1000th Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament

Excellencies
Ladies and Gentlemen
Dear Colleagues:

The 1000th Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate occasion to assess past achievements, to reflect on the causes of the impasse which has existed since around 1999, and to give thought to ways and means of restoring the leading role of the Conference in multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations.

During the first decade of its existence, the Conference on Disarmament set up its priorities recorded in the so-called “Decalogue”, on the basis of which the yearly agenda was to be drawn, as well as detailed its working methods that were then periodically reviewed and modified. Towards the end of this period, preparatory efforts started to bear fruit – the Conference entered the phase of negotiations of treaties.

With the conclusion of negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, in 1992, and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 1996, these items were removed from the agenda. Following the adoption of the treaties, the Conference entered a period of slowing-down of activities, which over the years has led to the impasse. Paradoxically, the origins of the impasse can be attributed to the end of the Cold War, which changed significantly the international security equilibrium and led to a re-evaluation of disarmament priorities by States. These priorities – until then rather stable – started to evolve with the changing perception of security by States.

New actors have emerged on the international scene, and with the possibility of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, international relations have become even more complex, more dangerous and less predictable than previously. Notions of strategic stability, war avoidance and nuclear deterrence have been redefined, and multilateralism has been giving way to a predominance of particular national interests.

Besides the short period, in 1998, when two Ad Hoc Committees were established: (1) on negative security assurances and (2) on prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to start negotiations, or structured deliberations, on any item on its agenda. Intensive efforts to break the deadlock have not brought the expected results. Gradually, the divergence of views on disarmament priorities led to the establishment of a package of items representing priorities of different groups of States, but not acceptable as a whole to a number of States – the so called "programme of work". Subsequent variations of such a programme of work, although sometimes attracting the support of a considerable number of CD Members, have never enjoyed consensus. For years, success in striking a balance between these priorities has eluded the Conference. Thus, instead of negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements, the Conference has been trying to forge consensus on current disarmament priorities.

Over the years, the impasse has been attributed to a number of causes, including differing views concerning the agenda, the rules of procedure, the decision-making process, the informal system of political groups, the composition and the lack of involvement of civil society. Potential remedies have not had the desired effect. The expansion of the Conference’s membership by 23 Members in 1996, and by 5 Members in 1999, did not help the Conference overcome its problems. Member States have continued to disagree on changing the agenda that was developed at the early years of the existence of the Conference and on changing the composition of the political groups. Also, civil society is not fully using the existing mechanisms for disseminating its views and materials to the Members of the Conference, including those adopted by the CD in 2004.

In this context, we should not lose sight of the fact that progress on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation has also been elusive in other contexts. The greatest disappointment of the 2005 World Summit in September was no doubt the failure to reach agreement on even a single paragraph on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction pose a severe danger to all of us, in particular the possibility of such weapons falling in the hands of terrorists. Progress on disarmament and non-proliferation is vital for our collective security, and efforts must continue as a matter of priority.

Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that in 2004 alone, the global total spent on arms topped $1 trillion for the first time since the height of the Cold War. In contrast, the amount spent on aid over the same period was $78.6 billion. Disarmament could thus liberate significant resources to be channelled towards development efforts, in addition to building greater confidence among States and contributing towards stability, which, in turn, would also be conducive to the development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals.

Excellencies
Ladies and Gentlemen:

Following the setbacks in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation of last year, the whole multilateral disarmament machinery needs an overhaul. The impasse in the CD has political, not structural or procedural sources. Debates aimed at "getting the CD back to work" that took place in 2004 and 2005 revealed mostly unchanged political positions of States. In such circumstances, it seems that it would be difficult to agree on the programme of work without joint efforts based on new, imaginative approaches.

Generating more interest and changing the attitude towards the Conference in capitals could be a welcome remedy. Also, developing new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament, going beyond the narrowly defined national security interests, could be of crucial importance for the revitalization of the Conference. Without political decisions at the highest levels, even the most determined efforts of the existing multilateral disarmament bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament, will not succeed. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to the Conference this year, "the impasse cannot be broken by procedural means or by merely fine-tuning existing proposals. Capitals need to thoroughly reassess attitudes towards the Conference, and develop a new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament."

Frustration over the impasse has led some to contemplate the possibility of suspending or even dissolving the Conference, should it not be able to "deliver results in the foreseeable future", and setting up an alternative forum based, for example, on the "like-minded" concept. There are, however, other views to the effect that replacing the Conference on Disarmament with another negotiating mechanism would not necessarily solve the problems it now faces. Firstly, the existing fundamental divergence of views on priorities on the international disarmament agenda and specific security concerns of States would not disappear with the dissolution of the CD. Secondly, the main difference between the Conference on Disarmament and any negotiating body based on the "like-minded" concept is that the latter, by definition, excludes some States that do not consider themselves "like-minded" but whose participation would still be crucial for a meaningful outcome of negotiations. Needless to say, certain issues can only be resolved through the multilateral disarmament negotiating body, that is, by the Conference on Disarmament, due to its intellectual and political potential, experience and clear rules of engagement.

We should not be discouraged from using existing and potential mechanisms available to the Conference now, such as debates on issues on the agenda, for mutually influencing policies and security perceptions of Member States and for furthering the consensus building process. In parallel, the Conference should review its working methods and seek new approaches that could make it more responsive to contemporary security threats and challenges. Progress may be modest, but the Conference cannot afford to remain inactive. We must remember that consensus building is a process that may take time – but not too much – especially when dealing with issues of strategic importance. Political will, perseverance and patience should be the virtues guiding our efforts.

Thank you very much.