CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES PROPOSALS ON A DRAFT PROGRAMME OF WORK
The Conference on Disarmament this morning discussed merits of the four proposals on a draft programme of work, which had been put forward by the United States, the United Kingdom, Nigeria and the Russian Federation.
Algeria pleaded with nuclear weapons States to uphold their commitments towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Nigerian proposal for the programme of work was seen as a good starting point for consensus-based consultations. Canada believed that working on a separate treaty on chemical terrorism within the Conference could be unnecessarily duplicative. Switzerland felt that it would be judicious to advance on two fronts at the same time: to adopt a programme of work focusing on key themes at the Conference’s agenda, and to continue to study the Russian proposal on an instrument on the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism.
Russian Federation believed that the existing international legal system, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, did not provide sufficient instruments for preventing and combatting acts of chemical terrorism. The Russian proposal was comprehensive and covered disarmament, non-proliferation and combatting terrorism. Italy supported the proposal on the draft programme of work put forward by the United States and was convinced that a Fissile Material Treaty was the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament. Turkey was still examining the Russian draft proposal. United Kingdom noted that it would take a considerable time, perhaps months, for delegations to consider the Russian proposal.
Republic of Korea’s Ambassador bid farewell to the Conference as he was changing functions in Geneva. Japan wished the best to the departing Ambassador.
Bolivia, as a non-Member State of the Conference, attended today’s session.
The next public plenary meeting will take place on Thursday, 17 March at 10 a.m.
Statements
Algeria stated that it attached great importance to the Conference as a unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues. Its Member States ought to meet the aspirations of the international community and overcome their narrow national agendas. The spirit of dialogue should prevail and lead to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of work. Algeria was ready to actively contribute to all initiatives aiming at building solid bases for peace and security, which, naturally, required cooperation in the service of collective security. Presenting a great danger to the existence of humanity, nuclear weapons were the essential priority which had to be addressed in the disarmament forum. In that context, Algeria had always firmly supported holding of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and was ready to actively participate in the work of the Open-ended Working Group looking for ways to establish a world free of nuclear weapons forever.
Algeria believed that respect of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of any future engagement towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In that context, Algeria reminded of the obligations to implement the decisions taken in the framework of the Treaty in 1995, and the plan of action in 2010 on the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. Algeria pleaded with nuclear weapons States to uphold their commitments towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Conference also needed to consider the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear weapons States as part of a legally binding international instrument which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. Algeria hailed the efforts of States who had put forward proposals to move the work of the Conference forward. The Nigerian proposal was seen as a good starting point for consensus-based consultations. Given the complexity and the nature of the subjects addressed in the Russian proposal, it would be good to consult with New York and The Hague first.
Canada was anxious to see the Conference resume its work. Speaking about the Russian proposal on a draft programme of work, Canada believed that working on a separate treaty on chemical terrorism could be unnecessarily duplicative. The issue was already subject of a working group of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and that process ought to be assessed before a decision be made on alternative actions. Canada was currently unconvinced that new legally binding measures would be necessary. If a new legally binding instrument was needed, it could better be addressed through a protocol of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Switzerland said that there were several draft programmes of work before the Conference, which demonstrated the interest of the members of the Conference to find a pathway to move forward. Switzerland thanked the Russian Federation for its innovative proposal on negotiating an instrument dealing with suppression on chemical acts of terrorism. There was a whole set of elements which ought to be clarified before deciding whether the Conference should go down that path. The prohibition of any attacks by chemical State or non-State actors was clearly established in the international law. It also had to be clarified whether the Conference was the best forum for such talks. Switzerland was awaiting for the explanatory note from the Russian Federation. It would be judicious to advance on two fronts at the same time: to adopt a programme of work focusing on key themes at the Conference’s agenda, and to continue to study the proposal on an instrument on the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism. Switzerland felt that the British proposal on the programme of work was the best one, as it most faithfully placed nuclear disarmament at the very core of the debate. The Russian proposal should be studied and the agenda could be adopted mid-year.
Russian Federation expressed condolences to Turkey over the terrorist attack in Ankara. Russian Federation appreciated the informal consultations which had been held in an open and transparent fashion, but, unfortunately, not all delegations had been able to participate in them. Speaking of its proposal of the draft programme of work, the Russian Federation said that the problem of chemical terrorism was highly timely, given that ISIS had used, on numerous occasions, not only industrial toxic agents, but also other full-scale chemical agents. Terrorists had access to infrastructure that could help them create chemical weapons. Such an activity was crossing borders and was a reality which required urgent steps. There were no compelling arguments which would demonstrate that the norms of the customary law would ban the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors. The Chemical Weapons Convention included a very limited number of obligations on the prosecution of individuals carrying out activities prohibited by the Convention, whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which considered toxic gases and liquids as a crime, had not been ratified by some 70 States and could thus not be considered universal. The Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was focused on the use of national means aimed at preventing acquisition of chemical weapons by terrorists, but it did not fully take into account the current situation. The International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings had a limited scope and referred to the use of deadly devices in specific locations.
The scope of a convention proposed by the Russian Federation would not be limited and could involve other rules and regulations, including on how to deal with chemical weapons taken from terrorists. Adoption of amendments to the Chemical Weapons Convention would be based on a very complicated procedure, and required support by 97 States, with no State voting against. A new convention on chemical terrorism could include all of the achievements reflected in international instruments and criminalize necessary acts. While there were different international fora which could be used to elaborate such a convention, the Russian Federation gave a preference to the Conference because its agenda contained issues focused not only on disarmament, but also on other matters related to international security. In line with its initial mandate, the Conference could consider a broad range of issues on disarmament and non-proliferation, and the Russian proposal covered disarmament, non-proliferation and combating terrorism. In the light of a growing trans-boundary threat of terrorism, such acts could become even deadlier and the proliferation of chemical weapons undermined the Chemical Weapons Convention and other instruments. Negotiations on a new convention would unite the Conference and break the 20-year old deadlock. That was why members of the Conference were asked to actively consider the proposal and support it, and the Russian Federation was ready to continue consultations in different formats.
Italy said that multilateral consultations in a restricted format had not led to any breakthrough. In 2016, each Conference President had adopted his own criteria on the format, which were not always clear. It was questionable whether that was the best way to move the process forward. Informal consultations should be kept open to all interested States, in line with the practice of previous years. It was important that there were four draft proposals of work on the table. Italy had supported the proposal put forward by the United States and was convinced that a Fissile Material Treaty was the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament. Italy recognized that the Russian proposal had the merit of addressing a serious problem which could affect all States. Italy was open to continuing discussions on that important subject, in the Conference or elsewhere. Italy stood ready to support any reasonable compromise on the way ahead.
Turkey thanked all for the condolences and expressions of solidarity over the terrorist act in Ankara. Turkey was still examining the Russian draft proposal and was ready to hear more opinions on that issue.
United Kingdom thanked the Russian delegation for the detailed explanation, but noted that many instruments would need to be considered in order to identify the existing gaps on the issue of chemical terrorism. It would take a considerable time, perhaps months, for delegations to consider the Russian proposal. The United Kingdom’s proposal was not exclusive, and allowed for an establishment of a new working group on any legal instrument which Member States might decide to consider.
Republic of Korea’s Ambassador bid farewell to the Conference as he was changing positions. Republic of Korea hoped that an agreement could still be achieved on the programme of work and that substantial negotiations would commence as soon as possible. Republic of Korea, as the last President of the Conference in 2016, was planning to make its utmost efforts to move that negotiation forward.
Japan wished the best to the departing Ambassador of the Republic of Korea.
For use of the information media; not an official record
DC16/013E