Conference on Disarmament Holds Thematic Debate on Fissile Material Production

The Conference on Disarmament today held a thematic discussion on agenda item 2 of the Conference on prevention of nuclear war, focusing on fissile material production.

Ambassador Yuri Borissov Sterk of Bulgaria, President of the Conference on Disarmament, said the possibility of reaching agreement on an international regulatory framework dealing with the production of fissile material had been in the focus of the international community for quite some time. More than a quarter of a century had elapsed since then, and yet there was no sign on the horizon of anything close to a legally binding instrument on fissile material production.

Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, recalled that there was little official data on fissile material, the two main holders of which remained the United States and the Russian Federation. Negotiating a treaty on fissile material had appeared as a low-hanging fruit in the nineties and the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution urging the adoption of such a treaty.  In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament took up the mandate under the leadership of Ambassador Shannon and in 1998 an ad hoc committee was established to negotiate the treaty. Since then, the inability to adopt a programme of work in the Conference had meant there was no possibility to move forward. This had caused frustration, leading some countries to call for negotiations outside of the Conference. 

Laura Rockwood, Director of Open Nuclear Network, said she had identified, based on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts, that there were two options for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty’s governance structure: a stand-alone Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Organization, overseen by its own Executive Council and Conference of States parties; or a hybrid relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency, with either verification carried out by the Agency within its own structures or a separate  Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty verification unit within the Agency, but outside its decision making processes.  While the first option would avoid issues related to potential different membership from the Agency and solidify distinct purposes of the treaty, it would be resource intensive, and there would be membership and mandate concerns, as well as risks of duplicating activities carried out by the Agency and competition for its resources.

Ambassador Robbert Gabriëlse, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, providing an overview of the work conducted by subsidiary body 2 in 2018 on the ban of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, which he had chaired, said that, despite differences, common positions had emerged: a Cut-Off Treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable; it should also make a concrete contribution to nuclear disarmament. One of the most contentious issues had been the scope of the future treaty, with some delegations insisting that a treaty should focus on only banning the future production of fissile material.  Other delegations were more flexible and expressed the view that a treaty banning only future production was a minimum. Yet other delegations said future and past production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices should be included.

In the discussion, speakers said disarmament should be the top priority of the Conference.  They expressed their full support for the recommendation of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group, which called for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without delay in the Conference on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.  While reaching a consensus was difficult, this was not a reason to not start negotiations.  They expressed openness to renegotiating the mandate, as long as it did not prejudge the outcome by including existing stockpiles.  All States should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices.  The inclusion of existing stockpiles should not be a condition for commencing negotiations, some speakers emphasised.  The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was the topic most mature for negotiation in the Conference, they said.

Speaking were Iraq on behalf of the Group of 21, Portugal on behalf of the European Union, United States, Japan, Egypt, Canada, Argentina, China, United Kingdom, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Australia, Belgium, Norway, India, Ukraine, Germany, France, Iran, Pakistan, Switzerland and Russian Federation.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Conference concluded its thematic discussion on agenda item 2 of the Conference on prevention of nuclear war, focusing on nuclear risk reduction.

Speakers said the importance of well-functioning risk reduction measures could not be overstated, notably as regards cyberspace and outer space. The only progress that had been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament since 2010 was the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Speaking were Germany and South Africa.

The Conference on Disarmament will next meet at 10 a.m. on Friday, 21 May.

Conclusion of Thematic Discussion on Prevention of Nuclear War, with a Focus on Nuclear Risk Reduction

The Conference on Disarmament started its thematic discussion on agenda item 2 of the Conference on prevention of nuclear war, focusing on nuclear risk reduction, on Tuesday, 18 May, and a summary can be found here.

Speakers said the importance of well-functioning risk reduction measures could not be overstated, notably as regards cyberspace and outer space. The only progress that had been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament since 2010 was the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Recently, regressive steps had been taken by some countries, such as the announcement of an increase in nuclear stockpiles and on-going investment in nuclear modernisation programmes. All of this went against the spirit of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Thematic Discussion on Prevention of Nuclear War, with a Focus on Fissile Material Production

Opening Remarks by the President of the Conference on Disarmament

Ambassador YURI BORISSOV STERK of Bulgaria, President of the Conference on Disarmament, said the possibility of reaching agreement on an international regulatory framework dealing with the production of fissile material had been in the focus of the international community for quite some time. More than a quarter of a century had elapsed since then, and yet there was no sign on the horizon of anything close to a legally binding instrument on fissile material production. In order to better understand the reasons for the current state of affairs and to inform a constructive discussion among Conference Member States on whether anything could be done to overcome the current hurdles, bring closer divergent views and positions, and outline a possible way forward towards a possible future agreement related to the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, the presidency had taken the liberty within the confines of its discretionary power to invite three distinguished panellists.

Presentations by Keynote Speakers

EMMANUELLE MAITRE , Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, recalled that there was little official data on fissile material, the two main holders of which remained the United States and the Russian Federation. Negotiating a treaty on fissile material had appeared as a low-hanging fruit in the nineties and the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution urging the adoption of such a treaty. In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament took up the mandate under the leadership of Ambassador Shannon and in 1998 an ad hoc committee was established to negotiate the treaty. Since then, the inability of adopt a programme of work in the Conference had meant there was no possibility to move forward. This caused frustration, leading some countries to call for negotiations outside of the Conference.

Amongst roadblocks and enduring challenges, there were procedural issues. Verification was the most difficult element. As regards stocks, the Shannon Mandate had been generally interpreted as leaving the possibility to define the scope of the treaty to the negotiation phase. With regards to the scope of the treaty, most agreed the scope of the treaty was summarised by the phrase “for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

Ms. Maitre added that think tanks, such as the International Panel on Fissile Material and the United Nations Institute on Disarmament Research, amongst others, had been working for 20 years to propose solutions, alternatives and scenarios. There was still support for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as it would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament by making the general trend of reduction of nuclear arsenals irreversible. It would formalise the moratorium of some countries on fissile material production and limit the pool of materials available for manufacturing nuclear weapons. It would also form an important step with regards to quantitative disarmament and be complementary with qualitative disarmament steps.

LAURA ROCKWOOD, Director of Open Nuclear Network, said she had identified, based on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts, that there were two options for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty’s governance structure: a stand-alone Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Organization, overseen by its own Executive Council and Conference of States parties; or a hybrid relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency, with either verification carried out by the Agency within its own structures or a separate Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty verification unit within the Agency, but outside its decision making processes. While the first option would avoid issues related to potential different membership from the Agency and solidify distinct purposes of the treaty, it would be resource intensive, and there would be membership and mandate concerns, as well as risks of duplicating activities carried out by the Agency and competition for its resources.

As regards the second option, Ms. Rockwood explained that if the International Atomic Energy Agency took on a new role of verifying an Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, including potentially through the creation of a dedicated unit, it would maximise its expertise on verification and be resource effective. However, there would be differences between the Agency's Board of Governors and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty membership that may cause problems. Further, the Agency had limited experience in States with unsafeguarded facilities. On the other hand, if the Agency carried out verification with oversight from the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Organization, it could adopt a structure similar to the Iraq Action Team. This would allow for decision-making and a governance of the treaty that would be specific to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and the Agency’s verification capacity and expertise would be maximised. There would also be drawbacks, as the context in which the Iraq Action Team was created was not directly translatable to a Cut-Off Treaty.

Ambassador ROBBERT GABRIËLSE, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament , providing an overview of the work conducted by the Council’s subsidiary body 2 in 2018 on the ban of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, which he had chaired, said that, despite differences, common positions had emerged: a Cut-Off Treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable; it should also make a concrete contribution to nuclear disarmament. One of the most contentious issues had been the scope of a future treaty, with some delegations insisting that a treaty should focus only on banning the future production of fissile material. Some had noted that with the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein, there was no need for a new mandate. Other delegations were more flexible and expressed the view that a treaty banning only future production was a minimum. Those delegations focused on the different categories of existing stocks of fissile material, arguing that some of these could be included. According to them, the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein left sufficient constructive ambiguity as to whether stockpiles were included in the scope or not. Yet other delegations said future and past production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices should be included. One delegation had said the Shannon Report had outlived its validity as a basis for negotiations.

Discussion had also taken place on the functional categorisation of fissile materials, and the issues of international transfer, acquisition and the treaty’s contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation. Another issue that required in-depth discussion was verification. Different verification approaches were considered, namely a comprehensive approach, a focused approach and a hybrid one, as well as the issue of sensitive information, the verification toolbox, and which bodies should be tasked with verification. On risk reduction, delegations had considered issues such as nuclear deterrence, strategic balance and the multilateralisation of risk reduction measures. They had agreed that further discussions on nuclear risk reduction were needed. In conclusion, Mr. Gabriëlse asked those present to comment on whether the work of the subsidiary bodies could be a basis for further substantive work in the Conference.

Discussion

Speakers said disarmament should be the top priority of the Conference. They expressed their full support for the recommendation of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group, which called for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without delay in the Conference on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While reaching a consensus was difficult, this was not a reason not to start negotiations. They expressed openness to renegotiating the mandate, as long as it did not prejudge the outcome by including existing stockpiles. All States should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices. The inclusion of existing stockpiles should not be a condition for commencing negotiations, some speakers emphasised. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was the topic most mature for negotiation in the Conference, they said.

Some speakers stressed that the aspired instrument should fulfil both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, which could not be achieved if fissile material stocks were excluded from its scope. An instrument that only banned future production was not a priority and would not represent any significant contribution to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Other speakers recommended that further work be undertaken on verification measures and other technical aspects of a Cut-Off Treaty, either in parallel to, or in advance of the negotiations. They said that no credible substantive steps remained short of starting Fissile Material Cut-Off negotiations.

Speakers said that the raison d’être of the Conference on Disarmament was nuclear disarmament and they should advance the work of the Conference from this vantage point. The question of fissile material was inseparable from nuclear disarmament. However, any treaty on fissile material should ensure both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and therefore must include stockpiles. Speakers supported negotiating a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices at the Conference that met the national interests of States. Any future treaty should address the issue of stockpiles, effective verification, and irreversibility. Some speakers said the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate venue to negotiate it and any attempt to hold negotiations outside it were not supported. Support was voiced for establishing a subsidiary body in the Conference on prevention of nuclear war as part of a balanced programme of work. Some supported the renewal of the work of the subsidiary body on fissile material.

Several speakers urged the Conference to immediately start negotiations on a fissile material treaty, noting that no issue, including the scope of such a treaty, could not be resolved during the negotiations. The consensus rule in the Conference ensured the national interests of all States parties, and all national concerns could be brought to the table during negotiations. A treaty on fissile material would contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reach a nuclear-free world goal. Any future treaty should address the issue of stockpiles, effective verification and irreversibility. Any treaty must also negotiate the definition of fissile material. Some said the International Atomic Energy Agency was the logical body to ensure the verification regime. A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would be an essential step toward nuclear disarmament. Some speakers said the Shannon report and mandate remained valid as a basis for conducting negotiations.

Some speakers said that the Conference on Disarmament should not wait any longer to advance exploratory work on fissile materials, while others urged the immediate launch of negotiations on a treaty, which would take the world a further step away from nuclear war. The question of the scope of the treaty could only be resolved in the context of effective negotiations. In the meanwhile, all nuclear-weapon States had a duty to maintain or declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear disarmament leading to global zero would only be possible through a step-by-step approach, and many steps needed to be taken. Some speakers noted that in view of the differing opinions on scope, the only feasible approach was the Shannon mandate as it left the issue of scope to be tackled in negotiations. The issue of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was mature and was the next logical step towards any progress on nuclear disarmament in general.

Speakers underlined the dangers of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear disarmament, noting that some States did not want to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and offered only marginal issues for the Conference to deal with.

Nuclear risk reduction was not a goal in itself and could not replace nuclear disarmament steps. The Conference should not continue to be held hostage to a single topic. Other speakers said it was insufficient for a treaty to simply ban future fissile material, it should also cover fissile stockpiles in some form or another. At the same time, this issue should not stop the start of negotiations.

CD21.022E