Overcoming Nuclear Dangers

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman [Senator Margelov] for your kind introduction and for giving me the floor. Let me, first of all, thank our host today, the Italian Government and Foreign Minister Frattini, for using the Italian G-8 Presidency to take forward the international debate on disarmament and non-proliferation. I wish to express particular appreciation and respect for President Gorbachev, Secretary Shultz and Senator Nunn for their leadership and initiative in co-sponsoring this timely and very necessary deliberation.

Allow me to contribute to our discussion today a few brief remarks from the vantage point of my role as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament.

When we discuss how to “create” a ‘Joint Enterprise’, I believe that we should – first and foremost – focus on how to make existing mechanisms and bodies fulfil their mandated functions. Joint enterprises do, in fact, exist, and we do not have to “re-invent” the wheel, but we can very well perfect it. The name of this existing ‘Joint Enterprise’ is the Conference on Disarmament. Paradoxically, at the height of the Cold War, in the 1970s and 1980s, this intergovernmental body was able to agree and give the world such multilateral disarmament instruments as the NPT, the CWC, the CTBT and others.

The Conference on Disarmament still has an important role to play as a forum where States can agree on norms to serve their common interests. The United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, has made promoting multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation a key priority. On top of this, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council have roles to play. As proposed by the Secretary-General in his five-point proposal to revitalize the international disarmament agenda, it would be valuable if the Security Council’s permanent members were to give political impetus to discussions on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process.

The Secretary-General has also repeatedly called for political will to overcome the decade-long impasse in the Conference on Disarmament. The simple fact is that the Conference on Disarmament remains the world’s only multilateral negotiating body on strategic disarmament issues, with both nuclear-weapon States (also those outside of the NTP regime) and non-nuclear-weapon States. As such, it is already a unique ‘Joint Enterprise’.

In seeking ways to create a ‘Joint Enterprise’, we also have to be clear and realistic about opportunities and obstacles.

A perceived ‘flaw’ of the Conference on Disarmament is that the consensus rule and the broad agenda contribute to linking issues and thereby stopping the process. This, to a great extent, is true. At the same time, the linkages across issues reflect key strategic interests of States, and we cannot hope to make meaningful progress unless we face the reality of those differing priorities and try to find common ground. In doing so, we have to bear in mind, that progress in nuclear disarmament is dependant on strategic stability and on the settlement of regional conflicts. I also strongly believe that nuclear disarmament is possible, if no other types of weapons of mass destruction are developed and deployed to assume the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons.

A fundamental divergence among Member States in threat perception exists and it cannot be ignored. This has led to a fundamental difference in the past decade in addressing the question of nuclear weapons: nuclear-weapon States and their allies focus on non-proliferation, while non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those in the developing world, advocate nuclear disarmament first. In a sense, disarmament and non-proliferation hold each other hostage through their respective advocates. As a result, there is no common global strategy to address issues concerning nuclear weapons. This is one of the primary causes for the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. The divisions in this area both illustrate and reinforce other fault lines in international politics and cannot be entirely divorced from disagreements in other areas. Indeed, the perceived ‘lack of political will’ in the Conference on Disarmament in the past decade, is very much a function of these disagreements in other areas. The key here is that the absolutely essential element of strategic stability and conditions that would be conducive to increased trust among nations so far has been missing.

Recent developments and statements - the joint statement in London by Presidents Medvedev and Obama, and the prospects for renewed US-Russian negotiations - do seem to have the potential to address – if not entirely reverse – this negative trend. But, there is a lot of hard work ahead.

Undoubtedly, the US and the Russian Federation have a vital role to play in providing leadership to advance disarmament and non-proliferation. But, the shared goals can only be realized fully through multilateral efforts. Bilateral initiatives must support and feed into the multilateral mechanisms to make the process sustainable and lasting. The different tracks must be mutually reinforcing.

As a reflection of the generally more positive international atmosphere, a Presidential non-paper has recently been tabled at the Conference on Disarmament by the current presidency, which is Algeria.

The proposal envisages the establishment of a Working Group to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons – FMCT. At the same time, it suggests the creation of three other Working Groups with deliberative mandates on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and negative security assurances.

The proposal differs from previous ones in that it supplements the mandate for negotiation of an FMCT with provisions for “international and effective verification”. This is considered a major compromise on the part of some Members.


While the proposal is still in the form of a non-paper, it is based on extensive consultations with all Members of the Conference and does encapsulate the growing determination of Members to overcome the prolonged impasse in a spirit of compromise and flexibility.

The outlook is promising, but the joint enterprise needs to be aimed at involving those that are out of the NPT process, which are – as I said – Members of the CD. The increasingly favourable international climate represents an opportunity – and an added responsibility – for the Conference on Disarmament, and I hope that our Member States will seize that opportunity.

With respect to the connection between the Conference on Disarmament and the NPT, progress in the Conference on Disarmament, through the adoption of a Programme of Work, would make a significant contribution towards a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference. Not only would practical steps have been taken on issues closely connected with the strengthening the NPT regime, but most importantly, trust would have been re-established, which could lead to genuine consensus-building across the priorities that are also part of the main bargain of the NPT.

I will stop here. I look forward to the debates and to contributing to the exchanges over the coming days.

Thank you very much.