CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSES ISSUES RELATED TO FISSILE MATERIAL
The Conference on Disarmament today held a plenary meeting in which 27 States made statements focusing on fissile material and the need for the Conference to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as the next step in multilateral non-proliferation and nuclear arms control.
In the statements, speakers said that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was the next logical step on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. It constituted an important building block of the international architecture, alongside a strengthened Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty to disarm and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to prohibit nuclear test explosives. The Conference on Disarmament remained the best and only option for negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with all of the key nuclear players. The inclusion of these key players in any treaty was essential if it was to fulfil the ambition of the international community to strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework in a meaningful way.
Other speakers noted that these negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty should be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and should include the issue of stockpiles and verification. A flexible approach could allow the Conference to move ahead without spending too much time on the modalities of a mandate. This was a complex issue that needed to be understood outside of political controversies. It was also pointed out that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and equal in importance, therefore negotiations on fissile material should be done in the context of nuclear disarmament and the other core issues of the Conference. Their results must be acceptable to all and take into consideration the national, regional, and international security considerations of all States. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty would be useful and effective if they were part of an integrated nuclear disarmament perspective.
Unfortunately, hopes of starting actual negotiations on this issue had been frustrated for decades. The Conference on Disarmament was now faced with the situation where there was essentially only one member who openly resisted the opening of international Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations because of national concerns regarding certain developments concerning civil nuclear cooperation. States should consider very carefully whether they wanted to take it upon themselves to prevent the entire international community from exploring mutually acceptable solutions in negotiations.
Bearing in mind the urgency of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear weapons to international security, several speakers called on Conference Member States to adopt and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work dealing with all the core issues in accordance with the rules of procedure.
Speaking today were Australia, Hungary on behalf of the European Union, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Turkey, the United States, Japan, Argentina, Syria, the Netherlands, Canada, Algeria, Colombia, Peru, Germany, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Austria, Iran, South Africa, Pakistan, Italy, India, China, Switzerland, Russian Federation, and Chile.
Speaking in a right of reply was the United Kingdom.
The next public plenary of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 February, at 10 a.m. when it will discuss issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Statements
MARIUS GRINIUS, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Canada), said that they had a very a productive discussion last Tuesday regarding nuclear disarmament, followed by a helpful meeting with the Conference interpreters. Mr. Grinius said he had also circulated a document from Pakistan.
PETER WOOLCOTT (Australia) said that Australia was committed to a world free from nuclear weapons and was committed to achieving this goal through balanced, progressive and reinforcing steps. Their immediate disarmament and non-proliferation priority in the Conference on Disarmament was the early commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. The 2010 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference re-affirmed in its consensus action plan the urgent necessity of negotiations and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The production of fissile material for weapons purposes represented a continuing threat to international peace and security. Australia continued to call on all States which continued to produce this material to join a global moratorium on the production of such material. Addressing fissile material through a verifiable treaty was the next logical step. Such a treaty would have both disarmament and non-proliferation benefits. It would significantly tighten international controls on fissile material but would also raise the bar for any State looking to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
Mr. Woolcott said that differences of opinion on this issue should not prevent the Conference from commencing negotiations. When negotiations did begin, there would be a range of issues that would need to be addressed. These included verification, scope, entry into force, institutional arrangements and dispute settlement provisions and how the question of pre-existing stocks was to be treated. Further, the definition of the terms “fissile material” and “production” would provide a left and right of arc for the treaty. On fissile material, Australia’s view was that the fissile materials to be covered by the treaty should be those relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Broadly speaking these were high enriched uranium and plutonium. The definition of materials regarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency as “direct use materials” (nuclear materials which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment) would seem an appropriate basis for the fissile material cut-off treaty. However, Australia considered that plutonium and uranium-233 in irradiated fuel should not be regarded as a “fissile material”, because they could not be used for nuclear explosive devices without first being separated from the irradiated fuel rods, fission products and other materials by reprocessing.
High enriched uranium and plutonium were the materials which had historically been used in nuclear weapons, but they needed to consider whether the fissile material cut-off treaty should also cover other fissionable materials which could be used to produce nuclear weapons, said Mr. Woolcott. The International Atomic Energy Agency had identified neptunium and americium as alternative nuclear materials of possible proliferation concern. Both should only become subject to treaty consideration after separation by processing. Taking these definitions for fissile material into account they could consider the definition of production. Australia saw two processes as being particularly relevant: uranium enrichment, in the case of high enriched uranium and separation from irradiated fuel by reprocessing, for both plutonium and uranium-233. They did not consider the irradiation of uranium or thorium fuel to form plutonium or uranium-233 to be production of fissile material. Production of plutonium should only include the process of separation by reprocessing. If the treaty encompassed irradiation it would have an extremely broad scope making effective international verification cumbersome and extremely costly. Further, reprocessing for civil use should not be proscribed.
ANDRÁS DÉKÁNY (Hungary), speaking on behalf of the European Union, reiterated that the European Union attached a clear priority to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. For the European Union, launching these negotiations was urgent and important. An effective Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would constitute a significant step in the process of nuclear disarmament, as well as strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. The European Union was convinced that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would contribute significantly to nuclear disarmament efforts under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Logically, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty constituted the next multilateral instrument to be negotiated in the nuclear disarmament field as a complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The international community’s support for the immediate commencement of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament was expressed in the final document of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
The European Union had repeatedly stated that nothing could be precluded from consideration if negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty were to start. All Conference on Disarmament Member States should appreciate that national security concerns, while legitimate, should be addressed as part of the negotiations process rather than a prerequisite. They also considered that there were confidence building measures that could be taken immediately, without the need to wait for the commencement of formal negotiations. This was why the European Union called on all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
JOHN DUNCAN (United Kingdom) said that the Government of the United Kingdom was committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and to progress on multilateral disarmament. In order to take forward these obligations, the United Kingdom considered it a priority to pursue a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to verifiably ban the future production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was the next logical step on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. It constituted an important building block of the international architecture alongside a strengthened Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to disarm and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to prohibit nuclear test explosives. Mr. Duncan said the Conference on Disarmament remained the best and only option for negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with all of the key nuclear players. The inclusion of these key players in any treaty was essential if it was to fulfil the ambition of the international community that it would strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework in a meaningful way.
The United Kingdom believed the strength of the Conference on Disarmament to be the respect it showed for every Member State’s national security interests through its rules of procedure. Through the consensus rule it offered protection to these interests both at the negotiation phase and in the eventual signature and ratification phases for any treaty. This came with the responsibility to the international community to demonstrate ongoing progress and they were all aware of the growing frustration of the international community at the Conference on Disarmament’s inertia. The United Kingdom therefore called on all Conference on Disarmament Member States to engage in a constructive manner with their colleagues across the various groupings in an effort to find ways to build an understanding on the key issues and make some progress towards a verifiable and internationally acceptable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. If they failed to do this, it may encourage other States to seek alternatives to the Conference on Disarmament in order to further their disarmament ambitions. This would not be conducive to concluding the sort of comprehensive and meaningful treaty to which the international community aspired.
LUIZ FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil) said that some of the statements made so far in the Conference had repeated, in a not very convincing tone, the lamentations on the paralysis of the Conference. He saw them has healthy signs of a modest honesty. They have been negotiating without success, trying to put into a legal document what had been included in so many international documents. Why could they not agree? This was because the nuclear weapon States and their allies wanted to limit the Conference’s role to the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. They could not accept the inclusion of any other aspect. Not all those same States admitted the negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space mandates of the Conference. There was no movement whatsoever towards a treaty banning nuclear weapons and any weapons of mass destruction. The world’s public opinion opposed such weapons. Their use would be a crime against humanity. To develop, improve, stock these weapons and have them deployed for rapid use were all preparations for such crimes.
Deterrence had made sense during the East-West context of the Cold War. Deterrence had been meant to achieve a balance. Nuclear weapons States usually added the adjective “credible” to the term “deterrence”. But in the current strategic consideration of the world, nuclear weapons States only expressed sheer power of intimidation in an extremely archaic fashion. They should start thinking outside the colonial box, said Mr. Macedo Soares. The possession of nuclear weapons was immoral. The justification for keeping arsenals was presented as a security guarantee. By means of friendly relations with neighbours, States kept armed forces for defense purposes, not menacing other States. Thus, the question arose whether States were morally entitled to possess arms of mass destruction for their defense? It was also sad to hear from some delegations that the problem rather lay with the Conference’s rules of procedure. He could also not refrain from saying that nothing prevented the current President from proposing a programme of work. The Presidency should also propose the creation of a subsidiary body tasked with the negotiation of a treaty banning nuclear weapons.
OĞUZ DEMIRALP (Turkey) said that Turkey’s position on arms control was well known to the Conference and Turkey aligned itself with the statement given by the Hungarian delegation on behalf of the European Union. Nevertheless, Mr. Demiralp wanted to reiterate that Turkey’s security policy eschewed the use of all weapons of mass destruction. Turkey believed in the necessity of establishing nuclear weapons free zones and it valued all treaty based accords be they multilateral or bilateral; in this context the New START treaty was an important development. Turkey hoped to see the Conference on Disarmament revitalized so that serious work on all core issues could start. Beginning negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be a significant building block in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. These negotiations should be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and should include the issue of stockpiles and verification. A flexible approach could allow them to move ahead without spending too much time on the modalities of a mandate. This was a complex issue that needed to be understood outside of political controversies. Mr. Demiralp said he hoped that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would create synergies and help them move forward.
WALTER REID (United States) said that yesterday President Barack Obama had signed the documents for the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In the coming days a meeting would take place between Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov in Munich for the exchange of treaty documents. The United States were very proud of this achievement.
JEFFREY EBERHARDT, Office Director, Bureau of Arms Control Verification and Compliance, (United States), said that the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was a vital objective which had been repeatedly endorsed by the international community. Such a treaty would place limits on the amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It would achieve this by banning the further production of fissile material for those purposes from the date of its entry into force. Such a limitation served their shared disarmament and non-proliferation goals. It had long been recognized as an essential step towards a world without nuclear weapons. This was one step on a long path, but it was an essential and achievable step and one that all States in the room could contribute to. The United States’ goal was a non-discriminatory treaty that halted the production of fissile material for weapons and was internationally verified. Negotiations were for the purpose of coming to agreement on how it would work in practice. Even if the Conference was not yet prepared to begin formal negotiations, there was great value in holding in-depth discussions on technical issues. There were, for example, significant differences over how to define fissile material. There were some who favoured a narrow definition of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, while others, including the United States, favoured a definition that covered weapons-usable forms of plutonium, uranium and which corresponded to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s definition of direct use material. Other favoured yet more expansive definitions.
Mr. Eberhardt said that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty must also recognize that there were legitimate civilian and military uses for fissile materials other than nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The technical issues did not end there. The definition of fissile material was closely linked to the definition of production. They had to be sure that they would not be so restrictive in the definition of production that they left open opportunities to circumvent the fundamental objective of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, while at the same time not being so expansive that they constrained activities that had no relation to a cut-off treaty. A definition that covered spent fuel for example would add considerably to the cost of verifying a treaty without adding significantly to its effectiveness. Defining fissile material and what it meant to produce such material led to a third fundamental issue: that of the definition of what constituted a “production facility”, as treaty verification would focus on such facilities. While resolution of such issues was properly left for negotiations, discussion of this broad area was timely now. They had to start somewhere, and they should carefully consider which issue with which to begin. Even the least divisive issues would take time to consider fully and they should not rush their work with an artificial timetable. In-depth discussion of technical issues could help build the foundation for future negotiations. The United States saw no barrier to the start of negotiations now. The obstacles that existed were of a political nature. Until those obstacles could be overcome the United States saw much value in engaging in technical discussions pending the commencement of formal negotiations. Engaging in technical discussions in the Conference might have the effect of convincing some who feared negotiations that they had, in fact, little to fear.
AKIO SUDA (Japan) said that Japan had been standing firm for many decades in its call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They were willing to participate in discussions, with a longer perspective, on how a multilateral nuclear disarmament framework or a nuclear weapons convention should look like in the future final phase of nuclear disarmament. However, everyone agreed that total elimination could not be achieved overnight or by a single convention. It required a cumulative process of practical and concrete measures. In this regard, it was obvious that the most urgent step in this process was the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. He could not imagine taking any road toward a world free of nuclear weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without first banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The issue of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty had reached a level of sufficient maturity for them to embark on formal negotiations. Nonetheless, the Japanese delegation was pleased to actively take part in substantive discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the plenary meetings without prejudice to their national position in actual negotiations.
The most important issue was to identify the core obligations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, what was prohibited and what was not. The first core obligation was, needless to say, the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from the date of the entry into force of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Furthermore, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should also ban assisting another State in its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Concerning definitions, Japan said its position was that they should be as broad as possible while not adversely affecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the subject of verification issues, there were many different approaches to the verification of the core obligation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which was a “ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.” The issue of stocks had often been hijacked by the question of whether to include existing stocks or not in the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Japan would suggest three categories of stocks: stocks for nuclear weapons purposes; stocks for non-explosive purposes (conventional military purposes); and stocks declared as excess military requirements.
In conclusion, Mr. Suda said that they had discussed these issues over and over and it was high time they started negotiations.
HECTOR RAUL PELEAZ (Argentina) said that in the last few years they had enriched their understanding on the subject with a series of informal discussions on the future aspects of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Such a treaty must be a tool to prevent nuclear proliferation and also one working towards complete nuclear disarmament. It had to cover direct use materials and highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Special provisions could be included for other additional materials. Argentina considered it indispensible to exclude nuclear activities and materials aimed to be used for peaceful purposes. Argentina acknowledged the political sensitivity of the stock issue. Argentina continued to believe that any instrument on disarmament and non-proliferation, if it wanted to be credible, had to include a verification mandate. A verification mechanism should not be too costly and they should consider the already existing capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. Such a treaty should also not create new obligations for non-nuclear weapons States, other than those already included in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
FAYSAL KHABBAZ HAMOUI (Syria) said that Syria was confident that the Conference could achieve tangible progress in its work this year. Syria was increasingly convinced of the Conference’s importance, but its success depended on the presence of genuine will in some major capitals and a true wish to achieve clear progress. Genuine will was the most important and the only element that helped the Conference on Disarmament achieve progress. What was strange and worrisome was the focus on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Why put aside the three other pillars that were just as important as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, some maybe more so. How could they negotiate on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty while putting aside the second pillar, the disposal of stockpiles? In Syria’s region of the world, described as a hot spot, they saw a State developing its nuclear arsenal regularly, foremost of which was fissile material, without any control or verification or knowledge of the International Atomic Energy Agency since this State refused to adhere to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. How could countries of the region and the world accept such a bizarre situation? How could they start negotiating on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty while this State threatened its neighbours and disregarded the principles of international legitimacy?
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and equal in importance. They must start negotiating nuclear disarmament and look at the other core issues. Such negotiations and their results must be acceptable to all and take into consideration the national, regional, and international security considerations of all States. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be useful and effective if they were an integral part of the perspective of nuclear disarmament. In conclusion, Mr. Hamoui said that the delegation of Syria would work openly and honestly in what it hoped was a climate of understanding in the interest of all.
PAUL VAN DEN IJSSEL (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands attached the utmost priority to the early start and conclusion of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. The Netherlands was convinced that such a treaty would serve the security interests of all Member States of the Conference and the wider international community. He could not imagine any road towards a world free of nuclear weapons without first banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Netherlands had always been in favour of a step-by-step approach as the best way to achieve nuclear disarmament. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was an essential pillar to complement the existing nuclear treaty regime. The all or nothing approach advocated by some States, whereby all attention should be focused on a treaty banning the use and possession of nuclear weapons and intermediate steps were disregarded, was neither credible nor realistic. The Netherlands saw no reason to further delaying the start of these negotiations; the subject had been on the table in the international arena for at least 20 years. A lot of work had been done on it inside and outside the Conference.
Mr. Ijssel said that there was wide international consensus on the need to put a cap on the production of fissile material. The Netherlands was flexible as for the inclusion of pre-existing stocks of weapons grade fissile material in future negotiations. A cut-off treaty should aim for maximum transparency and verifiability. The International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system should play a role in this respect. A treaty should include, apart from a ban on production, a ban on transfers, acquisition and on related assistance activities. All States would have the opportunity to defend their national interests during the negotiations.
GEOFF GARTSHORE (Canada) said that in recent years Canada had made clear its initial position on the many facets of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that would need to be considered during negotiations, including the three inter-related elements of scope, definitions, and verification. Determining the appropriate scope of the treaty was integral to its effectiveness, as this would determine the materials that were covered and thus, which facilities must be monitored and inspected. It must also address other, non-weapon uses of fissile material. Defining fissile material and production would be co-dependent on decisions regarding the scope and verification provisions of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Any definition of material used in a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty must be broad enough to ensure that all fissile material relevant to weapons purposes, now or in the future, was captured under its provisions.
Mr. Gartshore went on to say that the general parameters for a verification and compliance framework included five broad elements: an initial declaration; an assessment of the declaration; a continuous monitoring and evaluation process; a conclusion based on the results of this verification process; and finally, a means to address non-compliance. In conclusion, Mr. Gartshore said that the challenges ahead would not be easy to address, but with ingenuity and political will, they should surely be able to find common ground on this critical next step. Canada believed that the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was the next practical step to put a definitive halt to the nuclear arms race and to create the conditions necessary to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
IDRISS JAZAÏRY (Algeria) said that in past years the Conference had had difficulties to make use of all its available time. He thus saw it as a positive sign that the President had said this morning that time was short. Algeria was in favour of a treaty banning the production of fissile material, in keeping with the Shannon Mandate. They were ready to continue negotiations on this issue in a consensual manner. It was the main priority. The treaty should make it possible to set up a binding legal standard, prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. The treaty should not prevent nuclear activities for civilian purposes. Fissile materials covered by this ban ought to cover all materials which would not be included in civilian use. The treaty should meet the objectives of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The process should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They ought not to simply prohibit future production; they should also tackle stocks, as the Shannon Mandate permitted it.
In order to be credible, the treaty should be accompanied by an effective verification procedure, said Mr. Jazairy. The scope of the verification should not be limited to military facilities. The performance and effectiveness of a verification regime would require sufficient transparency with regard to stocks and inventories of military or civilian fissile material. Algeria further noted that some participants were still stuck with the idea of placing a cap on fissile material to hold it at bay. But one could not control a monster by simply putting a cap on its head. The conclusion of the treaty was not an aim in itself; the negotiations on a cut-off treaty should not hinder the movement on multilateral negotiations on other subjects.
ALICIA ARANGO OLMOS (Colombia) said that the nuclear threat endangered the very existence of the human race. The only way to free the world from this threat was to eliminate all nuclear arsenals and the only way to do this was through an instrument that prohibited the production, use and storing of fissile material. Colombia backed the participation of civil society, but the negotiating and decision-making capacity fell to the States. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and should be made universal and its three pillars effectively applied. Colombia emphasized the need for the universalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and made a special appeal to annex 2 States to ratify this treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be strengthened in its role and States should enter and ratify the safeguards and agreements and additional protocols. Colombia also supported nuclear weapons fee zones. Colombia reiterated the importance of education to promote a culture of peace and she stressed the inalienable right of countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the International Atomic Energy Agency could contribute to the socio-economic development of States. Ms. Olmos also warned about the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. In conclusion, she said the international community yearned for a world free of nuclear weapons and this body had an obligation to make progress toward a world free of the threat of nuclear war.
FERNANDO ROJAS (Peru) said that the United Nations Secretary-General had addressed the Conference last week and had called on the Conference to emerge from the paralysis that had been afflicting it for years. Peru considered that looking for the reasons behind the paralysis in procedural matters or in the way the Conference had been guided was not the right way. The Conference was blocked because of global circumstances. The Conference ought to work towards ensuring the existence of conditions aiming towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons States had a special responsibility in this regard.
Mr. Rojas said that Peru was ready to begin immediately substantive work on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. This should be done in the broadest possible way and include the verification of existing stocks. They understood the Shannon Mandate as a fundamental guide, but they did not see any limit in it. The Conference should also not lose from sight or cease work on other issues leading towards nuclear disarmament.
HELLMUT HOFFMANN (Germany) said since the 1950s advocates of nuclear disarmament had sought a treaty that would cap the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons and lay a basis for irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons. It was fair to say that today the international community was close to being unanimous in seeking to open negotiations on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. There were indeed compelling reasons why a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty continued to be what was often referred to as the “next logical step” in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would offer a unique opportunity for creating a non-discriminatory common denominator imposing essentially equal obligations on nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear States alike. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would also help to enhance nuclear material security, and establish transparency with regard to current nuclear complexes where there was no transparency yet. Imposing a cap on nuclear arsenals would obviously constitute another important milestone in a well calibrated approach toward a world free of nuclear weapons.
Alas, hopes of starting actual negotiations on this issue had been frustrated for decades. The Conference on Disarmament was now faced with the situation where it was essentially only one member, namely Pakistan, which openly resisted the opening of international Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations because of national concerns regarding certain developments concerning civil nuclear cooperation. Mr. Hoffmann said Germany believed that States should consider very carefully whether they wanted to take it upon themselves to prevent the entire international community in its efforts at starting a process of exploring mutually acceptable solutions in negotiations. With regard to the controversial issue of stockpiles, Germany believed that there was a need to strike a balance between opposing approaches. What form respective measures could take would depend on many factors which would have to be considered at the appropriate time. What could be said at this point was that a minimum transparency would be an issue high on their agenda so as to make a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty a meaningful exercise. Finally, verification would be key. The system would depend on the treaty’s scope, but as a matter of principle Germany would argue in favour of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effective system of verification, where the same rules applied to all States parties.
DELL HIGGIE (New Zealand) said that New Zealand had consistently supported the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty. They had long maintained that such an agreement would represent a substantive contribution to both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The longer negotiations were delayed, the greater the amount of fissile material that would come into existence and the greater would be the potential for increasing the number and size of nuclear arsenals. There were a number of approaches that could be taken to the conduct of negotiations on a fissile material treaty. There might well be the need for more than a single treaty. A regime, or framework, approach might prove to be one means of narrowing, and even accommodating, the difference of opinion, for instance, which persisted on the question of the inclusion of existing stocks of fissile material.
Turning to the latest report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, Ms. Higgie said that the Panel was of the view that accurate information on highly enriched uranium and plutonium production and stocks was a necessary prerequisite to progress on nuclear disarmament. The Panel had also suggested that cooperative initiatives could be developed in order to compare procedures used in shutting down production facilities and finalizing the accounting of materials hitherto produced. It was not too early to explore the prospects for practical steps at the national level to help mould the eventual outcome of the negotiations. A fissile material treaty might indeed only be feasible in the context of a framework approach, with the treaty being supplemented by protocols negotiated on a multilateral basis, or by unilateral declarations given by the relevant States. These other instruments could be negotiated in parallel to the treaty negotiations or following the conclusion of the treaty. One could, for example, envisage that existing stocks might be made the subject of declarations requiring possessing states to implement State auditing practices under which weapons-grade material would be subjected to controls. The verification regime needed however to be able to differentiate between stocks held at the date of entry into force of the production ban and stocks produced illegally after the date.
KAM WOON-AN (Republic of Korea) said that for the past several years they had engaged in discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Unfortunately, no substantial progress had been made on this important issue due to differing positions on key issues stemming from the divergence of individual security concerns. However, in his opinion, no delegation in this room would negate the need to conduct negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty itself. At this stage, he believed the task of the Conference on Disarmament was to seek ways and means to bring together the different national security interests in harmony. As stated on previous occasions, the Republic of Korea continued to place a high priority on commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the earliest possible date. Indeed, his delegation believed that it was an issue that came close to the negotiation stage in the Conference on Disarmament and would therefore like to see its earliest possible commencement. The Secretary-General had advised the Conference on Disarmament to commence an informal process before they agreed on formal negotiations. In this context, he hoped this debate could be followed by more thematic discussions focused on more technical issues. This would be helpful in building trust and facilitating the formal process.
ALEXANDER MARSCHIK (Austria) said that Austria attached high importance to a Fissile Material Cut-off treaty. Its merits had been subject to lengthy debates. For Austria it represented an indispensible and inevitable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. But it was more than a stepping stone. Only a treaty would create the necessary structures and mechanisms to ensure long term security. While the Conference was still seeking its role, Austria would welcome the participation of technical experts in the informal discussions on the subject. Concerning the scope of the treaty, Austria defended the broadest possible definition. The reliability of the treaty would lie in a relevant verification mandate. The useful and vast experience of the International Atomic Emergency Agency should be considered in this regard. If nuclear weapons were a source of insecurity, why would some country want more? In Austria’s view, multilateral negotiations remained the best way to protect national security interests in a long term and sustainable manner.
MOHAMMAD REZA SAJJADI (Iran) said that Iran was of the firm conviction that the existence of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to the security of all nations. Therefore, nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority of the Iranian delegation in the work of this Conference. They needed to immediately start some urgent measures in the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a nuclear weapons convention. In this regard, Mr. Sajjadi reiterated the call for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all, of the possession, development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such weapons. He re-emphasized that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should not be turned into an instrument in the area of non-proliferation. Iran would never accept such an approach. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be a clear and meaningful step for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all their aspects. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should also be a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. Past production and existing stocks as well as the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must be covered under the scope of the treaty. Iran would vigorously pursue their position in this regard during any negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. Sajjadi said they were at a crucial stage in the work of this Conference. They had to build upon their achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, and he believed every State had a special responsibility to work toward the removal of the threat of nuclear weapons. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty only had value added if it added a new firm commitment to the nuclear weapons States and this would happen only when it covered all the stocks of the nuclear weapons States and if it was universal. Bearing in mind the urgency of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear weapons to international security, Iran called on Conference Members to adopt and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work on the basis of its agenda, which dealt with all core issues in accordance with its rules of procedure.
JERRY MATTHEWS MATJILA (South Africa) said that South Africa had long argued for a systematic and progressive approach towards achieving the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. For this reason, his delegation fully supported negotiations on a treaty that would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and that fulfilled both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. South Africa did not subscribe to the view promoted by some Member States of the Conference that a fissile material treaty was the only item ripe for negotiations. The Conference, as a negotiating forum, was able to negotiate on any issue under its agenda. The continued bickering about procedural issues should now be set aside and substituted with the substantive consideration of the items on the Conference’s agenda. It was now 15 years since the Shannon report had been submitted and the Conference continued to be occupied with a seemingly esoteric debate about the possibility of negotiations. The control of fissile material would directly impact upon the control of proliferation and would be an important step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. A fissile material would clearly reinforce the ideals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and complement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. If they were serious about nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the negotiation of a fissile material treaty could no longer be postponed.
South Africa believed that such a treaty should be non-discriminatory and verifiable and fulfil both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. South Africa’s experience had shown that despite significant technical complexities that would need to be acknowledged, all of these could be overcome if the necessary political will existed. Stocks would have to be covered by a future treaty for it to be a credible instrument. A fissile material treaty that fulfilled disarmament objectives would necessarily also have to give effect to the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification. To be effective it should further be the product of multilateral disarmament negotiations.
ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said regarding fissile material that he could state very clearly that this issue went to the very heart of Pakistan’s security concerns. They had explained that due to regional reasons Pakistan had been compelled to seek a credible capability for nuclear deterrence. In this context, the issue of asymmetry in fissile material was very important to be addressed for Pakistan and hence the position they had taken regarding the propped Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as proposed was flawed because it did not take into account several critical issues including stockpiles. Definitions were also important because they would determine the scope of a future verification regime. Pakistan also believed that they needed to take into account not just future stockpiles, but existing stockpiles of fissile material, which must be taken up in their entirety at the regional and global levels. The treaty should not be just about halting production, but about reducing existing stockpiles. Even if major powers ceased production of fissile material, sufficient material would remain for them to continue to make nuclear weapons if they chose to do so. This would lead to a risk of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. These asymmetries were a factor for regional instability. There were also issues of verification and the verification machinery on offer was not sufficient to ensure and provide the kind of guarantees that were needed to have a truly verifiable treaty. In view of these concerns, Pakistan suggested the desirability of having a Fissile Material Treaty versus a cut-off treaty, which was simply a non-proliferation move. What was really needed was a treaty to reduce existing stocks and ban future production. The following elements needed to be included in any future treaty: a broader definition of fissile material beyond uranium and plutonium; a broader scope; a reduction in existing stocks; an independent verification mechanism with onsite inspections; and entry into force only when all States capable of producing fissile material had signed and ratified the treaty.
Regarding statements by the ambassador of Germany, Mr. Akram said that it was not their desire to prevent international consensus but unfortunately circumstances had been created that undermined Pakistan’s security and forced them to take this position. The responsibility for the delays experienced by the Conference lay with those countries that had, for the sake of profit and politics, undertaken policies in violation of their own non-proliferation commitments that had created this environment.
GIOVANNI MANFREDI (Italy) said that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was a priority for Italy in the Conference on Disarmament. It had essentially two objectives: it was both an instrument of disarmament and of non-proliferation. In Italy’s opinion, the Conference on Disarmament should now concentrate on five topics, keeping in mind the Shannon mandate. The first topic was the definition of fissile material, as already addressed by Australia this morning. Defining fissile material was a complex but necessary task. There was scope for negotiating on this issue and for expert input to make a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty credible. The second item was verification. In Italy’s opinion the provision of verification was an essential part, as it was in any other disarmament and non-proliferation instrument. The third aspect was nuclear fuel. The navies of at least four nuclear weapon States used enriched uranium as fuel for their naval ships. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would have to consider whether this material should or should not be covered by a treaty and if so why. The fourth issue was the problem of production plants of weapons grade fissile material and whether these would have to be decommissioned or if these could be used for other purposes. The fifth question was stockpiles of fissile material. This was the real stumbling bloc of the future negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Should the treaty be a simple cut-off treaty or should it also include the issue of stockpiles?
HAMID ALI RAO (India) said India had had a consistent view on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty since 1993. India had also joined consensus on an ad hoc committee on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in 1995 and 1998. He recalled and reiterated the importance India attached to the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and they believed this was the appropriate forum for negotiating the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It was essential that all relevant countries participated in the negotiations and contributed to their successful outcome. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty must be non-discriminatory in that the obligations and responsibilities must apply to all parties to the treaty and verification would be an important element of the treaty’s architecture. The treaty must also ban future production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as this would be the main characteristic in defining the treaty.
Mr. Rao said that India had listened very closely to the reasoning given by certain countries in this chamber that certain asymmetries were what were holding back the Conference, and they did not agree with this. Contrary to what had been said, India’s membership in certain groups would strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. There was no change in India’s support for the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. They had participated with an open mind in all plenaries, including last year’s discussions, and would continue to do so.
WANG QUN (China) said that they had heard comments from delegates today with regard to the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, saying: “just do it”. But one had also to show wisdom while “doing it”. China had always been in favour of an early negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Such an instrument would advance the process of nuclear disarmament, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and safeguard international peace and security. It was unnecessary to start negotiations on this subject outside of the Conference. The Conference on Disarmament was the only and best place to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. China would like to see a balanced programme of work and good negotiations resulting in a good treaty. By good treaty they meant one that could attract the participation of all Member States.
RETO WOLLENMANN (Switzerland) said Switzerland attached great importance to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and it was for this reason that it had supported the publication of a reference work which dealt with the way this topic had been handled by the Conference on Disarmament. Switzerland had also financed three seminars on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The Swiss delegation felt such an instrument would constitute the third pillar of a multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation system. It would allow them to reach a new step toward the establishment of a world free of nuclear arms. Such an instrument would also reduce the discrimination derived from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which established a strong asymmetry between nuclear States and non-nuclear States. Such a treaty should be designed to prevent not only horizontal proliferation, but also vertical proliferation and contribute to disarmament. It should prohibit not only the production of fissile materials, but should also institute a ceiling on and a reduction of existing stockpiles. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should at least partially cover stockpiles to achieve the dual aim of non-proliferation and disarmament. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should also help strengthen the non-proliferation regime by bringing more closely together the States parties and non-parties of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Lastly, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be effectively verifiable. Switzerland believed that the Conference on Disarmament remained the appropriate forum for these discussions and they would remain fully engaged in these discussions.
VLADIMIR NOVOKHATSKIY (Russian Federation) said that the development of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament and towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Russia had stopped development of weapons-grade uranium over 20 years ago. The main issue for Russia, with regards to the scope and content of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, was the definition of fissile material. Such a definition should reflect the realities of today and be in-keeping with the latest findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency. They should also not introduce into the treaty the production of fissile material for non-military purposes.
Further, Russia believed that it would be fully logical to build into the treaty verification mechanisms and to strengthen the already existing verification mechanisms existing within the International Atomic Energy Agency. The control mechanisms should be clearly defined in the treaty. Russia also believed that the discussion on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should take place in the Conference on Disarmament and with the participation of all the countries possessing nuclear weapons and those which had the capacity to develop them.
PEDRO OYARCE (Chile) said this morning they had listened to a constructive debate that once again demonstrated the priority given to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and an interest in initiating negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. A moratorium on the production of fissile material as suggested by several delegations was an element to which political consideration should be given as a means of confidence building. A treaty in this area would help secure nuclear arsenals, provide transparency and impose a ceiling on nuclear arsenals. These were essential steps to be taken toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Objectives, definitions and verification were all inter-related and of course needed to be defined and they would have to concern themselves with non-compliance and the defining various types of materials. There were reference points in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral agreements. This would take a lot of work, but they should make the most of the opportunities to get ready and initiate the technical discussions they would need to have, which those who worked in the political sphere could benefit from.
Right of Reply
Speaking in a right of reply, JO ADAMSON (United Kingdom) said that the discussions they had had today showed how much passion the subject could create. With regard to the speech made by the Brazilian Ambassador this morning, she wanted to react to his categorization of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference outcome. The United Kingdom would not expect anybody who had not been part of the drafting of the outcome document to comment as such on it. The United Kingdom believed that the outcome document had some very important aspects in it. Diplomacy was the art of the possible. They should be challenging themselves to get themselves doing what they had to do.
MOHAMED EL-ATAWY (Egypt) responding to what the United Kingdom said in their right of reply, gave a friendly reminder that the action plan included nuclear disarmament as well as the other two pillars.
JO ADAMSON (United Kingdom), speaking in a second right of reply, said that it was by no means her intention to forget this issue and said that she hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would be able to work on this issue in the future.
Concluding Remarks
MARTIN GRINIUS, President of the Conference on Disarmament, (Canada), said that the Year of the Rabbit represented wisdom, speed and luck and this was how they should proceed. However, he said they didn’t want rabbits running in all directions because that could potentially cause chaos. In terms of housekeeping items, he reminded the delegates that there was a panel discussion taking place on Monday evening preceded by sandwiches and possibly Canadian beer. This panel discussion would be a good introduction to the theme of next Tuesday’s plenary which would be the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
A number of countries then discussed whether this panel discussion was part of the work of the Conference or only a side event.
For use of the information media; not an official record
DC11/006E