Conference on Disarmament Holds Thematic Discussion on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

The Conference on Disarmament today held a thematic discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Ambassador Salomon Eheth of Cameroon, President of the Conference on Disarmament, said the thematic discussion would centre on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Bassem Hassan, Member of the Group of Governmental Experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, said that there was a long-standing consensus that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was in the interest of all States and contributed to international peace and security.  There was an overwhelming and growing recognition that the existing international legal framework was not sufficient to address the relevant threats, especially with the exponential growth in the level of reliance on outer space technology and the number of outer space objects, as well as the increasing number of actors.  However, there were deep divisions over the way forward. 

Nathalie Archinard, Chair of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, said the Committee had been established in 1961 as a permanent subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly’s Fourth Committee. Its mandate included the promotion of international cooperation and the study of legal questions. It had developed the five United Nations space treaties establishing basic principles of international space law, as well as the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines of Outer Space Activities, which had been adopted in 2018 by consensus.

Laetitia Zarkan, Researcher with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said that when it came to threats to space systems, it was possible to talk about the destruction of satellites by missiles. One of the most complicated points to manage was the collective consequences of so-called "anti-satellite" operations, and she outlined guidelines in the event that this type of operation was carried out. All the verification and surveillance measures put in place in space did not change the fact that space objects designed for perfectly legitimate civilian purposes could also be used to disrupt or destroy other objects in space once they were placed there. 

Michael Spies, Researcher with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, provided a preview and overview of the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/36, on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” and the major points reflected across the various submissions, many of which referred to space systems. Where used, this term was inclusive of: (1) the space segment, including the satellite and launch vehicle; (2) the ground segment, including command and control; and (3) the data links between the two. Mr. Spies then turned to the characterisation of actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible, or threatening, and their potential impact on international security.

In the ensuing discussion, many speakers said that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter further militarisation of outer space or prevent its weaponization.  Some speakers, commending the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, said this instrument was a good starting point. Those criticizing it were only seeking to uphold their domination in outer space, notably through its weaponization, while ascribing these aims to proponents of the treaty, who never sought to impose on other States. Other speakers said they would consider proposals for space arms control in the Conference if they were equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhanced their national security, adding that they did not consider that the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space met these criteria. The two countries that authored the draft treaty had turned outer space into a warfighting domain.

Speaking were Kenya on behalf of the Group of 21, Canada, Sweden, United States, Italy, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Morocco, Argentina, Spain, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Germany, China, Australia, Russian Federation, Algeria, Republic of Korea, Venezuela, Egypt, India and the Netherlands.

The Conference will next meet in public at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 3 June, to conclude its thematic discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Opening Remarks

Ambassador SALOMON EHETH of Cameroon, President of the Conference on Disarmament, said today’s discussion would centre on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Keynote Speakers

BASSEM HASSAN, Member of the Group of Governmental Experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, said that there was a long-standing consensus that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was in the interest of all States and contributed to international peace and security. There was an overwhelming and growing recognition that the existing international legal framework was not sufficient to address the relevant threats, especially with the exponential growth in the level of reliance on outer space technology and the number of outer space objects, as well as the increasing number of actors. However, there were deep divisions over the way forward. There were three or four threat scenarios according to experts: space to space, when an outer space weapon was deployed against another outer space object; space to Earth; Earth to space; and Earth to Earth. The obligations envisaged in a legally binding treaty on outer space were: prohibiting the placement of weapons; prohibiting the use of force against outer space objects and/or systems; establishing that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted in a manner that hindered peaceful uses and a commitment to strengthen international cooperation; and finally an obligation related to verification.

Recalling that a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects had been presented in 2008 and 2014, Mr. Hassan said some had criticised it for, inter alia, lacking a clear verification regime. Such criticism was not compelling according to several experts: verification was not an end in itself, and this matter could be addressed during negotiations. The value of setting the norm should not be underestimated. The Group of Governmental Experts had presented a draft report in 2019, and there was also an ongoing attempt at developing a legally binding treaty led by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Finally, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution dealing with the rules of responsible behaviour, which, experts feared, promoted the concept of “responsible weaponization” that could undermine the creation of a legally binding treaty. The prevention of an arms race in outer space should be considered as a low-hanging fruit. The issue was not the lack of technical knowledge or technological capabilities, but mainly the lack of political will and the prevailing polarisation over the topic. It was important to acknowledge and maintain complementarity between the different approaches while avoiding the “all or nothing” attitude. Constructive engagement was needed, and possible gradual steps should be carefully considered.

NATHALIE ARCHINARD, Chair of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, explained that the Committee had been established in 1961 as a permanent subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly’s Fourth Committee. Its mandate included the promotion of international cooperation and the study of legal questions. It had developed the five United Nations space treaties establishing basic principles of international space law, such as due regard, non-interference, international consultations, liability, and registration. It had also developed soft law instruments, including the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines of Outer Space Activities, which had been adopted in 2018 by consensus. The Guidelines dealt with topics such as avoiding harmful radio frequency interference, registration of space objects, and new measures to manage the space debris population.

The Group of Governmental Experts’ report on transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities had been adopted by consensus by the group in 2013. It outlined measures related to information exchange on space policies, notifications on space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contacts and visits to space launch sites and facilities. It stated that coordination among multilateral organizations engaged in developing space transparency and confidence-building measures was essential. The Guidelines contributed to transparency and confidence-building - among States and among space actors. Information exchange and international collaboration contributed to transparency and sustainability in outer space activities: sustainability and security were two sides of the same coin.

LAETITIA ZARKAN, Researcher with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said that when it came to threats to space systems, it was possible to talk about the destruction of satellites by missiles. One of the most complicated points to manage was the collective consequences of so-called "anti-satellite" operations, and she outlined guidelines in the event that this type of operation was carried out: preventing the creation of debris, or else limiting it as much as possible by carrying out these operations in low orbit, for example, and in all cases, notify, communicate on these activities to prevent wrong perceptions or interpretations of these operations. All the verification and surveillance measures put in place in space did not change the fact that space objects designed for perfectly legitimate civilian purposes could also be used to disrupt or destroy other objects in space once they were placed there. It was not their characteristic that changed but rather their function, the way in which they were used. A satellite equipped with a grappling hook or a harpoon to move space debris could also be used to deflect a military communications satellite out of position. The line between what was a perfectly legitimate civilian capability and what was a military capability was quite fine.

Ms. Zarkan added that the traditional approach of disarmament and arms control diplomacy - looking at objects or capabilities and putting qualitative and quantitative controls on systems to remove the need for competition - was not exclusive. The other way to look at the factors of the arms race was to observe the behaviours or actions of different parties which could exacerbate tensions. The stakes were very high in space, in part because of the nature of the space environment and the potential consequences of errors of judgement, because objects were out of range once launched. Without increased transparency about space objects and their missions, it would be difficult to dispel perceptions about the threats these co-orbital devices or anti-satellite tests might pose. To conclude, in terms of space, it had emerged from the discussions that thinking about the future of the safety and security of operations was more than necessary.

MICHAEL SPIES, Researcher with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, provided a preview and overview of the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/36, on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” and the major points reflected across the various submissions, many of which referred to space systems. Where used, this term was inclusive of: (1) the space segment, including the satellite and launch vehicle; (2) the ground segment, including command and control; and (3) the data links between the two. On the identification of existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, Mr. Spies noted that a general distinction was also made between acts with temporary effects and those generating irreversible consequences. Particular concern was drawn to acts that could generate long-lasting space debris. Threats also included the use of space objects to attack terrestrial objects. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs had preliminarily grouped the sources of threats and security risks into three categories: general sources; systems and capabilities; and operations.

Mr. Spies then turned to the characterisation of actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible, or threatening, and their potential impact on international security. While submissions provided a robust set of examples for responsible and irresponsible behaviours, it should also be noted that some expressed concern about the possibility for subjective judgment in attempting to distinguish between the two. Examples of responsible behaviours included, inter alia: avoiding surprising or provocative actions; communicating in advance of high-risk operations; and refraining from deliberate and non-consensual interference. On the other hand, examples of irresponsible or threating actions and activities included, inter alia: development, testing, deployment, use of counter-space capabilities or the use of a space object to attack a terrestrial target; and operations that interfered with space systems, including military and situational awareness systems. As regards approaches to the development of norms, rules, and principles, many expressed support for a behaviour-based approach. It was considered that such an approach could lead to a legal instrument or be pursued in tandem. There was also support for continuing the traditional approach for preventing an arms race in outer space. The submissions reflected a rich menu of elements that could form the basis for norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviour, such as: affirming the applicability of international law; debris mitigation; and restrictions on various forms of intentional electromagnetic interference.

Discussion

Many speakers said that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter further militarisation of outer space or prevent its weaponization. The legal regime applicable to outer space did not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness. Some speakers suggested that the Conference should establish a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space as soon as possible, to start the negotiation of a legally binding instrument. On the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 75/36, some speakers encouraged all Conference Members – especially smaller, non-space faring and developing nations - to share their perspectives on how the resolution fit into their vision for a peaceful and sustainable future in outer space. The development of universally agreed upon norms would create momentum for more ambitious steps, including the eventual possibility of a comprehensive, verifiable, and legally binding regime. Other speakers said multilateral norms were needed in three areas, namely the destruction of space objects and similar deliberate actions that created space debris or in other ways had a strong negative impact on the space environment and other space systems, including kinetic anti-satellite weapons tests; rendezvous and proximity operations; and other, mainly non-kinetic, threats, such as cyber, against space systems that may damage vital functions of a satellite, disrupt space-based services, or in other ways jeopardise the safety of people and goods.

Speakers sought to draw attention to two different sets of irresponsible behaviour in outer space: behaviours of unintentional negligence in carrying out space activities with potential or indirect impacts on security, and behaviours stemming from intentional actions with direct impact on the security of space actors and its systems, products and services. Some speakers said they would consider proposals for space arms control in the Conference if they were equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhanced their national security, adding that they did not consider that the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space met these criteria. The two countries that authored the draft treaty had turned outer space into a warfighting domain. It was difficult to define “weapon” as regards outer space because all objects in space had dual-use nature, and this brought complexity to verification, speakers remarked. While acknowledging this challenge, other speakers said the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space clearly failed to meet it: it was not precise in its definitions nor complete in its scope or effectively verifiable. What was more, it only dealt with an exclusive type of threat, obscuring threats from Earth to space, or threats resulting from hostile or aggressive behaviour.

Speakers welcomed the behaviour-based approach, which seemed more sustainable as it could not be overtaken by future technological developments. It was suggested that seven types of activity would benefit from further, expert-level discussion: (i) destruction of, or threat to destroy, a satellite; (ii) use of direct ascent anti-satellite missiles; (iii) non-kinetic threats, such as lasers; (iv) threats aimed at creating loss of imagery/sight of space assets; (v) interference with position, navigation and timing signals from satellites; (vi) reducing the ability of a ground operator to control a satellite; and (vii) rendezvous operations and proximity operations. Turning to the work of the Conference, speakers urged the Conference to adopt a programme of work that would allow negotiations to start, and acknowledged that, until then, discussions would at the very least reduce misunderstandings.

Taking into account the dual nature of space technology, speakers said the legally binding instrument preventing an arms race in outer space should not negatively affect the right to develop and acquire technology and equipment for the peaceful use of outer space. Previsibility and transparency were urgently needed in outer space; the lack thereof increased the risk of miscalculations. Some speakers, commending the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, said this instrument was a good starting point. Those criticizing it were only seeking to uphold their domination in outer space, notably through its weaponization, while ascribing these aims to proponents of the treaty, who never sought to impose on other States. The behaviour-based measures were merely confidence-building tools; they would close the existing loopholes in the international legal framework. Other speakers underlined that the treaty was not incompatible with United Nations resolution 75/36. The intent of the resolution was to seek to moderate actions to enhance security and stability, not legitimise the weaponization of space, according to some who underlined the need to manage the twin dilemmas of uncertain intent and the dual-use nature of many space objects, which could not be achieved through prohibition measures alone.

New approaches were needed, notably to better address attribution issues, speakers said. They criticised forceful means wielded by some States to maintain their domination in outer space, while refusing to tackle the issue of the prevention of an arms race. Disunity and politicised aggressive statements were not the solution, speakers emphasised. Some speakers said mankind and all States had a right to explore outer space for peaceful means; all acts that went against this principle should be rejected, including the unilateral deployment of weapons in outer space. Others stated that outer space could be used for military operations within the confines of the applicable international legal framework. While calling for negotiations on a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, some said it should have a comprehensive scope that included four prohibitions that could be subject to verification regimes: a prohibition on the placement of any weapons, defensive or offensive, in outer space; a prohibition on any armed attacks against satellites or any outer space assets; a prohibition on any intentional harmful interference that interrupted the normal functioning of outer space assets; and a prohibition on the development, testing, and stockpiling of weapons that were specifically designed for the sole purpose of attacking outer space assets or being deployed or used as a weapon in outer space.

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