Verifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Executive Secretary
Ladies and Gentlemen
Dear Colleagues:

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Palais des Nations and to this exhibition to mark the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty – the CTBT – some ten years ago. Allow me first of all to extend a very warm welcome to Executive Secretary Tibor Tòth, who is an old friend of Geneva and particularly of the Conference on Disarmament – and of course, a good friend of mine also. It is indeed a pleasure to have you back – here in your “old environment”, but in your new capacity.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was the result of many years of strenuous multilateral negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament in this very Council Chamber, aimed at bringing an end to all nuclear test explosions. The ultimate purpose of the Treaty is to advance both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and in this way enhance international peace and security. The conclusion of the Treaty marked the completion of an important step in the ongoing process towards multilaterally agreed and verified elimination of all nuclear weapons.

In concluding the Treaty, States demonstrated their determination to put an end to over 50 years of nuclear testing – a period that witnessed over 2,000 test explosions. Since its establishment, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization and its Provisional Technical Secretariat have made strenuous efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty with considerable success. However, the challenges that impede the Treaty’s entry into force persist.

Yet, as the General Assembly stressed in its latest resolution on the CTBT in December of last year, a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The solid guarantee against the resumption of testing, backed up by confidence that any illegal testing would be detected, would provide many governments the assurance they need that the NPT regime is protected. Entry into force would restore confidence in multilateral security arrangements in general, and would boost efforts to negotiate further instruments towards nuclear disarmament, such as a treaty on fissile materials. Further delay in signature and ratification not only postpones this much-needed progress, but also increases the risk that nuclear testing would resume. It may even jeopardize an opportunity to advance further nuclear disarmament.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
This exhibition showcases the significant progress made in setting up the international monitoring system to ensure that the verification regime envisaged under the Treaty is ready by the time it enters into force. In its December resolution, the General Assembly welcomed these efforts – and I think that we can see why when we look around us here.

Dear Colleagues:
In its December resolution, the General Assembly stressed the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urged all States that had not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. The negotiations of the Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament highlighted the ability of this body to shape and move ahead the international disarmament agenda. Only last week, during its annual high-level segment, a number of dignitaries voiced political support for the work of the Conference. I hope that this support may give impetus to the early entry into force of the CTBT, as well as to the discussions in the Conference. This exhibition certainly serves to highlight the potential of the Conference, and I hope that it will provide inspiration inside the Chamber here beside us.

It is now my pleasure to hand over the floor to the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. Tibor Tòth.