Conference on Disarmament Hears More General Statements and Continues Consultations Regarding Requests of Non-Member States to Participate as Observers in the Work of the Conference in 2022
The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon heard more general statements and continued consultations regarding requests of States non-members of the Conference to participate as observers in the 2022 session of the Conference.
Ambassador Li Song of China (Disarmament), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that regarding the requests of States non-members of the Conference who wished to participate in the work of the Conference, he had been holding consultations with all parties concerned. At this juncture, he felt that pushing for a decision on this issue today would not obtain results that were satisfactory to all. Parties concerned were still actively engaged in consultations, which he hoped would help them make progress on this major important issue. After consulting with his P-6 + 2 colleagues, regional coordinators and individual delegations, he decided to put off this issue until the next plenary. More than 30 countries were asking to participate as observers.
Speaking this afternoon were Brazil on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Poland and Turkey.
Speaking in right of reply were the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 3 February.
Statements
Brazil, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, delivered the statement issued by the New Agenda Coalition - Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, and his own country Brazil – on 25 January, 2022. The statement took note of the joint statement on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races’ issued by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on 3 January 2022 and its emphasis on the continued pursuit of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. The joint statement was a necessary effort to stabilise strategic relations and the Coalition hoped it signalled the beginning of greater cooperation between the nuclear-weapon States in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations. The Coalition was concerned about recent policy statements by the nuclear-weapon States relating to the modernisation of their nuclear weapon programmes.
The continued existence of nuclear weapons further aggravated tensions in the international security environment and represented a grave threat to humanity. Stabilisation efforts were not sufficient on their own without each of the nuclear weapon States taking tangible steps towards diminishing the salience of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines, leading to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Such intermediary steps could include the provision of legally binding negative security assurances. While nuclear weapons continued to exist, they would always pose an unacceptable risk to humanity. The Coalition was disappointed that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tenth Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which was due to convene in New York in January 2022, was further postponed. However, the postponement now provided the nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to publicly reiterate and make progress on the full implementation of their unequivocal undertakings.
Poland said European security was nowadays facing unprecedented threats and challenges, the biggest since the end of the Cold War. Involvement in a diplomatic dialogue, using the established international mechanisms, was needed now more than ever. This applied in particular in the dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation. Poland perceived the integrity of the rules-based international system as a crucial component of global security and would support effective multilateralism and international cooperation. In this context, Poland regretted that the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty had to be further postponed due to the current pandemic situation. However, this would not prevent Poland from continuing its efforts with the aim of assuring the most effective course and outcome of the Review Conference. Concerning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Poland hoped that the parties would finally reach a consensus on the reactivation of the nuclear agreement. Poland expressed its full support for the verification and monitoring activities in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran. Also, a complete, verifiable and irreversible de-nuclearisation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remained an absolute imperative and priority. These parametres defined Poland’s position while approaching the ongoing discussions of the Conference on Disarmament.
Turkey said developments in the field of international security were not promising. The challenges to the rules-based international order and global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture continued unabated. Important arms control instruments had either eroded or become defunct in past years, while new challenges posed by emerging technologies had also increased risks and tensions. This must be changed by upholding international norms, fully implementing obligations and commitments, restoring dialogue, and promoting transparency and confidence-building measures. Turkey’s priority was to retain the Conference on Disarmament, which was an invaluable forum, and bring it back to its substantive work. Unfortunately, the Conference had been unable to reach consensus on a programme of work and the creation of subsidiary groups in 2021. In the face of the pressing global disarmament issues, it was high time to overcome polarisation and realise the full potential of the Conference on Disarmament. There was a pressing need for political will for the Conference to re-commence its primary task, namely to negotiate legally binding international treaties. If a consensus on a programme of work was not possible in the next few weeks, starting thematic debates in the plenary sessions would also be an instrumental option.
Turkey hoped that the Review Conference of the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty would take place this year as it believed that it could provide an opportunity for States parties to strengthen and reiterate commitments to the Treaty and efforts on nuclear disarmament. Turkey was ready to work on achieving a successful outcome at the Review Conference. Turkey also continued to support constructive efforts to set up a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Turkey gave utmost importance to protecting the right of unrestricted access to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It welcomed the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group and would constructively engage in developing norms for responsible behaviour in space.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, speaking in right of reply, responded to allegations by some European countries and others about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s recent missile launching test. Strengthening national defence capability was a legitimate right of sovereign States. These missile tests did not cause any threat or damage to the security of neighbouring countries.
Iran, speaking in right of reply, responded to allegations made by France on behalf of the European Union and Germany. Those States were among the main arms exporters to the Middle East and were complicit to atrocities in the region. They could not divert attention from this by pointing fingers at others.
Japan , speaking in right of reply, responded to the statement made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Japan maintained an exclusively defence-oriented policy. Japan would never change its course as a peace-loving nation. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and missile developments were clear violations of Security Council resolutions.
Republic of Korea, speaking in right of reply, responded to the statement made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Peace on the Korean Peninsula always started with dialogue and cooperation. The Republic of Korea urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abide by its international obligations.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, speaking in right of reply, was surprised at what Japan had said. Japan was openly accelerating its plan to become a military power in the region. As for what “South Korea” said, the launch of tests was self-defensive. “South Korea” was holding joint military exercises, following the American hostile policy against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Japan , speaking in right of reply, said the claims made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regarding Japan were based on factual errors.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, speaking in right of reply, was again surprised by what Japan had said. Japan was using the pretext of threat from neighbouring countries as a stepping stone to become a military power in the region.
Concluding Remarks by the President of the Conference on Disarmament
Ambassador LI SONG of China (Disarmament), President of the Conference on Disarmament, said the Russian Federation reserved the right to make a right of reply at the next plenary. Regarding the requests of States non-members of the Conference that wished to participate in the work of the Conference, he had been holding consultations with all parties concerned. At this juncture, he felt that pushing for a decision on this issue today would not obtain results that were satisfactory to all. Parties concerned were still actively engaged in consultations, which he hoped would help them make progress on this major important issue. They all had the same purpose to ensure that every Member State of the United Nations could enjoy the right to fully participate in all forums of multilateral diplomacy. This legitimate right must be guaranteed. After consulting with his P-6 + 2 colleagues, regional coordinators and individual delegations, he decided to put off this issue until the next plenary. More than 30 countries were asking to participate as observers. He hoped all parties could make the best use of the time before the next plenary to carry on new efforts. His team would also continue efforts.
Concerning the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Li said that the Secretary-General of the Conference and the President of the Conference had jointly signed invitations to all delegations. These invitations were valid throughout the whole year, but suggested that the dignitaries addressed the Conference in the week of 28 February 2022. Taking into consideration the continued limitations on international travel and in-person gatherings, the Conference offered the possibility of addressing it in person or through a pre-recorded short statement limited to five minutes, in one of the official languages of the Conference.
Mr. Li said the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization had approached the Conference and expressed interest in the opportunity for the Executive Secretary of the Organization to address the Conference. This statement would be made during the week of 28 February. If the Conference agreed, he would send confirmation to the Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization.
Mr. Li said that as next Tuesday, there was no suitable conference room available for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the next plenary would be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 3 February. He looked forward to hearing general views on the work of the Conference in the current international situation and on the programme of work. At this plenary, the Conference would also make decisions on the requests from non-member States for their participation.
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not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.
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