts of the Human Rights Committee Express Condolences for Terrorist Attack in Ankara, Raise Questions on Türkiye’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Measures Imposed during the 2016 State of Emergency
The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the second periodic report of Türkiye on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts expressing condolences for the terrorist attack in Ankara, while raising questions on anti-terrorist legislation and measures imposed during the 2016 state of emergency.
Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Committee Chairperson, said the Committee expressed its deep condolences to Türkiye for the terrorist attack in Ankara which occurred this afternoon. The Committee stood in solidarity with the Turkish people. Several other Experts expressed their condolences.
A Committee Expert said the State party reported that the definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terrorism Act was in conformity with the Constitution and the Covenant, but a reading revealed that the terms of the Act allowed for an overly broad interpretation and did not provide sufficient protection against arbitrariness. The Committee had also received information that these provisions were used against human rights defenders. Could more information be provided on this?
Another Expert said the Committee had questions about the proportionality of derogations from the Covenant during the two-year state of emergency following the coup attempt in July 2016. Numerous credible reports indicated that emergency decrees resulted in over 130,000 public sector employees, police officials, academics, judges and prosecutors being dismissed from employment, many of whom were convicted of criminal offences. Were the emergency measures strictly proportional and limited in duration and material scope?
Havva Yonca Gündüz Özçeri, Ambassador, Türkiye, head of the delegation, presenting the report, said that in order to restore the Turkish democracy and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Turkish people after the brutal coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared and was endorsed by the Turkish Parliament on 21 July 2016. Throughout the state of emergency, Türkiye maintained its cooperation with international organizations, acted in line with its international human rights obligations, and observed the principles of necessity and proportionality. Türkiye terminated the state of emergency on 19 July 2018.
The delegation said that as a result of the cruel coup attempt, 251 people died, including public servants, law enforcement officials and civilians, and more than 2,000 people were injured. The state of emergency had been needed for the protection of the Constitutional order. During this period, Türkiye had had to fight terrorist organizations and needed to accelerate the eradication of the means funding these organizations.
The delegation said that a terrorist attack had taken place in Türkiye this afternoon during the current meeting, resulting in three deaths. Türkiye was clearly a country which constantly dealt with terrorist threats. The State was committed to following international standards in its approach to tackling terrorism. Türkiye had regulations in place and was reviewing non-governmental organizations with a risk-based system. If there were risks of financing terrorism or money laundering, there was stricter oversight.
Ms. Yonka Özçeri said since the state of emergency was lifted in 2018, Türkiye had been working towards its reform agenda and had made significant progress. The Committee’s observations would serve as a valuable guide in efforts to further strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights in Türkiye.
In concluding remarks, Ms. Yonka Özçeri said the State would sustain its full cooperation with the Committee and take its comments into consideration, with a genuine commitment to promote and strengthen human rights. She expressed gratitude to the Committee and for all who had made the dialogue possible.
Ms. Abdo Rocholl expressed deep gratitude to the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant, and for all those who had made the dialogue possible. The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in Türkiye.
The delegation of Türkiye was made up of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of National Defence; and the Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the United Nations Office at Geneva.
The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.
The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Monday, 28 October, to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ecuador (CCPR/C/ECU/7).
Report
The Committee has before it the second periodic report of Türkiye (CCPR/C/TUR/2).
Presentation of Report
BURAK AKÇAPAR, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Türkiye was committed to protecting civil and political rights as defined in the Covenant. The State was dedicated to sustaining transparent and close cooperation with United Nations mechanisms. The dialogue today was more important than ever. Over the past 12 years, Türkiye had not wavered in promoting democracy and human rights. Türkiye had to defend the nation against multiple terrorist organizations operating at its borders. The State was concurrently faced with the biggest influx of human displacement in the world, and millions had run to Türkiye for shelter. Within the same timeframe, Türkiye faced a brutal coup attempt organised and perpetrated by the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization, which the State defeated. The State was proud to have moved forward despite these challenges and had made significant progress.
HAVVA YONCA GÜNDÜZ ÖZÇERI, Ambassador, Türkiye, head of the delegation, said in July 2016, Türkiye faced a large-scale and brutal coup attempt organised and perpetrated by the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization. The clandestine criminal terrorist organization had infiltrated critical government posts, tried to capture the Turkish State, and attempted to suspend the Constitution and take over the democratically elected Government, resulting in the deaths of 251 Turkish citizens.
To restore the Turkish democracy and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Turkish people, a state of emergency was declared shortly after and was endorsed by the Turkish Parliament on 21 July 2016. Throughout the state of emergency, Türkiye maintained its cooperation with international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the Council of Europe, acted in line with its international human rights obligations, and observed the principles of necessity and proportionality. Türkiye terminated the state of emergency on 19 July 2018. All notifications of derogations from certain human rights obligations were also revoked on the same day.
Türkiye had been working towards its reform agenda and had made significant progress. This included establishing the Ombudsman Institution (2012); increasing penalties for the crime of torture, and lifting the statute of limitations (2013); establishing the Human Rights Compensation Commissioner (2014); incorporating hate crimes into the Penal Code (2014); defining as a crime the obstruction of freedom of religion and conscience (2014); setting up the Law Enforcement Oversight Commission to allow citizens to submit complaints related to law enforcement services (2016); establishing the Human Rights and Equality Institution, in line with the Paris Principles (2016); and lowering the minimum age for being elected as a Member of Parliament to 18 (2017).
Since the judicial reform strategy was published in 2019, eight judicial reform packages had been adopted. The human rights action plan for 2021-2023 was announced in 2021. In this regard, many legal amendments were made, including in relation to the judiciary and places of detention. The national electoral threshold was reduced from 10 per cent to 7 per cent in 2022, to increase democratic representation. With an amendment, voting for people with disabilities was facilitated. Several regulations were implemented to protect the rights of Alevi and Bektashi citizens. In 2022, the Alevi-Bektashi Culture and Cemevi Directorate was established within the Ministry of Culture, allowing municipalities to provide maintenance and material support. Building on these achievements, Türkiye was currently working on the new human rights action plan for 2024-2028 and on the renewed judicial reform strategy.
Türkiye pursued the policy of zero tolerance for violence against women. The fourth national action plan 2021-2025 was prepared with the contributions of all relevant stakeholders. The law on the protection of the family and the prevention of violence against women was enacted, and necessary amendments were made to the Penal Code. The offense committed against a spouse/ex-spouse or a woman was regulated as an aggravated crime, which represented significant progress towards effective punishment of crimes of violence against women. Women victims of violence were granted free legal aid and support.
Special domestic violence bureaus were expanded; as of the end of October 2023, they were available in 81 provincial centres, 144 districts, and 225 courthouses. Türkiye had recently developed a vision document and action plan for 2024-2028, which outlined a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the family institution. To put the new legal and institutional framework into practice, continuous training of relevant public officials was ensured.
Hosting the largest refugee population in the world, Türkiye was determined to continue its efforts to manage irregular migration and combat migrant smuggling. In this regard, the new law on foreigners and international protection was enacted in April 2013. Within this law, the principle of non-refoulement had gained legal basis for those who faced the risk of facing torture or similar inhuman treatment.
The law also set the basis for the establishment of the Presidency of Migration Management to be put in charge of implementing policies and strategies concerning migration issues. Ms. Yonka Özçeri said the Committee’s observations would serve as a valuable guide in efforts to further strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights in Türkiye.
Questions by Committee Experts
A Committee Expert said the situation in Turkey was not easy; it was the country with the largest number of refugees in the world and in February 2023 it suffered a devastating earthquake. However, the Committee trusted in its ability to overcome difficulties, and in its vocation to unite with the other countries of Europe, in full respect for the rights in the Covenant. In its report, Türkiye referred to the human rights action plan adopted on 2 March 2021, its objectives, goals and activities. Under what "standard" had the above-mentioned measures been adopted? The action plan did not introduce measures to ensure the independent functioning of the judiciary and to prevent the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation against opposition politicians, political activists or journalists for peacefully exercising their human rights. Could the State party comment on these shortcomings?
In April 2017, without lifting the state of emergency, a referendum was held in Türkiye that approved 18 constitutional amendments that significantly expanded the powers of the Government's executive branch. As a result, the President had begun to make use of the possibility of enacting laws and making appointments within the judiciary, bypassing Parliament and oversight procedures. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, in reviewing these amendments, had concluded that they would result in a system where the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary would not be guaranteed? Could the State party provide information on the measures taken in light of these observations? The Committee was also concerned that the evaluation given by the World Alliance of National Human Rights Institutes to the Turkish Human Rights Institution was a “B” rating. Would the State party consider taking measures to better implement the Paris Principles and to obtain an "A" accreditation for this institution?
The State party reported that the definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terrorism Act was in conformity with the Constitution and the Covenant, but a reading revealed that the terms of the Act allowed for an overly broad interpretation and did not provide sufficient protection against arbitrariness. The Committee had also received information that these provisions were used against human rights defenders. Could more information be provided on this? In 2024, the eighth judicial package introduced amendments to article 220/6 of the Turkish Penal Code. However, the article still lacked clear criteria on the criminalisation of conduct and therefore did not provide safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention and unfair prosecutions and sentences. Furthermore, according to sources, the State party was considering reinstating the death penalty. Could the delegation respond to these concerns?
The Committee was concerned about Act No. 7262 on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Under the law, all non-governmental organizations, including human rights organizations, were considered to pose a risk and were subject to strict supervision, monitoring and restrictions. Could the delegation provide disaggregated data on the fines and audits that had been ordered under this law? Would the State party consider amending the law to bring it into line with the Covenant?
Another Expert said that the existing legal framework in Türkiye did not fully protect against discrimination on all grounds covered by the Covenant. Would the State party revise its legal framework to ensure effective protection against discrimination for lesbian, gay bisexual, transgender and intersex persons? Sexual orientation and gender identity were absent from the Human Rights and Equality Institution’s founding law, which precluded the institution from receiving complaints of discrimination on these grounds. Would the State party consider amending the Equality Institution’s founding law to address this gap? What steps were being taken to protect the use of Kurdish language in education, media, and public spaces; and to investigate violence against Kurds?
Could information on the 2023-2025 action plan be provided, including efforts to eliminate the ban on appointing physically disabled persons as judges and prosecutors? What was being done to remove accessibility barriers in courthouses, police stations, and prisons? What measures would the State party take to address gaps in the law, and to improve the effectiveness of investigations into and prosecutions of hate speech and hate crimes?
The Committee had questions about the proportionality of derogations from the Covenant during the two-year state of emergency following the coup attempt in July 2016. Numerous credible reports indicated that emergency decrees resulted in over 130,000 public sector employees, police officials, academics, judges and prosecutors being dismissed from employment, many of whom were convicted of criminal offences. The Committee was also concerned about the lack of strict tailoring of emergency measures, including the transposition of emergency decrees into ordinary legislation and permanent revisions of national laws. Were the emergency measures strictly proportional and limited in duration and material scope? How did the State party narrowly tailor criteria to identify individuals and organizations with genuine connections to terrorist groups?
In 2017, Türkiye created the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission to review complaints about emergency measures. However, although the Commission received over 125,000 applications, it rejected over 85 per cent of them. How did the Inquiry Commission investigate complaints? What steps were taken to ensure the Commission’s independence and impartiality? The Committee was also concerned about violations of Covenant rights that could not be suspended during an emergency, such as the principle of legality in criminal law. What steps were taken to prevent violations of non-derogable rights?
Could updates be provided on the implementation of all recommendations made by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery? Concerning anti-corruption, reports received included information on police raids involving confiscation of over $17 million U.S. dollars in 2013, and corruption in the construction sector after the 2023 earthquake. What concrete efforts had been made to investigate, and if appropriate, prosecute these and other instances of corruption?
The assets of many organizations alleged to be involved in the 2016 coup attempt were confiscated. Reports indicated that seized assets were sold, rented, or donated to trustees, who, in turn, transferred them to entities with close ties to the Government. Could the delegation respond to these allegations and explain what safeguards it had adopted to prevent the possibility of corruption by transferees?
An Expert said according to the figures received, the number of femicides committed each year in Türkiye remained very high, with more than 300 women killed by their partners in 2023. In addition, between 2012 and 2023, at least 33,600 women were estimated to have died in a context of intra-family violence or so-called honour killings. Female detainees were reportedly subjected to full body searches by male officers, rape and other sexual violence, resulting in at least 12 women who fell pregnant in detention due to rape from a guard. What measures had been taken to combat so-called honour killings? What measures were being taken to combat impunity for perpetrators of gender-based violence, including rape and other sexual violence, even when committed by State agents? How were perpetrators tried and sentenced? Did the State plan to become a party to the Istanbul Convention again?
The Committee was concerned about several different issues relating to the 2016 coup attempt, including the cancellation of passports for thousands of people; travel bans or obligation to request permission to leave the territory for academics, civil servants and students suspected of having participated in the coup attempt or of belonging to the Gülen movement; and the abduction abroad and forcible transfer of more than 100 persons suspected of being affiliated with the Gülen movement by the Turkish authorities. What were the rules for the issuance and revocation of passports? How many people had had their passport cancelled; had travel bans applied and for what reason?
The Committee had received information that pushbacks and collective expulsions to States such as Afghanistan and Syria continued, and that hate speech and anti-migrant propaganda against Syrians continued to intensify. What measures were being taken to guarantee the principle of non-refoulement and the right to individual examination of applications for international protection? How was Türkiye ensuring the absence of coercion in the implementation of “voluntary” returns? How was the list of safe countries determined?
Another Committee Expert said it was reported that there was a systematic practice of Türkiye's State-sponsored extraterritorial abductions and forcible returns of individuals allegedly associated with the Hizmet/Gülen movement, in coordination with local authorities. How did Türkiye respond to these allegations? What procedures were in place to address and rectify such offences?
Could information be provided on the number of cases of enforced disappearances in Türkiye in the south-east region and on enforced disappearances in Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria? What mechanisms were in place to investigate alleged abductions and enforced disappearances, including in relation to cases reported to have occurred in the 1980s and 1990s? Under what legislation did Turkey address enforced disappearances to ensure compliance with international standards? Did the State party have a specific definition of enforced disappearance within its criminal justice system? What oversight mechanisms were in place to prevent enforced disappearances and ensure remedies for victims?
Would the current prison expansion plan address the overcrowding issue? Did the State party ensure compliance with international standards, such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures? What measures was Türkiye taking to comply with international standards regarding solitary confinement?
Another Expert said since the abolition of the statute of limitations for the crime of torture, how many prosecutions had been initiated and what had the results been?
What mechanisms ensured that officers accused of torture were suspended? Could the State party provide concrete examples of the role of independent preventive bodies in the prevention of torture, as well as the safeguards taken to prevent such acts from occurring? How many prosecutions for torture charges had been initiated by the Prosecutor's Office in the last five years? How many had resulted in judicial convictions of the perpetrators and effective reparations for the victims? Had there been any cases of law enforcement officials being suspended or dismissed from their duties as a result of complaints received by the Law Enforcement Oversight Commission? What measures were being taken to protect vulnerable groups from torture in detention centres? In recent years, how many victims of torture had been able to benefit from legal aid?
What were the guarantees that persons prosecuted for terrorism had access to a lawyer? What guarantees existed for access to a fair trial, especially in terrorism cases? In cases such as that of Judges Alparslan Altan and Hakan Baş, who were dismissed from their posts and placed in pre-trial detention after the 2016 coup attempt because of their alleged links to the Gülen movement, how did the State party ensure that these dismissals and detentions did not undermine the independence of the judiciary and that the proceedings respected the guarantees of a fair trial?
What was the status of the implementation of the third national action plan against trafficking? What were the initial objectives of this plan? How did the State party combat forced labour and forced marriages among migrant populations? What mechanisms were in place to fund and monitor support services for victims of trafficking? How were residence permits for foreign victims managed? Was their cost considered affordable? What specific actions had been taken to prevent child trafficking, including at borders and at school level? How did the Safe Return Programme ensure that victims of trafficking were not exposed to re-victimisation?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said the human rights action plan 2021–2023 was developed following 55 meetings and five large-scale workshops. The action plan was implemented in a participatory manner. The elections law, among others, was amended as part of the plan. Steps had been taken to enhance democratic participation. A vertical appeal process was introduced to the criminal judgeships of peace. It was mandatory for authorities to have concrete evidence in order to hold someone in detention, meaning that even if there was a risk of flight, unless there was concrete evidence, detention was not recommended. Türkiye had introduced some new separate crimes to the list of offences. Women who were subjected to violence could benefit from free legal aid. The juvenile justice system was strengthened. A presidential circular was issued, prioritising the implementation of the human rights action plan by all ministries.
In July 2016, Türkiye faced a cruel coup attempt; 251 people died, including public servants, law enforcement officials and civilians, and more than 2,000 people were injured. The state of emergency had been needed for the protection of the Constitutional order. During this period, Türkiye had had to fight terrorist organizations and needed to accelerate the eradication of the means funding these organizations. The Constitutional Court organised the individual applications for this period. After the prevention of the coup attempt, thanks to the authority given by the Constitution, different measures were taken, including the use of decree laws.
Public servants in Türkiye were expected to remain loyal. They did not have the liberty to act against the unity of the State. The law on public service stated that civil servants could not be a member of a political party and needed to be impartial. They could not engage in any transaction which would hinder their impartiality. Conditions for new laws and legislation were met, and some lighter measures had been taken, including the establishment of the State of Emergency Commission. The Commission was analysed by the European Court in 2016 and was accepted as a remedy to be exhausted. Appeal and cassation mechanisms were still open in these decisions.
The Turkish Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court followed the jurisprudence of the European Court closely and passed their judgement in line with the jurisprudence of the international courts. If force or intimidation or threats were used to distort the Constitutional order, these were considered as acts of terror. Terrorists were defined in the anti-terrorist law as people who were members of organizations that aimed to overthrow the Constitutional order.
The delegation said that a terrorist attack had taken place in Türkiye this afternoon during the current meeting, resulting in three deaths. Türkiye was clearly a country which constantly dealt with terrorist threats. The State was committed to following international standards in its approach to tackling terrorism. Public Prosecutors could carry out effective investigations against all possible offences. It was reiterated that as the meeting with the Committee was being held, a terrorist attack was carried out in Ankara. There were martyrs and injured people involved.
Türkiye had regulations in place and was reviewing non-governmental organizations with a risk-based system. If there were risks of financing terrorism or money laundering, there was stricter oversight. Türkiye was determined to protect non-governmental organizations in the country, and would follow any legislation necessary to make sure this was possible.
Prison systems in Türkiye were based on rehabilitation and reintegration, observing the Mandela Rules and international standards. Audiovisual interview systems were in place, which enabled control of the prisons throughout the country. Internal security guards in female prison institutions were always women. It was not possible for male guards to work in women’s institutions. A physical search could only be conducted by a female guard. The legislation had positive discrimination for pregnant women or women who had just given birth in prison; they had more advantages and rights. Children would not be kept in prisons by force. This was up to the decision of the mother. The use of solitary confinement was marginal and the maximum duration was not practiced by institutions. A judge’s approval was necessary. A psychological evacuation was also necessary prior to serving solitary confinement.
The provisions of the Istanbul Protocol were practiced meticulously in Türkiye; 89 forensic experts had been brought together from different cities and received training. Those who prepared forensic reports, worked in emergency departments, and doctors were included in the training programmes. Trainings were ongoing.
There were refugee health service units in several cities, where free vaccinations were offered to refugee children. Medical services were offered to everyone with no discrimination, including to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.
Türkiye had a zero-tolerance policy against violence against women. The State had received criticism for withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention that this had increased acts of violence against women in Türkiye, but the State did not believe there were grounds for these criticisms. There were 613 institutional mechanisms which assisted victims of violence and their children. Violence prevention centres were established in 83 cities and there were 112 shelters. Electronic bracelets, victim protection units, and GPS units were technical methods used to follow perpetrators. A hotline was in place which operated 24/7.
Türkiye had the greatest number of asylum seekers and vulnerable persons. Through many projects, there were protection desks which determined the needs of refugee and asylum seekers. Those who were victims of human trafficking would be determined by these desks. The action plan against human trafficking would enter into force shortly. It defined all kinds of trafficking and discussed victim support services. If victims of trafficking did not have residences, the State prepared a temporary resident document of six months which could be extended to three years. This was free of charge. A centre was supported by labour, employment, and health authorities.
The Turkish Constitution and the law on education denied discrimination in education and guaranteed education for everyone. Education was a fundamental right. Kurdish was offered as an elective course in certain grades. If 10 students chose the same elective, the course was open and offered to the students. More than 20,000 students had chosen Kurdish as an elective.
Questions by Committee Experts
TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, said the Committee expressed its deep condolences to Türkiye for the terrorist attack in Ankara which occurred this afternoon. The Committee stood in solidarity with the Turkish people.
A Committee Expert asked how many non-governmental organizations had been suspended from their activities as a result of the new law? How many investigations had been conducted on the basis of this law?
One Expert said there had been necessity to take measures following the 2016 coup. How was it ensured these were tailored and proportional? How were the emergency decrees reviewed? How did the Judicial Review Mechanism function in practice? How was Türkiye responding to the recommendations of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery?
Another Committee Expert noted the reply regarding the Istanbul Convention. The objective of the Convention was to prevent and combat domestic violence. Why did Türkiye withdraw from the Convention in the first place? Was the kidnapping of a person abroad an element which could be used before the courts to nullify the detention of the person in question and the internal legal proceedings?
An Expert said reports indicated that the current state of the prison system was inadequate. How did Türkiye respond to these concerns. The lack of response to the questions on enforced disappearances was puzzling. It would be appreciated if responses could be provided soon.
One Expert asked how the Turkish National Human Rights Institution could exercise its role in preventing torture? How was it ensured that those who committed torture had access to legal support? It was important to have more detailed answers regarding these questions and questions on trafficking and children.
Another Expert said reports had been received that following the recent death of Fethullah Gülen, Türkiye had censored and taken action against numerous journalists and social media users, many of whom had simply shared condolences or praised the Islamic scholar. How were these actions in line with the Covenant?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said Türkiye fully cooperated with the Working Group on Enforced Disappearance. The so-called abductions or enforced disappearances occurred when members of the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization went into hiding, or when they were deported back to Türkiye from other countries, due to their activities. They were brought before the judiciary when they returned to Türkiye, meaning there were no cases of enforced disappearances. The Government also responded to all cases of enforced disappearances and provided necessary information.
Türkiye’s operations in Syria were counter-terrorism operations against multiple groups. Türkiye firmly rejected allegations about effective control as they lacked legal grounds. The State had executed three counter-terrorism operations on the basis of self-defence. From 2016 until today, investigations had been opened on actions of 208 police personnel, with many given administrative fines. Fethullah Gülen and his group had been accepted as a terrorist group by Türkiye. Praising terror was a crime in Türkiye. Therefore, prosecutions and detentions had been executed when necessary for people who praised terror.
Decree laws passed through a parliamentary review and were then subject to a judicial review. After parliamentary approval, the Constitutional Court could run a judicial review. Emergency decrees were published in the official gazette. The Constitutional Court had reviewed 145 decrees and decided to annul them due to their unconstitutionality. The State of Emergency Commission was an administrative unit which had an electronic system for lodging complaints.
To speak of membership to a terror organization, it needed to be determined that there was an organic tie between the individual and the organization. A visually impaired candidate had been accepted as a judge in Türkiye. Türkiye had aggravated fines and imprisonment for killings committed with the motives of “honour” or “customs”.
Türkiye was collaborating with the Group of States against Corruption, and other institutions in the fight against corruption. A report had been submitted under the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Judicial control had been put into force regarding all crimes. In 2020, an amendment was made by parliament, whereby inmates of open prisons could be employed outside of prisons if they volunteered to do so.
The Istanbul Convention was a framework and therefore did not have an impact on cases of violence against women. The reason for Türkiye’s withdrawal was no different from other countries which had not ratified the Convention.
Questions by Committee Experts
A Committee Expert said none of the 13 members of the Council of the Magistracy and the Office of the Prosecutor were appointed by judges themselves. How could this system avoid interference from the executive and legislative branches or political parties? How many bar associations had been established in Türkiye since the entry into force of Act No. 7145, which allowed for the direct appointment of judges and prosecutors by the President? What measures were being taken to avoid politicisation? According to Committee sources, 1,600 lawyers had been arrested in 2023 and 181 of them were still in prison, with a significant number being investigated for their alleged "membership of a terrorist organization". Could the State party comment on these allegations?
Could the State party respond to allegations that judges and prosecutors who had been dismissed en masse oversaw proceedings which investigated cases of large-scale corruption involving senior government officials and their families? How many judges and prosecutors had been detained, arrested or released? How many were reinstated in their respective professions? Which body was responsible for the appointment of judges and prosecutors? What was the role of the Judicial School and the Council of Judges and Prosecutors in the appointment procedure? What about the Ministry of Justice? Was there a public exam? Could the State party provide disaggregated data on the transfers of judges and prosecutors against their will, carried out during 2023?
Was there a habeas corpus procedure in terrorism cases? To the Committee's knowledge, the State party had failed to comply with the binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. What were the reasons for the non-compliance with these judgements?
Another Expert asked for statistics on people still in pre-trial detention in connection with the 2016 Gülen movement? What safeguards prevented the use of coerced evidence in trials related to the movement? How did the State party ensure that individuals were not prosecuted retroactively for acts committed prior to the designation of the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization? Could the State party provide an update on the status of the 125,678 cases of dismissal from the public service since December 2021? How was the independence of the "Commission of Inquiry into the Measures of the State of Emergency" ensured, to guarantee effective judicial review of the Commission? What measures had been taken to address allegations of human rights violations, including torture and ill treatment of detainees accused of affiliation with the Gülen movement? What mechanisms ensured a thorough investigation into these allegations?
How did the State party ensure that the prosecution of human rights defenders, as in the case of Osman Kavala and others in the Gezi Park events, was based on hard evidence of guilt, rather than on their commitment to human rights? Was there a programme for the protection of human rights defenders, environmental defenders and other members of civil society, Kurdish activists and journalists and lawyers who practiced their profession, who were perceived to be critical of the Government, from reprisals and harassment? What measures had been taken to ensure a safe and enabling environment for civil society?
What measures were being taken to ensure that the use of force during demonstrations was strictly necessary, strictly proportionate and supervised?
Were there concrete examples where security forces had de-escalated peaceful protests without the use of force? How were decisions to restrict certain public spaces for gatherings made and communicated? What measures had been put in place to protect marginalised groups, such as the Sunday Mothers? To what extent was law no. 2911 on assemblies and demonstrations, which regulated public meetings, assemblies and demonstrations, compatible with the freedom of assembly protected by the Covenant?
Another Committee Expert asked about the relationship between the Personal Data Protection Authority and the National Intelligence Agency? Could the Personal Data Protection Authority effectively safeguard privacy rights in light of the enhanced powers granted to the National Intelligence Agency? What was the existing legal framework to ensure adequate redress for individuals whose privacy rights had been infringed upon? How did the State party ensure that data collected during investigations was not used for purposes beyond the law? What oversight mechanisms were in place to ensure the protection of privacy rights during such investigations? How did the State party ensure the protection of privacy rights in the context of mandatory SIM card registration?
How did the State party justify the compatibility of article 318 of the Turkish Criminal Code, “Discouraging People from Performing Military Service," with the Covenant, particularly considering international jurisprudence on conscientious objection? Did the State party intend to amend the Penal Code to align with international human rights standards?
Regarding travel bans and deportations of non-Turkish Protestant religious leaders, only records for Amanda Jolyn Krause were available. According to the information received, after she received her initially granted short-term residence visa for her stay, it was terminated for reasons of public order and security, in line with the law on foreigners and international protection no. 6458. Her appeal was currently pending. What was the current status of this appeal?
Reliable sources indicated that the current laws governing the registration of religious groups did not provide for the registration of associations or foundations representing specific religious congregations. As a result, many religious minority groups remained unregistered. How were religious minorities that lacked registration ensured protection of their right to freedom of belief? Where registration was in place, was the application of the law conducted in a transparent, fair, and inclusive manner? Was the process for establishing places of worship being implemented in a way that reflected the actual circumstances of religious minorities? Was the enforcement of zoning laws being applied in a manner that accommodated the unique needs and realities of these groups?
One Committee Expert said the Committee had received multiple reports about the prosecution of journalists, opposition politicians, and critics of the Government under various provisions of the Criminal Code. Could the delegation comment on reports of arbitrary enforcement of these laws against political opponents, journalists, and civil society groups? Would the State party consider issuing clear guidelines to prosecutors and judges to ensure that the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression was not infringed by criminal allegations in the absence of concrete evidence?
The Committee had received multiple reports indicating that internet law 5651 and law 6112 on the establishment of radio and television enterprises and media services had been invoked to block more than 260,000 websites; 13,000 Twitter/X accounts; 67,000 tweets; 24,000 YouTube videos; and content on Facebook and Instagram, including during the 2023 elections. How did the State party ensure that these enforcement actions served a legitimate aim and were necessary and proportionate? What steps were being taken to review, and potentially lift, internet blockages currently in effect?
The European Court of Human Rights in the Vedat Şorli case of 2021 found that the crime of insulting the President was incompatible with the right to freedom of expression. Despite this ruling, reports indicated that more than 68,000 individuals were recently prosecuted for this offense. What steps were being taken to limit the enforcement of these provisions and to align them with international standards on freedom of expression? Sixty-two Turkish media outlets were closed following the 2016 coup attempt. Multiple reports indicated that over 80 per cent of those outlets remained shut today. What was the legal basis for those outlets to remain closed? What efforts were being made to reopen them?
The Committee appreciated that the Radio and Television Supreme Council had created procedures for media outlets to apply for the restoration of assets and compensation. Could information on these procedures be provided, including the number of cases in which assets had been restored or compensation provided? How many journalists’ press cards remained cancelled to date and how many had been restored? Could a comprehensive breakdown be provided of the types of organizations closed during the 2016 state of emergency, and the justifications for such a broad targeting of civil society institutions?
The Committee understood that mass closures were carried out under emergency decrees that authorised shutting organizations with alleged links to terrorist groups. How was it ensured that the mass closures did not arbitrarily target these organizations or their members? What safeguards existed to ensure that closures were not politically motivated or used to suppress dissent?
Another Committee Expert asked how it was possible that, in a State governed by the rule of law, the Court of Cassation systematically refused to apply the judgments of the Constitutional Court on issues of parliamentary immunity and the arrest of members of Parliament? What measures were being taken to bring the domestic rules on intellectual property into conformity with the rights of the Covenant and to implement the judgments of the European Court and the Constitutional Court in this regard? What was being done to reinstate members who had been stripped of their immunities to their positions?
Did the State intend to reverse the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of intentional offences, as well as the deprivation of the right to vote for cadets and members of the armed forces? How was the exercise of their right to vote organised in practice? What measures were envisaged to reform the general electoral framework and the presidential elections, to implement the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe recommendations? Was a reform envisaged, which aimed to entrust electoral disputes to the Constitutional Court? How did Turkey intend to implement the general measures implied by the Selahattin Demirtas judgment? This was linked to everything already stated by Committee members about the vague definition of terrorism and lack of independence of the judiciary. How would Türkiye ensure that during the holding of local, legislative or presidential elections, the internal penal system was not used against political opponents who were members of the Peoples' Democratic Party or other opposition parties to reduce the scope of free democratic debate?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said that to become a judge or a prosecutor in Türkiye, one needed to be a Turkish citizen, a graduate of law school, and had to have been successful in administrative judicial examinations. Türkiye was aware of all responsibilities resulting from international conventions. Judges were independent in their duties and could not be dismissed or retired before the age prescribed by law, unless at their request. An article in the Penal Code stated that it was an offence to attempt to influence those in the judiciary. Selahattin Demirtaş was currently imprisoned, and the independent judiciary was continuing work on this case.
Freedom of expression was a building block for a democratic society, but it could be subjected to limitations. The European Convention of Human Rights talked about public order, the integral security of the State, and prevention of crimes and privacy, among other issues. Journalists were not subject to prosecution or investigation simply for the nature of their work.
There were no stipulations on conscientious objection in the Criminal Code. There was a regulation regarding alienation from military service, but this was not really implemented. The Conscientious Objection Mechanism in Türkiye was not an effective mechanism, as the courts of Türkiye had annulment decisions in line with the European Court of Human Rights. Members of Parliament could not be subjected to investigation or prosecution unless there was an allegation of heavy crimes. In this case, a warrant would be created and processed, which could lead to the removal of immunity from the member of Parliament.
When a certain number of SIM cards were used, there needed to be a mechanism to follow these. If a certain SIM card was allocated to several people at the same time, it was necessary to have a control mechanism. In Türkiye, there were 83 Bar Associations which were active in all cities and ran their operations independently. The law on lawyers stated that if Bar Associations were active in areas which did not fall in line with their designated activities, they would be placed under review.
There were 452 places of worship for people belonging to different religions in Türkiye. There needed to be rules for opening places of worship, including for Muslims. If Muslims wished to build a mosque, they would be subject to the same rules as people of different religions trying to open their own place of worship. Minorities in Türkiye had 50 different schools and could take classes in their own language. They had their own media outlets as well as websites. There were 167 foundations belonging to different religions. The law had been amended to enable them to elect their own governing bodies.
Türkiye had received visitors belonging to different religions from 33 different countries. These people had applied to hold their religious worship in museums and churches in different cities of Türkiye. They had been provided with venues where they could worship. In Türkiye there was no discrimination against anybody for religion or faith.
Turkish personnel were trained in negotiation techniques, in the case of public demonstrations. After the negotiation phase, a gathered group needed to be informed of an intervention three times, and after that force was used. Tear gas was used as a final phase. If these interventions failed, the security forces could use batons. If the protest continued and threatened the security of the police forces, other interventions would follow. Between April 2023 and October 2023, 769 people participated in demonstrations.
The family was considered to be the most sacred unit in Turkish society. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons were seen as a threat to the Turkish family structure. They were therefore not deemed acceptable by a large portion of society, as they believed this lifestyle threatened the main building blocks of life.
In line with the state of emergency procedures in Türkiye, certain associations were shut down. Almost 16 per cent were reopened, with approximately 13 per cent being human rights associations. The legal procedure was implemented in line with the state of emergency procedures and was then translated into a law. Members of an association which had not been shut down were provided with training activities, including on anti-terrorist measures. Therefore, non-governmental organizations had not been negatively implemented by the law but were now better protected against risks.
An entry ban could be implemented on foreigners in Türkiye, a visa could be denied, and an extradition could be arranged. No individual could be barred from entry to Türkiye based on their religious beliefs, or for belonging to a certain social group.
Provisions existed within the Penal Code regarding the confiscation of goods. The anti-terror law regulated redress and compensation mechanisms. Seizure and confiscation decisions were made by courts. Appeal procedures were possible in these cases.
The elections which took place in March 2024 and in May 2023 were held in line with the standards of free, fair and democratic elections. The elections of 14 May 2023 were followed by a total of 489 international observers. There were two groups in penitentiaries in Türkiye - the detainees and the convicts. Detainees were still in the legal process and were bound by the presumption of innocence and could therefore vote. Regarding the convicts, those sentenced to unintentional crimes could vote during their imprisonment sentence. However, there were certain limitations for those who had committed intentional crimes, but these had improved over time.
Questions by Committee Experts
A Committee Expert asked for further clarification regarding the appointment of judges.
Another Expert said in 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly noted that the number of cases of non-compliance remained elevated. Türkiye had a substantial number of pending cases. There was a real issue with non-implementation of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. Was the State resolved to strengthen the judiciary to improve the rule of law, which was essential to protect civil space and democratic elections?
An Expert said a lot of information had been received about how formal laws and decrees operated. What was necessary for compliance with the Covenant was how those laws, decrees and policies were implemented in practice. Regarding applications like the Signal Act, would the State party accept they could be used for legitimate purposes? How did comments that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons posed a threat to the Islamic family structure corroborate with comments made previously that there was no discrimination against anyone in health and education?
One Expert asked for data on people still in detention relating to the Gülen movement. What were the legal remedies for the over 120,000 people stripped of their public service responsibilities?
Another Expert asked for responses regarding the Personal Data Protection Authority. Was mandatory SIM card registration truly necessary? Was it considered proportionate? If conscientious objection to military service was not considered an issue, would it not be prudent to amend the Criminal Code to reflect this?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said there were two categories of judges in Türkiye. Judges and prosecutors served as assistant prosecutors for three years; they were then accepted to the profession by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. For an individual to be deemed a member of a terrorist organization, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation laid down certain principles, including the level of intensity and the diversity of activities by the individual. This could result in a link being determined.
Conscientious objection was not regulated through criminal legislation. The Turkish Constitution and the law of national education abhorred discrimination of all kinds. Everyone was equal before the law. The law of national education set forth that education was open to everyone and there would be no discrimination. The same applied for access to health. Health professionals only focused on the medical needs of individuals and did not discriminate based on any factor.
Closing Remarks
HAVVA YONCA GÜNDÜZ ÖZÇERI, Ambassador, Türkiye, head of the delegation, said she was pleased to note that Türkiye’s report had attracted considerable attention. The State would sustain its full cooperation with the Committee and take its comments into consideration, with a genuine commitment to promote and strengthen human rights. Türkiye would spare no effort to reach higher standards in the future. Ms. Yonka Özçeri expressed gratitude to the Committee and for all who had made the dialogue possible.
TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, expressed deep gratitude to the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant, and for all those who had made the dialogue possible. The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in Türkiye.
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CCPR.24.025E
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